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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the nineteenth century Colombia has had but
two major political parties. While historically exhibiting distinct
positions with regard to important political issues, there is some
question whether the differences between thern have not now all but
disappeared. Collaboration between these two traditional competitors
reached its structural zenith during the period known as the ''National
Front" (1958-1974) when both parties were constitutionally obligated
to evenly divide positions in the legislature and the bureaucracy,
while every four years alternating the presidency between them.
The implications of such an historical and structural context
upon the efforts of the Colombian government to consciously pursue
strategies of "development" are presently unclear. This dissertation
examines the role of the national government in modernization and
economic development. Two interrelated research targets were formu-
lated to illuminate this question. The first was to determine system-
atic annual variations since 1960 in four development policy areas--
politico-administrative, industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure.
The second was to evaluate the impact of political party affiliation
of key decision makers in the above policy areas. Together, the re-
search targets were designed to determine to what extent there have
been ideological variations in the actual policy outputs and their
implications for further development policy.
v
Using a functional classification of budget items, the study
traces the actual (as opposed to budgeted) expenditures of the Colom-
bian national government from 1961 to 1976. In addition to. politico-
administrative development policy, three sectors of economic develop-
ment policy are examined in detail.
Within the area of politico-administrative policy, the find-
ings indicate that while the Liberal and Conservative Parties tend to
agree, on the most general level, with the desirability for (or scope
of) active state involvement in the economy, there are differences be-
tween them in terms of preferred methods and administrative arrange-
ments within the public sector. Specifically, differences are mani-
fest over issues of decentralization, the role of planning and pro-
ject evaluation, and methods of financing the development effort.
Differences between the parties are also examined with respect to
emphasis given to the overall economic development effort, as opposed
to social, cultural, or administrative development.
Within the industrial sector, attention is focused upon dif-
ferences in strategies of industrialization. Included here are dif-
ferences not only in the actual scope of government involvement in
the industrialization effort, but also methods of involvement, in par-
ticular commercial policies such as balance of payments concerns, tar-
iffs, tax credits and rebates, export promotion, credit availability,
and exchange rate regulation. Particular attention is given to the
sources and consequences of Import Substituting Industrialization as
a strategy of economic development.
vi
Within the agricultural sector, most emphasis is given to the
role that that sector has played with respect to the industrialization
effort. Included here is consideration of government support for agri-
cultural export promotion, research and development, and agrarian re-
form. Particular attention is given to the role of the agricultural
sector as a source of foreign exchange.
Within the infrastructure sector, variations are examined with
respect to three areas—transportation
,
energy, and communications.
The implications of manifest patterns of support both within and be-
tween these sectors, especially transportation, are examined in light
of their contribution to the economic development effort.
The implications of systematic variations found in the above
policy areas are discussed with respect to their possible impact upon:
1) the alignment of internal political power relations; 2) the impact
upon other sectors of economic development; and 3) the political/eco-
nomic relationship between Colombia and the rest of the world.
vi i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT • iv
ABSTRACT
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS viii
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF FIGURES xii
Chapter
I. PUBLIC POLICY, POLITICAL PARTY AND IDEOLOGY IN
COLOMBIA 1
Determinants of Public Policy 1
Modernization and Economic Development 7
Political Parties and Public Policy 11
The State and Political Parties in Colombia ... 19
Sectors of Development Policy 32
II. THE STATE AS FACILITATOR OF DEVELOPMENT 44
Administration—The Directors of Development ... 49
Centralization Versus Decentralization 53
Planning and Program Evaluation 62
Banking and Finance 71
Conclusion 85
III. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 90
Sources of Industrialization 91
Strategies of Industrialization 106
Agriculture, Mining, and Export Promotion .... 131
Conclusions 141
IV. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 144
Transportation 148
Water transportation 160
Land transportation 163
Air transportation 168
Conclusions 171
Energy ]72
Communications
Conclusions ''°
viii
V. CONCLUSIONS 182
Politico-Administrative Policy
.
.
. 184
Industrial Policy 193
Agricultural Policy 199
Infrastructure Policy • 205
General Conclusions .
, 211
NOTES 217
BIBLIOGRAPHY 231
APPENDIX 246
LIST OF TABLES
1. Control of the Finance Ministry by Party during
the Frente 39
2. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Expenditure for Economic Development 40
3. Adjusted Ratio Between Public and Private Ex-
penditures on the Gross Domestic Product 51
4. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Expenditure Invested by Departments, Muni-
cipios, Etc 56
5. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Expenditure Invested by Decentralized
Agencies and Institutes 60
6. Adjusted Ratio Between Central Government Support
of Decentralized Agencies to Departments
and Muni ci pi os 61
7. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Project Evaluation 66
8. Average Adjusted Percent of Administrative Sector
Expenditure for Planning and Statistical
Analysis 68
9. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Taxation 75
10. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Domestic Credit Sources 78
11. Foreign Investment Proposals in Colombia,
1967-1974 80
12. Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Foreign Credit Sources 84
13. Patterns of Real Wage Changes in Colombian
Industry, 1951 -1964 116
14. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Promotion of Industrial
Exports 1^8
15. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Industrialization 130
16. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Agricultural Sector 132
17. Average Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditure for Agrarian Reform 134
18. Average Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditure for Agricultural Research,
Investigation, and Extension
19. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Mining Development 137
x
20. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Promotion of Agricultural
Exports •
. 140
21. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Infrastructure - 148
22. Average Adjusted Percent of Infrastructure
Expenditure for Transportation 154
23. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Transportation 155
24. Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Water Transportation 162
25. Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Ocean Transportation 162
26. Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Roads and Highways 166
27. Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Air Transportation 170
28. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Energy Sector 174
29. Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Communications Sector 177
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Dimensions of Ideology
, 15
2. Percent of Central Government Expenditure
for Each Development Area j 38
3. Comparison of Public and Private Sector
Contributions to the Gross Domestic Product 51
4. Percent of Consolidated Public Sector Expenditures
Spent by Decentralized Agencies 58
5. Percent of Economic Development Expenditures
by Sector 147
6. Percent of Expenditures for Infrastructure and
Economic Development Devoted to Transportation 153
xii
CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC POLICY, POLITICAL PARTY
AND IDEOLOGY IN COLOMBIA
Life's Single Lesson: There's
more accident to it than anyone
can admit to and remain sane.'
Determinants of Public Policy
The belief expressed above by Thomas Pynchon is undoubtedly
true with respect to both sampling designs and null hypotheses; its
validity with respect to public policy outcomes is not as undisputed.
As defined by Dye, not only are policy outcomes the chief output of
a society's political system, but on a larger plane, they express
the value allocations of that society. In Dye's words, policy out-
comes are "a result of forces brought to bear upon a system and
causing it to make particular responses ." The extent to which such
"forces" are of a political character is a sharply debated topic
among public policy analysts. Just because public policies offic-
ially emanate from a political authority (government) does not
necessarily mean that the political authority is the most important
force in determining their composition. Indeed, many political
scientists argue that the political authority represents the "system"
upon which whatever forces are important in a society impinge in
order to affect some kind of change (or, alternatively, to preserve
a condition which is subject to change).
1
The most important of such forces are usually found within
the realm of economics. The idea that economic conditions affect
political life in general and the policies of a government is not
new; the intellectual origins of such a proposition extend back at
least as far as Aristotle. Currently, this idea has its most devel-
oped and systematic expression in the writings of Marxists of all
varieties. However, the importance of economic factors in explain-
ing political reality is by no means limited to the left, as a
perusal of the works of Pareto, Michels, and Weber would testify.
In his pioneering study on the determinants of public policy out-
comes in the United States, Dye comes to the conclusion that overall,
the effects of levels of economic development are more important in
3
explaining policy variations than political system characteristics.
In fact, quite a few studies of policy making among the states and
cities in the United States have come to a similar conclusion.^
1 It is not only with respect to the United States that policy
variations have been attributed principally to economic factors.
For instance, Pryor, in his pathbreaking study comparing public
policy variations in six communist and six capitalist nations,
notes that "if the basic economic circumstances (in Marx's termin-
ology 'productive forces') are similar, it should not be surprising
that the directions taken [in policy] are also roughly similar."
Other works in the relatively unexplored area of cross-national
policy studies also indicate that economic variables are quite im-
portant in explaining variations in different types of policy outcomes.
3We noted above that policy outcomes are the result of forces
brought to bear upon a system. But just because the political
authority may better capture the essence of the "system" from which
public policy may emanate does not mean that there are not important
political forces which may act upon it or within it. Political
forces, like economic forces, also have an impact upon policy out-
comes. The exploration of this hypothesis in one particular con-
text -the Republic of Colombia—will be the central concern of this
study.
The idea that political forces affect policy outcomes has
been assumed in most political science research. It was not until
policy studies in the late 1960s demonstrated the importance of
economic variables that political scientists have attempted to dis-
tinguish systematically between the relative weight of political
and economic variables in explaining policy outcomes. Largely with-
in the ,subfield of United States state and local government, a de-
bate was begun in which such scholars as Sharkansky, Hofferbert,
and others have sought to reassess the balance between economic and
political forces.^ Perhaps the most significant outcome of this
reassessment has been the realization that while economic variables
are generally important in the explanation of policy outputs, so
too are political variables. This is especially true when examining
the influences of political and economic forces on certain specific
policy areas such as welfare benefits.
There has been more research in the area of cross-national
impacts of political variables in explaining policy outputs. Research
4in Latin America has been particularly instructive with regard to
variations in policy outputs by different types of political regimes. 9
The findings of these studies indicate that there are variations in
policy output among different regime types. They indicate that
while economic and social constraints have a definite impact on
defining the context of possible policy outputs, the former variables
in and of themselves give a very incomplete picture of observed var-
iations. Most would agree with Schmitter's conclusion that political
structural variables "are relevant to an understanding of the nature
of public policy in this region of the world [Latin America], defin-
itely more so than the more limited, homogenous area of North American
state politics." 10
Before one can judge the relative importance of economic or
political forces in explaining public policy outputs, an analytical
distinction must be made concerning the state and politics as explan-
atory variables. On one hand, the state itself may be said to con-
stitute a political force in the determination of policy. In this
case the state—any state—will constitute an independent variable
in any model of policy output. In such a conception the state, or
government of the state, is held to be important regardless of the
particular arrangements which might make up that government. An
example of this is the contention that the state in Latin America
has generally taken a more activist stance in matters of certain
types of public policy, especially economic development policy,
than
many other states in the liberal, democratic West.
5But the state does not exhaust the set of political variables
of potential relevance in explaining policy. States, like most other
interesting phenomena in society, are multi-dimensional. That is,
the specific structural arrangements peculiar to any state may be
as important in explaining policy variation as the existence of the
state itself. In other words, the political forces which are hypothe-
sized to affect policy output may be characteristics of the state or
part of its governing structure. The political characteristics which
define the structures of the state may be of more consequence in
analyzing policy variations than just the existence of the state
itself as a political force. The concept of the state itself as a
political force which affects policy output will be dealt with in
further detail below. The use as explanatory variables the concepts
of political forces acting within the state has been the norm for
most policy studies discussed above. The extent of their influence
vis a vis economic characteristics in explaining policy variations
is as much as anything an empirical question.
Much of the confusion as to the relative contribution that
political and economic forces make in explaining public policy out-
puts can be traced to three elements. The first concerns the oper-
ational i zation of the independent variables—political and economic
forces. In Dye's original conception, policy variations were ex-
plained using both types of forces, with one set of indicators rep-
resenting political system characteristics and the other representing
economic forces.
11 Dye himself later noted that the political var-
iables he used, all of which had referents to concepts important
in
6a pluralist conception of politics, may not themselves be the most
influential in the determination of public policy. 12 The use of
other types of political variables has produced better explanations
of policy variations, particularly in non-United States settings. 13
Independent variables of a political or economic nature must not
only be theoretically grounded but also relevant for the type of
policy being explained.
A second source of confusion is the operational ization of
the dependent variable. If we conceptualize public policy as con-
sisting of the outputs of a political system we are left with quite
a data management problem to say the least. It is necessary to
specify and distinguish between different types of policy outputs.
Lowi , for example, takes an analytic approach when he distinguishes
between policies which are distributive, redistributi ve , and reg-
ulatory. 14 Dye, on the other hand, takes more of a sectoral approach,
categorizing policies on the basis of functions which the policy is
designed to serve. 15 It is this latter approach which is used in
this study.
The final source of confusion in relating political and
economic forces to public policy outputs concerns the level of
measurement of both independent and dependent variables. All para-
metric statistical procedures of analysis are based on the assumption
that the data which is analyzed is at least interval in scale.
(Other properties which are theoretically required but often not
rigorously adhered to in practice concern the distribution character-
istics of the variables in the population being studied.
Such a
7requirement seriously limits both the type of data which can be
utilized as indicative of the independent and dependent variables
as well as the types of analysis which can validly be performed.
Many variables which may be considered important in explaining
policy outputs do not have natural (or at least accessible) refer-
ents or indicators which measure them according to the scale deemed
appropriate for the type of analysis being contemplated. The same
is true for policy outputs themselves. In most of the policy studies
cited above, policy output variables have consisted principally of
levels of public taxing, spending benefits, and services. In this
study the operational ization of the quantitative aspects of public
policy output is also based on government expenditures and taxation,
but instead of absolute level
s
, we have used sectoral distribution .
The significance of this distinction, as well as other aspects of the
operational ization and measurement of our independent and control
variables, is discussed in the Methodological Appendix.
Modernization and Economic Development
The public policies surrounding the issue of modernization
and how a society may become economically developed represent more
than just a measurement problem. In the Third World in general and
Latin America in particular, the second half of the twentieth century
has been marked by an increase in the levels of many variables con-
sidered indicative of economic development. But as growth rates,
urbanization, national income, productivity, and industrialization
have increased, so too has the role of the state. At the same time,
8there has also been growth in the belief on part of many that mod-
ernization is not necessarily a concomitant phenomenon of economic
development, especially if the former is measured by quality of
life criteria and the latter by growth rates of the Gross National
1 c
Product. Nevertheless, something labeled economic development
has been the driving telos of a multitude of public and private
actors in the past century. As ill-defined as it may be, the pur-
suit of this elusive concept has occupied the energies of countless
members of society employed in the service of the state. Latin
America in particular has utilized the mechanisms of the state to
encourage various types of economic production and expansion. In
short, political forces in Latin America have sought to influence
the course of economic development.
But economic development occurs neither in a vacuum nor with-
out historical antecedent. Both the form that such political forces
have assumed and their success in achieving developmental goals are
conditioned by this fact. Urbanization, industrialization, and
economic change on an unprecedented scale are characteristics not
only of the developed societies of the twentieth century but also
many of those which have been termed "underdeveloped." This is
especially true in Latin America and other parts of the world that
have been integrated into the world economic system since last century.
This world economic system is most often characterized by its dom-
inant mode of production--capi tal ism. In the West in general, and
Latin America in particular, virtually all changes in the arrange-
ments and techniques devised to produce material goods have come
9under the aegis of this system. Whether this is good or bad, de-
liberate or accidental, controlled or spontaneous is a matter of
continual debate among those who live in a world conditioned by its
existence.
One major portion of this debate concerns the extent to
which the ostensibly legitimate organized expression of the polit-
ical will --the state--is an autonomous actor in the processes which
characterize the capitalist system. Or put another way, to what
extent do the actions taken by (or in the name of) the state influ-
ence the processes of the capitalist system?
This is particularly important when we consider that the
purported result of the workings of this system is increasing mater-
ial prosperi ty--or economic development. As noted above, the concept
of economic development is an especially difficult one to define.
At its most basic level economic development represents the growth
of the material product of the system. The boundaries of the system
ultimately are defined by the context within which the system fun-
ctions—in this case the boundaries of the capitalist market. In
the twentieth century, however, there are another set of boundaries
which, at least in the sense of marketing rationality, are artific-
ially imposed—the boundaries of the nation-state. The boundaries of
this latter system have important implications not only for the fun-
ctioning of the entire world capitalist system itself. The boundar-
ies of the nation-state also serve as contextual boundaries within
which a given system of economic production must operate. In other
10
words, although capitalism is recognized as a world-wide system of
production, economic development can be defined in national terms
as wel 1
.
Within the context of a world capitalist system, the sit-
uation in which the nation-states of Latin America find themselves
is one of dependency. The increase in the literature devoted to
exploring this concept has mushroomed in the last decade. 17 Depen-
dency as used here refers to a structural condition defined in terms
of the actual relatinoship between particular national economic
systems and the world economic system. In the words of Cardoso,
There exists among the developed and underdeveloped
economies a difference, not only of the stage or the state
of the productive system, but also of function or position
within the international economic structure of production
and distribution: Some produce industrial goods; others,
raw materials. This requires a definite structure of re-
lations of domination to assure an international trade
based on merchandise produced at unequal levels of tech-
nology and labor cost. . . The idea of dependence refers
to the conditions under which alone the economic and
political system can exist and function in its connections
with the world productive structure.
In other words, the manuvering limits within any Latin
American economy are to a great extent set by the external world.
This is not to say that policy in a peripheral economy is com-
pletely "dependent" upon actions taken in the center or that policy
in the periphery is directed from the outside. But, it does mean
that the range of possible public policy responses to economic dev-
elopment problems is bounded by the conditions of dependency. This,
of course, will vary from country to country, not because there is
a difference in the "degree" of dependency but because the character
11
of dependency and therefore the limits within which to manuever will
vary over time and space. 19
The extent to which the boundaries defined by dependency
limit the ability of political forces to affect economic develop-
ment is a matter of disagreement. Furtado, on one hand, seems quite
pessimistic about the ability of political forces to affect indus-
trialization and meaningful development within the limits imposed by
Of]
structural dependency. Cardoso, on the other hand, denies that
economic development in a dependent context must necessarily lead
to stagnation; under certain conditions there may be "room for some
kind of associated capitalistic development. This "associated
capitalistic development" may or may not represent (or lead to) mod-
ernization as it is conceived by those who stress the aggregate
growth aspects of development. Much depends upon the extent to
which" increases in aggregate growth rates truly represent real in-
creases in material well being rather than more modern accounting
procedures, or the placing of a monetary value on production which
was previously "outside" the market. It is clear, however, that
especially in the context of dependency, the probability of such
development depends, among other things, upon a fundamental role
being assumed by the state.
Political Parties and Public Policy
The assertion that the state is important in determining
policy outputs gives little indication as to why a particular state
may affect the policies that it does. In other words, it does not
12
indicate the characteristics of the state which produce one type of
policy as opposed to another. The reasons commonly asserted by
political scientists to have an impact on this include class interest,
interest group interaction, rational weighing of alternatives, inertia,
and ideology. Furthermore, in Western democratic systems there
usually exists a formal political structure which allegedly serves
to combine some or all of these and produce some kind of coherent
policy direction. This structure is the political party system. In
the words of LaPalombara and Weiner, "Political parties and party
systems are not only the product of their environment but also in-
struments of organized human acition for affecting that environment." 2 ^
Political parties in contemporary Latin America represent an
interesting twist to such a conceptualization. It has been asserted
that historically, parties in Latin America have been weaker in the
political decision-making process than their counterparts in Western
Europe and North America. This is largely because parties in Latin
America have traditionally been dominated by the executive. This is
true not only for the overwhelming number of nations in the region
which have military executives but also those which have civilian
regimes. Furthermore, in the few nations in which they are permitted
to function, political parties have been classified as being "tra-
ditional," meaning that they represent the vested interests of small
ruling cliques and do not perform such "brokerage" functions as in-
tegration and aggregation.
24
This does not mean necessarily that
they have no impact on public policy; it does mean that the basis of
their impact would draw from sources other than brokerage functions.
13
Such sources may be economic and social as well as political.
It is the contention of this study that a party in power may draw
upon all of these sources to affect state action or public policy.
What is not clear a priori is the extent to which public policy out-
puts reflect a random as opposed to a systematic alignment of such
forces. A random alignment would be more expressive of the political
party as a broker metaphor. In this conception, policy implemented
by a party in power would reflect the outcomes of temporary and con-
tingent alliances of various forces. Such alliances would be highly
specific not only as to the type or character of policy but also its
scope and timing as well. As such, policy output would vary with
the nature of the alliances within the political party which came to
dominate at that particular time.
A systematic alignment, on the other hand, would be more
characteristic of political parties which to some extent adhered to
an ideology. The degree to which political parties in power reflect
ideological influences in their policies to a great extent depends
upon the definition of the term ideological. The concept of ideology,
as it is used in this study, follows that which Seliger calls an
"inclusive" conception:
What defines the inclusive use of 'ideology' in the context
of social and political theory and science is that it covers
sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends
and means of organized social action, and specifically pol-
itical action, irrespective of whether such action aims to
preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order.
^
Such a conception is broader than the more restricted use of the term
by Mannheim and Marx.
26
Instead, it is much more akin to what Convers
14
refers to as a "belief system." 27 In the inclusive concept, the
term "ideology" is applicable to all political belief systems; in
the restrictive conception, the use of the term is confined to
specific political belief systems. In Seliger's words:
In the restrictive use of the term, 'ideology' is reserved
for extremist belief systems and parties, or ideological
factors are held to be present in some and absent from
other belief systems, or at least they are assumed to be
more important in some than in others. 28
Under an inclusive conception, systematic policy outputs
of any political system can be said to reflect ideological pos-
itions. When discussing the relationship of ideology to policy
a further distinction made by Seliger is particularly important.
This is the distinction between two dimensions of ideology--a fun-
damental and an operative dimension.
[I]deology applied in action inevitably bifurcates into
two dimensions of argumentation: that of fundamental
principles, which determine the final goals and grand
vistas in which they will be realized, and which set
above the second dimension, that of the principles which
actually underlie policies and are evoked to justify them.
This second dimension of argumentation I have proposed
calling operative ideology. 29
In many ways there can be said to be an isomorphism between
Seliger's fundamental and operative dimensions of ideology and
Sartori's distinction between "rationalistic processing-coding" and
on
"empirical processing-coding," and Lindblom's distinction between
31
"synoptic problem solving" and "disjointed incremental ism." How-
ever, whereas Sartori's and Lindblom's conceptions are to a great
extent mutually exclusive concepts, Seliger's distinction is based
more on emphasis and centrality of what he calls "technical prescrip-
15
tions" which are "more or less directly derived from facts, i.e.,
from their descriptive and cl assificatory as well as from their
32
analytical and causal perception and presentation." In the fun-
damental dimension of ideology, on the other hand, central ity is
accorded to "moral prescriptions" which are "also predicated on the
description and analysis of facts, but they present a value judge-
ment on them which may run counter to and prevail over technical
33
norms." This distinction has been diagrarnatically presented in
Figure 1
.
Fundamental
Dimension
D = Descri ption
A = Analysis
I = Implements
R = Rejections
P
m
= Moral Prescriptions
P
t
Technical Prescriptions
Operative
Dimension
Figure 1. Dimensions of Ideology. [SOURCE: Martin Seliger,
Ideoloay and Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1976)
p. 110]
Although they both represent aspects of the same phenomenon
—
ideology--the operative dimension has particular relevance for the
study of the ideological forces affecting public policy, 'ihis is
true for two reasons. The first is that ideological differences
and
34
change first manifest themselves in the operative dimension.
The
second reason is that "even if change is inevitably
evinced in the
operative dimension, it is far from certain that change
will be
acknowledged overtly there, let alone in the dimension
of funda-
16
35
mentals." Inasmuch as policy variations can be explained by
reference to ideological forces upon political parties in power, it
will be from the more flexible and more "action" oriented operative
dimension.
The fundamental dimension need not change to accomodate
ideological variations in the operative dimension except in the
very long run. Differences in the operative dimension, therefore,
may be reflected in policy outputs long before they are reflected
in ideological fundamentals. This is especially true if policy
outputs are of a type which constitute only a weak part of the sub-
stance of the fundamental ideology. In other words, the more
distant in the past that a party's ideology was first formulated,
and the more variety of policy options which must be confronted by
a party in power which were not directly addressed in initial form-
ulations of party ideology, the less we can rely on pronouncements
concerning the fundamental dimension to reflect accurately the
actual ideological content of public policy outputs. Likewise,
the greater extent to which there is a distinct and systematic
variation in policy between different parties in power, the greater
the probability that such policy variations will reflect differences
in the operative dimension of ideology.
The oldest contemporary functioning party system in Latin
America is in Colombia. In fact, it is the only party system which
has maintained a basic two-party structure. Inasmuch as the Liberal
and Conservative parties have been a ubiquitous part of the
Colombian
17
political landscape for over a century, one would expect that they
not only have their roots deep in Colombian society but also serve
as viable instruments of public policy. In order to determine the
extent to which the political parties (and the ideologies embedded
therein) continue to have a systematic impact on policy outputs we
must first examine the relationship of the party structure to the
state itself.
At the most basic level this study is concerned with whether
there have been ideological differences in recent times between the
Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia as to who in society
is to benefit from state action (or inaction). The question as to
whether ideological distinctions have become irrelevant in distin-
guishing Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties has been ans-
wered by researchers in both the affirmative and the negative. Payne,
in particular, has been insistent in his contention that there are
currently no manifest differences between the Liberals and Conser-
vatives.^ Other researchers have not been so certain that ideology
can be completely dismissed as irrelevant in discussing Colombian
politics. 37 This is particularly relevant inasmuch as the structural
arrangements of the Colombian government since 1958 may have removed
other salient dimensions of conflict. Hoskin and Swanson, for ex-
ample, note that:
Two salient dimensions of conflict characterize the [Colombian]
party system, a government-opposition pole and an ideological
pole. . . Conflict centering around control of the govern-
ment traditionally has been more forceful than ideological
conflict, but this is changing, in part as a consequence of
the National Front, with prospects for increased political
and governmental instability. 38
18
The question of whether there are ideological differences
between Colombian political parties, and if so, over what issues
relevant to development policy, is the main thrust of this study.
To answer such a question meaningfully we must first examine the
extent to which the parties can be said to differ with respect to
their relationship to the state. As discussed above, to say that
the state is an important force in determining policy outputs does
not necessarily answer the qeustion of why certain sectors in
society will benefit more from that state intervention than others.
Nonetheless, to answer this latter question, we must first deter-
mine the extent to which the former is true. In other words, to
answer the question of whether the Liberal and Conservative parties
differ with respect to their distribution of state benefits while
in power, we must first determine the extent to which they differ
in their relationships vis a vis the state mechanisms through which
they will distribute such benefits. In the words of Seliger, "as
long as it is neither near total nor near m'll, it is not the amount
of government intervention but its purpose which preeminently ful-
fills the function of ideological differentiation of political
,..
„39
parties
.
It is to this former aspect to which we must first turn our
attention. The second aspect, whether policy variations can be
discerned in the purpose of state intervention will occupy the re-
mainder of this study.
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The State and Political Parties in Co lombia.
The ideal of a non-interventionist state enshrined in tra-
ditional capitalist thought has never taken strong root in Colombia.
The political mechanisms of the state have been an important part
of the economic environment since its independence. Furthermore,
this role was not the direct result of the Wars of Independence. It
has been argued that economic systems of the Spanish colonies them-
selves were the deliberate results of active intervention on part of
the Spanish state to transfer an economic surplus from the Colonies
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to Spain. Even if this were not so much the case with the earlier
Spanish monarchs, the situation became much more explicit with the
change from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule in the early eighteenth century
and especially the accession to the throne of Charles III in 1759.
Whereas 1 the earlier Hapsburgs may have been somewhat lax in their
view of the colonies as a major supplier of wealth for Spain, under
the Bourbons the instruments of the state were used in an unpresce-
dented fashion not only to organize the extraction of a surplus from
the colonies but also to effectuate the transfer of that surplus to
the mother country. Indeed, one observer goes as far as to assert
that "Bourbon policies in Colombia brought the advent of a truly
.,41
export-oriented economy.
It cannot be overemphasized that the emergence of the Liberal
and Conservative parties in Colombia did not occur in either a pol-
itical or an economic vacuum during the middle of the nineteenth
century. The period following the Wars of Independence marked the
20
fruition of earlier Bourbon colonial policies. The state apparatus
which existed during three hundred years of colonial rule was not
demolished with the Wars of Independence. Indeed, it may be argued
that in many important respects the state emerged from the Wars of
AO
Independence even stronger than before. In a sense, it was not
the Colombian state which was being captured by an emerging bour-
geoisie to facilitate its accumulation of surplus in the middle of
the nineteenth century; it was rather the emerging bourgeoisie
which was being captured by a changing state to facilitate national
integration and the creation of wealth. It is for this reason that
Colmenares argues that both the Liberal and Conservative parties
were more than anything, organized responses on part of both older
and emergent groups in Colombian society to the prospect of increased
43domination by the state.
Neither the Liberal nor the Conservative party was the result
of "like-minded men" banding together to express, via a political
vehicle, either the sentiments and proclivities or the arguments and
logic of an explicit ideology. Neither the Liberals nor the Conser-
vatives were interested in the building of new coalitions of support
among the masses through exposition of the "rationality," "economic
efficiency," "moral superiority," or "realism" embodied in their
respective party pronouncements. Instead, as Leal notes, after the
fall of the government of General Jose Maria Melo (1853-54), "party
differentiation was more clearly defined between the two major sectors
of the dominant class (which represented the two forms
of social organ-
ization of the time): the existing colonial latrfjjndja.
and the emerg-
21
ing mercantile capital
.
1,44
It was not until later in the nineteenth
century that this move was actually embodied in coherent systems of
ideology which were to allegedly serve as the raison d'etre for party
differentiation. 45
It was in this context, then, that the Liberal and Conser-
vative parties emerged. Colombia had been independent from Spain
for almost thirty years before a president came to power upon whom
we may place a party label. It was also during the rule of one of
the first "party affiliated" presidents, General Tomas Cipriano de
Mosquera (1845-49), that a marked change in the nature of the Colom-
bian state vis a vis society was affected: the adoption of a policy
of free trade and manufacturing and the abolition of the state
tobacco monopoly. Mosquera, nominally a Conservative, was followed
in office by General Jose' Hilario l_6pez, nominally a Liberal. L6pez
went e,ven further by promulgating the Reforms of 1850, which, in
addition to supporting the reduced tariff policies of his predecessor,
also enacted monetary reform, the expulsion of the Jesuits, the
emancipation of the slaves, and a land reform which provided for
the elimination of communal Indian resguardos (communal lands or
reservations)
.
The Reforms of 1850 were different from governmental policy
prior to that time in terms of their impact upon state and society.
It is true that the benefits of these policiy changes did accrue to
particular individuals. In that sense, a "Liberal" General L6pez
differed little from his "non-partisan" predecessors in rewarding
certain favored elements in society. But the individuals
who bene-
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fited from such changes were individuals unlike those who had been
rewarded with political spoils before. These were individuals who
represented a new way of thinking and who were impatient with the
fetters the state and society had heretofore placed on their actions.
With the same act of bestowing upon a group of individuals
certain perogatives and opportunities previously denied, the mechan-
isms of the state under both Conservative and Liberal administrations
following the Reforms of 1850 bestowed upon a class--a nacient nat-
ional bourgeoisie—the heretofore illegitimate right to engage in
trade and commerce for the benefit of the individual rather than in
the name of society or the state. While individuals demanded access
to markets and the opportunity to engage in trade, it was the state
which was the fount of such privileges. It was the state, then,
which consciously permitted the first direct commercial links between
a nacient Colombian bourgeoisie and the emerging colonial powers in
Europe, particularly Great Britain.
Economic growth based on direct state intervention on behalf
of the national bourgeoisie within a capitalist world context may be
traced at least as far back as General Mosquera and his Finance Min-
ister Florentino Gonzalez. The model of growth chosen--the direct
promotion of commercial agriculture oriented toward the world market-
provided a keystone of Colombian development policy which was to
emerge with varying intensity for more than a century. But what
is
important to note is the fact that the state, acting on
behalf of
private Colombian citizens (although in no way the masses),
provided
the policy tools with which to guide a mode of
economic development.
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The idea of an active state must not be taken too abstractly.
The idea of the state actively intervening to promote the expansion
of plantation agriculture is evidence of an active state. But that
same active state declined to become involved in industrialization.
After an initial attempt in the 1840s to spearhead an incipient
industrialization drive failed, the attempt was not repeated again
for half a century. Florentino Gonzalez, Mosquera's finance minis-
ter and architect of the state intervention on behalf of agrarian
and commercial interests, was a strong believer in the international
division of labor. The state, he believed, should limit itself to
encouraging the development of primary materials and agriculture
because Colombia "has not been called upon to become a manufacturing
nation." Citing three reasons which would be echoed all along the
next century of Colombian development, Gonzalez, in the early 1840s,
held that it would be foolish for the state to encourage such ven-
tures because: 1) Colombia lacked adequate capital and technical ex-
pertise; 2) it lacked a natural resource base to sustain industrial-
ization; and 3) it could not compete with foreign manufactures for
consumer allegiance in an open market. Gonzalez went so far as to
assert that consumers would prefer imported manufactures to those
produced domestically even in the face of protection guaranteed by
a high tariff.
The Conservative administration of President Mosquera and
his Liberal successors did use the power of the state for practical
ideological purposes. They created, almost singlehandedly, a national
bourgeoisie. Needless to say, the instruments of state power were
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not brought to the aid of all private individuals who sought it as
an ally. The nacient commercial and agri cul'tural bourgeoisie in-
itially found little in common with those attempting to begin a few
basic industries in Colombia. Particularly before the state patron
,
the standing of these two sectors was not equal. The question of
why the state initially favored commercial and agricultural interests
over those of industry and manufacturing is an interesting one, but
which cannot be answered here. What is important to note is that
the state did actually intervene to encourage economic development
and growth, and that the state action in this regard was neither
accidental nor incidental. The degree to which this intervention
can be seen as systematic and coherent in later years in Colombia is
as much a function of empirical investigation as it is of theoretical
construction. State intervention has been accepted by both the
Liberal and Conservative parties since their organization in the
middle of the nineteenth century. The extent to which there are
systematic variations between them with respect to their utilization
of state intervention in the middle of the twentieth century has
yet to be established.
From the Constitution of 1886 until the golpe de estado which
unseated Conservative President Laureano Gomez in 1953, political
parties in Colombia were accustomed to one overriding reality—the
party in power was also the country's largest patron . Control of
the state meant control of the national budget. This control was un-
hampered by serious restriction and served as a strong incentive to
take power seriously. If nothing else the century between the found-
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ing of the political parties and their temporary eclipse from 1953-
1957 had been a period of four mini
-hegemonies. The Liberal Party
from the 1860s until the 1830s used its decentralized, federalist,
free-trade constitutions to not only stake out a political ideal
but also stake out an economic reality. Decentralization and fed-
eralism did not mean that power was absent from the system, only
from the central government. At the departmental and municipal
level --the level of the local gamonales
,
casigues , and patronec—
power (and wealth) was sought and defended.
From 1886 to 1930, the Conservative Party, through its cent-
ral ist, grudgingly secular, unified, free-trade Constitution also was
beneficiary of the public weal. The concept of a unified state
having become a reality in structure, this epoch also saw several
attempts to institutionalize bipartisan party structures. The
Nationalist Party, founded by Rafael Nunez in the 1880s and the
Republican Union of 1909 both represented attempts to ameliorate
the effects of Conservative Party hegemony , upon the still existent
Liberals. All of these attempts were temporary and lacked a con-
stitutional basis. And most important, according to Dix, was the
fact that in all experiments with bipartisan governmental arrange-
ments prior to the National Front (1958-76), "one or the other party
was the clearly dominant partner, or it was tacitly understood which
one would emerge as such after a period of transition."
With the return to power of the Liberal Party in 1930, and
especially after the politico-administrative reforms of President
Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo's Revolucidn en Marcha begun in 1934, control
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of the state became at once more complex and more subtle. The po-
tentialities of power bacame even more attractive as the idea of
an actively interventionist state began to be expressed in non-
budgetary terms. Control of the state after several Constitutional
modifications in 1936 implied control not only over the budget,
which after all was limited in both its depth as well as its via-
bility, but also over an increasingly important generator of wealth—
the private sector. Always subject to one degree or another to the
power of the state, the private sector in Colombia finally became
worth noticing in economic terms during the 1920s. In the years of
unprecedented economic growth between the War of 1000 Days and the
First World War, the private sector of Colombia grew at a rate un-
precedented before or since in history. It was finally during the
1930s that the worth of the economy passed that of the national
budget. 48 In a sense, control of the state now meant not only that
the budget would be "on tap"; the power of the state could also be
used to help one's supporters prosper through the "free market" of
the private sector.
By the time that the Conservatives returned to power in 1946,
the state in many ways was quite different than that which they had
left in 1930. But while the state in the late 1940s was more power-
ful than it ever had been before, the party leadership of the Conser-
vatives still seemed to view it in somewhat antequated terms. To
control the state in 1946 meant not only to control the national
budget, but also access to the private sector to a degree
unpreceden-
ted in Colombian history. And to deny access to private as
well as
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public sources of wealth would be no less than an economic death
sentence.
The state, as an object sought by both the Liberal and
Conservative parties, was becoming more and more powerful and val-
uable. Control of the state began to imply even greater power in
both economic and political matters than it ever had before. The
instruments that a party possessed if it controlled the state con-
tinued to grow in importance even as the parties themselves would
be busily deciding how the spoils were to be divided. In one sense,
the state had developed more rapidly than had the political parties
which sought to control it. What is more, the country had developed
along with the state in ways unanticipated by the leaders in either
political party, but especially the Conservative. The conscientious
mobilization of urban labor by the Liberals (and later the Conserva-
tives) had produced more than the corporate units which would rep-
resent the voice of the aristocracy of the working class in the
councils of government. A genuine class leader had emerged and
fallen by 1948, and increasingly politics and conflict was being seen
in class rather than party terms. Colombia was becoming more indus-
trialized, more integrated into the world economy, more regionally
integrated, arid more aware of its situation vis a vis other Latin
American countries as well as the world.
That the state could function without the active partisan
participation of many important segments of either the Liberals or
the Conservatives was demonstrated by General Rojas Pinilla between
1953 and 1957. That the Liberal and Conservative parties
could
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function without formal access to and control of state mechanisms
was becoming less obvious as the years of the Rojas Interregnum pro-
ceeded. The Colombian economy was growing at an average annual rate
substantially higher than during either the Liberal or Conservative
administrations which preceeded it. The quasi-civil war called la
violencia which had been raging in the countryside since 1948 was
being attenuated after some 300,000 lives had been lost. Civil
liberties, while severely constrained due to the State of Seige which
was in existence throughout the entire Rojas period, were at a much
higher level than during the Conservative civilian government which
preceeded him. And many Colombians for the first time were beginning
to contemplate seriously the possibility of a future without either
the Liberals or the Conservatives with a formal stake in the oper-
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ation of the state.
It was this last trend which the leadership of both the
Liberals and the Conservatives perhaps feared most. It was becoming
apparent that it was the state, and not the political parties which
controlled it, that was important in the continued growth and develop-
ment of Colombian society. Indeed, it was becoming apparent that
the energy spent on the competition and conflict between the parties
was a luxury which many Colombians could do without; the state did
not need this sort of situation in order to persue economic growth.
In other words, as far as many Colombians were concerned the role of
the state in fostering economic development could be separated from
the role of the political party structure.
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But the political party structure which had evolved over a
century of conflict and compromise proved more durable than most
observers thought at the time. In a period of less than five years
the two parties which were literally at "arms" length from each
other developed a plan whereby they both would participate in the
management of the state— the Frente Nacional (National Front). The
Frente Nacional
,
or simply the Frente , was at least two things. On
a structural level it was a plan whereby the two parties shared formal
control of the mechanisms of the state, to the exclusion of all other
political parties or groups. On a metaphysical level it was a con-
sensus whereby the Liberals and Conservatives recognized that both
were facets of the same socio-economic heritage.
The structural aspects of the Frente were simple enough, pro-
viding for changes in the Constitutional structure which were ratif-
ied by a national plebiscite at the end of 1957. Three basic struc-
tural' changes were provided: 1) al ternacion , or the alternation of
the presidency between the two traditional .political parties; 2)
paridad , or equality of representation by members of the two tradi-
tional parties in all executive, legislative, and judicial bodies in
the Republic; and 3) a requirement for the decisions of all legis-
lative bodies to be ratified by a two-thirds vote. The al ternacion
provision was originally to have lasted for three terms or twelve
years. This was subsequently changed to sixteen years; the
paridad
provision was extended at the national level (although not at the
departmental and local levels) until 1978; and the two-thirds
re-
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quirement was eliminated (except in certain cases) in the 1968 Con-
stitutional Reform.
The structural changes embodied in the Frente were unique in
the annals of government structures. But their ultimate significance
was not so much in their novelty but in their "therapeutic" effect. 50
In other words, it provided relief from both the violence of the
civil war and the vagaries of a military government. In this view,
the Frente was an unqualified success in that it reestablished for
the Liberal and Conservative parties a role in the state. This pos-
ition is perhpas best summed up by Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, son of the
president overthrown by the military in 1953 and himself a presiden-
tial candidate in 1974:
The Frente Nacional is neither a structure nor a set of rules.
The Frente Nacional is not al ternacion ; it is not al ternacion
and pari dad ; it is not al ternacion , pari dad and the two thirds
requirement. It is not, in addition, a simple problem of
dates. It is much more than all of this: it is a system of
guarantees.
In many ways the structural aspects of the Frente provide a
unique opportunity to study the effects of political party ideology
in the execution of public policy. All important public offices
below the president—in the executive, legislature, and judiciary-
were equally divided among members of the Liberal and Conservative
parties. The only exception was the alternation of the presidency
every four years. Until 1968 the legislature was usually ineffective
due to the difficulty of obtaining the required proportion to
pass
legislation. Furthermore, the president retained quite a bit of
power in his ability to modify the budget, especially
through his
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ability to transfer funds from one account to another, and after
1968, the requirement that all bills dealing with economic develop-
ment policy must originate with the executive. 52 Such a situation
provided the president with a unique opportunity to engage in policy
making with the understanding that not only would he be unable to
seek reelection, but that the next president would be a member of
the opposite party.
Public policy outcomes in Colombia are the result of a
number of forces—both political and economic. One of the advantages
of using the period of the Frente as a focus when attempting to
assess the relative importance of each is that it provided "controls"
at the systemic level. The political structures in effect during
the Frente (and immediately thereafter) only serve to heighten the
visibility of the major political variation which did occur during
those sixteen years--the party affiliation of the president. Also
during this period Colombia became the first country in Latin Amer-
ica to develop a national plan for economic development. As noted
above, any development policies promulgated under such a plan (or
apart from a plan for that matter) would have to take cognizance of
the constraints inherent in Colombia's position as a dependent cap-
italist economy.
53 But regardless of such constraints, for a number
of reasons the Colombian political leadership felt it essential to
embark on a self-conscious, deliberate, and sustained effort to in-
crease the rate of economic growth. It is the sectoral beneficiar-
ies of this policy effort— the bureaucracy, the agricultural sector,
the industrial sector, and the infrastructure sectors—which con-
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stitute the bulk of this study. The principal question to be ans-
wered is whether there has been a discernable and systematic differ-
ence between development policy outputs of Liberal and Conservative
regimes in as far as these sectors are concerned.
Sectors of Development Policy
When speaking of development and modernization it is customary
in the West to think almost exclusively in economic terms. Most of
the literature concerning development not only in the Third World but
also the "developed" nations assumes that it is economic development
which underlies the transition from "tradition" to "modernity." It
is often argued that all types of development--pol i tical , social, cul-
tural, and so on--depend upon economic development, and indeed cannot
be considered as occuring in any meaningful sense until a certain
level of economic abundance has been achieved. It is not within the
scope of this study to debate whether all development is at its core
economic development. As it is used in this study, the concept of
economic development is much narrower.
Although the fullest concept of economic development is a
broad one, at its base is the idea that when productivity is in-
creased development will occur. Indeed, increasing productivity is
often the principal criterion for judging all types of development,
not just economic. The question then becomes, how does one go about
increasing productivity? Most approaches look at increased produc-
tivity as the result of lowering factor costs and increasing
output
per unit of input. There are several interrelated societal
compon-
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ents, sectors, and subsectors within which action may be pursued to
achieve this end. This study examines Colombian development policy
during the Frente period (1961-1976) with particular attention to
three of its aspects: 1) the role of the state in the definition
and execution of what its leaders consider to be "development;" 2)
the state's reification of that concept of development along its
principal dimension—industrial ization--and the strategies evolved
in the agricultural sector to aid in this transformation; and 3)
the state's policy with respect to the development of basic social
overhead capital or infrastructure in the context of both the dev-
elopment model chosen and the condition of structural economic depen-
dency.
The promotion of economic development through an active
policy of increasing industrialization has been the hallmark of
economic development policy since the turn of the century. One of
the principal incentives to persue economic development via indus-
trialization has been the desire to preserve foreign exchange. This
type of industrial ization—import substituting industrialization
( ISI )—has been particularly important since the Depression of the
1930s. The collapse of the world market demand for agricultural
and primary products at that time drastically limited the ability
of nations such as Colombia to earn foreign exchange from the sale
of rural products. This led to a scarcity of foreign exchange and
thus prevented Colombia from purchasing many of the manufactures
which it had previously bought on the world market. The solution,
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in simple terms, was seen as increasing the ability to produce domes-
tically that which previously had been imported.
Aside from providing tax breaks and other fiscal incentives
to the private sector to encourage this process, the active inter-
vention of the state can take two major forms. First, the state may
direct resources and investments to the industrial sector itself.
It may create or subsidize the creation of various types of manu-
facturing concerns, and maintain varying degrees of control over
them after their creation. A second means of active state inter-
vention is to establish special financial and credit institutions
expressly for the purpose of serving the private industrial sector.
This method, which in this study shall be called business promotion
(as opposed to the former method of state industrialization) is in-
creasingly popular in Latin America.
Regardless of which industrialization process the state may
prefer, a nation such as Colombia could never economically produce
all the manufactures it would need. Economies of scale, advanced
production techniques, as well as lack of favorable prerequisites
and conditions for industrialization all would make it imperative
(or at least much less costly) to import some manufactures rather
than attempt to produce them domestically. In Colombia, as most
of Latin America, the ability to earn foreign exchange depends upon
an overriding concern--the ability to export agricultural and pri-
mary material s
.
Historically, the principal export commodity in much of Latin
America has not been what is grown upon the earth, but what is ex-
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tracted from beneath it. Colombia today remains the world's prin-
cipal producer and exporter of emeralds, as well as a major producer
of gold and platinum. But mining in Colombia has never assumed the
importance that it has for Mexico or Chile, and its impact on either
earning foreign exchange or serving as a source of domestic savings
has been less during the period of the Frente than in previous decades.
Instead, the development of Colombian industrialization has predom-
inantly been due to transformations in the countryside involving
the cultivation and marketing of a perennial crop--cof fee. The
relationship between the two is clearly stated by McGreevey when
he notes that Colombia "began economic development through a process
involving mutual interdependence between export expansion and manU-
CA
facturing activity. 1
The other major component of economic development explored
in this study shall be infrastructure. A precise characterization
of infrastructure development is difficult. In one sense, it is
difficult to argue with the proposition that "Infrastructure dev-
elopment, far from being the exclusive concern of economics, cuts
across the entire devel operant process."
55 On the other hand, a more
restricted conceptualization must be sought if it is to have value
as an analytic tool for understanding economic development policy.
As it is used in this study, infrastructure refers to three sectors-
transportation, energy, and communication.
The first of these, transportation, is of particular im-
portance for economic development policy in Colombia. Historically
the difficulties encountered in providing a unified, coordinated
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system of transportation have been one of the major obstacles in
lowering the costs of production not only for the external market
but the internal market as well. Foremost among the difficulties
in developing a national transportation system has been the extremely
rugged nature of the terrain through which transportation lines must
run. This is particularly acute for developing a transportation
network which would serve the internal market. For this reason and
others discussed later, the transportation system in Colombia has
been principally oriented toward servicing foreign trade requirements.^
Energy, the second sector of infrastructure, becomes increas-
ingly important as the country proceeds along the road of industrial-
ization. Power production capabilities must at least keep pace with
industrialization if the latter is not to experience production
bottlenecks. And while the use of electricity, petroleum, and coal
are essential in the industrialization process, the demand for power
is also increasing as the country becomes more urbanized. While the
non-industrial consumption of electricity is not as crucial for econ-
omic development, the provision of electricity services is one of the
basic tasks of any urban community.
The final sector of infrastructure development is that of
communication. While not as fundamental for economic development as
transportation and power, the provision of a modern communications
network is necessary for other development to take place. For ex-
ample, an increased use of air transportation to overcome geographical
obstacles in land transportation requires an extended communication
37
system. Also, the efficiency of financial, business and other econ-
omic transactions depends upon smoothly functioning communications
networks
.
Taken together, these three sectors— industry
,
agriculture,
and infrastructure—constitute the targets or focii of the central
government's efforts in effecting economic development. Since at
least the decade beginning in 1960 the committment of the Colombian
national government to economic development (as contrasted with
politico-administrative or socio-cul tural development) has fluctuated,
but not widely. As can be seen in Figure 2 below, on the average
about 22 percent of the annual budget has been spent on programs
which have been classified as contributing directly to economic
development. Overall, it appears that during the years when the
Liberal Party controlled the presidency, especially during the years
of the Lleras Restrepo administration, economic development programs
consumed their greatest portion of national government expenditures.
Since 1971 this percentage has remained almost constant.
As will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, the
intervention of the state in the Colombian economy has been neither
new nor insignificant. In Colombia, the chief government official
responsible for coordinating and effectuating this involvement is
the Minister of Finance. Legally the finance minister has several
responsibilities, including 1) to direct and develop the fiscal
policy of the state; 2) collect and administer national taxes, revenues,
fees, and other sources of income; 3) supervise in the formulation of
the national budget and exercise administrative control over its
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implementation; and 5) participate in the formulation of policy
concerning international commerce and capital markets. 57 As such,
the portfolio of the finance minister is the broadest of all members
of the cabinet. The political party relationship between the pres-
ident and the finance minister throughout the period of the Frente
and until 1976 is presented in Table 1. As we can see, the party
affiliation has been the same as that of the president since the
beginning of the Lleras Restrepo administration. Regardless of party
affiliation, however, one would expect that the views of the presi-
dent with respect to the broad outlines of state intervention in
the economy would be mirrored by the finance minister.
TABLE 1
Control of the Finance Ministry by Party
During the Frente, 1958-1976
Fi nance
Minister
Lleras
Camargo
(Lib.)
Valencia
Tovar
(Cons.
)
President
Lleras
Restrepo
(Lib.)
Pastrana
Borrero
(Cons
.
)
Lopez
Michel sen
(Lib.)
Conservative
(# of Years) 10 0 4 0
Liberal
(# of Years) 3 4 4 0 2
Over the sixteen years under consideration, the Liberals have
tended to devote a greater proportion of national resources to economic
development policies. As can be seen from Table 2, the adjusted average
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proportion of national expenditures devoted to economic development
under Liberal presidents has been over 20 percent greater than under
Conservatives.
TABLE 2
Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Expenditures for Economic Development
Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 20.14 22.75
R = .627
Liberal
s
24.38 22.04
R
2
= .307
Partial Beta .56 .09
It should be noted here that in this table, as in all other
subsequent tables of a similar format, the figures in the body of
the table represent the average proportion of central government allo-
cations actually expended, adjusted for both the other independent
political variable as well as the economic control variables. More
precisely, the effects of the economic control variables—off icial
capital imports from abroad, the budget deficit in the previous year,
the anticipated budget receipts of the current year, and the contri-
bution of the public sector in the generation of the GDP—have been
accounted for or controlled statistically in the calculation of the
figures. Likewise, the effects of the other relevant political
var-
iable—party affiliation of the finance minister or president, de-
pending on the figure-have also been statistically controlled.
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Therefore, the figures presented do not necessarily represent the
exact expenditure distribution of Liberal and Conservative finance
ministers and presidents. Instead, they represent expenditure dis-
tributions from which the effects of our other possible explanatory
variables have been partialled out. (See Methodological Appendix)
Much of the variation in Table 2 above may be due to the
presidential administrations of Lleras Camargo and LI eras Restrepo.
In the period covered, both administrations were substantially
above the mean with regard to expenditures for economic develop-
ment. The administration of Lopez Michelsen, however, deviates
from this pattern. Not only was his performance in this areas
essentially the same as his Conservative predecessor, but also in
the last year under consideration he became the only president of
the Frente era to devote less than 20 percent of the national
budget to programs in the economic development sectors.
The continuation by Lopez of the relative de-emphasis of
government resource allocation to economic development begun by
Pastrana may be indicative of several things. One possible ex-
planation would be that as Colombia is becoming more "developed"
economically there is more need to devote national resources to other
areas in order to maintain thp levels already achieved. Another
possible explanation would be that the state is channeling its
support of economic development programs through official agencies
other than the national government, i.e., the departments and de-
centralized agencies and institutes. A related explanation would be
that the central government is restructuring its direct involvement
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in the economic development process along what Lowi would call "reg-
ulatory" instead of "distributive" or "redistributi ve" lines. 58
None of these explanations can be tested directly through
this study. The time series used in the study is not long enough to
discern any long term secular trend. Expenditure data of the depart-
ments and decentralized agencies are generally unavailable for the
earlier years of the study and are in a form which is only marginally
compatible with the data from the national government. At the aggre-
gate level, then, the importance of ideological differences in ex-
plaining variations which have been observed must be qualified.
Some clarification will be possible as variations in the specific
components within the economic development sphere are examined in
detail below.
Before we elaborate upon the particular sectors of economic
development policy and political party variation in it, we must first
examine more closely the concept of the state and its relationship
with the process of development. Following this discussion in the
next chapter, the remainder of the study will examine the active
intervention of the Colombian national government within the sectors
of economic development outlined above. It will explicitly assess
variations in economic development policy as measured by the commit-
tment of national resources by the central government during the
Frente period from 1961 to 1976. Particularly it will examine the
impact of the party affiliation of two actors--the president and
the finance minister— in economic policy decisions. It will assess
not only the relative strength that variations in party affiliation
has on explaining variations in policy but more importantly the
extent to which the Liberal and Conservative parties have actually
differed in their al locative decisions.
CHAPTER II
THE STATE AS FACILITATOR
OF DEVELOPMENT
The state has never assumed a completely passive role in
the process of development. The question of state involvement,
especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, does not
revolve around the issues of "whether" but "how much" and "how."
Even economists who are not noted for radical inclinations note
several areas in which active state intervention can be beneficial
for economic development.^ ^os t prescriptions for state involve-
ment which adhere to a "liberal" perspective focus upon activities
which provide basic public services and stability, as well as
support for growth-stimulating policies. The latter is often limited
to stimulating the growth of the private sector. Such a view of the
state's role in economic development can be summed up as "to simply
provide a framework within which economic development is possible,
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given the presence of active agents."
This model of state involvement in the economy is activist
only in a limited sense. Indeed, it may be argued that such a form-
ulation represents the state's involvement in any society; the state
does not have to be actively involved in promoting economic develop-
ment in order for it to subscribe to the state/society relationship
noted above. Instead, for the most part, the above functions may be
termed "executive" functions, or those which are "designed to fulfill
all the legal requirements of governmental operations and to maintain
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social stability." 61 The executive functions of the state provide
the essential basis for its further involvement in the development
process. In a sense, they refer to those governmental structures
which ostensibly permit the society to maintain its integrity and
evolve as a society. There are at least four basic executive fun-
ctions which must be performed in order to make a state viable within
a capitalistic framework. For convenience, these functions have been
grouped into "sectors;" within each sector, administrative and pol-
itical structures have emerged or been created purportedly to satisfy
the functional requisites of the society.
The first--the law and order sector—consists of those
structures which provide what is considered by some as the only real
justification of a government in the first place, stability and
security. The second--the administrative sector—consists of those
structures which provide the mechanism through which the state can
take part in the actual direction or management of the society. At
its most basic level this is the government itself. The third—the
finance sector—provides the mechanism for developing and organizing
the necessary resources to sponsor any kind of development in a mat-
erialistic sense. The fourth—what is called social overhead capital
sector— consists of those structures which provide society with the
necessary material environment within which development can take
place. It is within this sector that the state in Latin America has
assumed its most activist posture with respect to development.
Perhaps the principal lesson learned from the structural
-
functionalist school has been that most social structures are
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invariably multi-functional. In this context, the governmental
structures which have emerged in any of the sectors noted above
may perform in ways which satisfy parts of many functions. The
structures which have emerged in the above sectors are no exception.
In contrast to specifically executive functions as outlined above,
in Latin America the role of the state in actual practice appears
to be somewhat more activist or "managerial." At the broadest level
this study is concerned with what may be termed managerial functions
of those governmental structures which may have been developed in-
itially to satisfy executive functions.
The role of the Colombian state in economic development is
marked as much by the transcendence of the executive functions as by
their deliberate cultivation, although, it must be pointed out that
most development policy thrusts have been built upon the same gov-
ernmental structures which emerged to satisfy the executive functions.
For the purposes here, the precise division between what may be called
executive functions and managerial functions is unimportant. As a
general principle, the greater the state's active role in the pro-
mulgation of policies which have a direct bearing on economic dev-
elopment the greater will be its involvement in what have been termed
managerial functions. Of the four executive functions outlined above,
the last—social overhead capital --appears to be the most maliable
in terms of the state transcending from an executive to a managerial
function. As such, it will occupy the bulk of the consideration in
subsequent chapters.
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On the other hand, the first of the executive functions out-
lined above--stability--appears to be the least maliable in terms of
the state transcending the executive function. The existence of the
armed services and a national police force, the principal state
structures developed to satisfy the stability function, is undoubt-
edly an important aspect of the environment under which development
policy is promulgated. But its relationship to development policy
£ua_ policy is much less clear. The law and order functions of the
state, more than any other, represent the involvement of the state
in defining the context within which development will or will not
take place. But its influence is for the most part indirect with
respect to the state assuming an active or managerial posture vis a
vis the development process. Support for these structures may rep-
resent the division of resources which may have been more productively
employed in more specifically "developmental" areas, but there is no
way of assessing either the magnitude or the composition that such
alternatives may assume. The increased "production" of stability by
investments in the military, police, and legal institutions may
ultimately be developmental; but so too might the increased pro-
duction of morality by investment in religious institutions.
The two remaining sectors— those dealing with administration,
and banking and finance--have both executive as well as managerial
aspects. Furthermore, the executive functions which a^e satisfied
by government structures in these sectors are directly relevant to
the state's role as an active participant in the formulation and
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execution of development policy. As they apply specifically to
economic development, these two executive functions cast the state
in the role of facilitator. Or more precisely, the structures which
have evolved to address these functions in fact define the state as
facilitator of development.
The final sector—which includes what has been termed social
overhead capital --will be explored in subsequent chapters. State
actions with respect to the social overhead capital sector undeni-
ably have implications for its role as facilitator of development.
But there is sufficient evidence that in many of its manifestations,
support for the development of social overhead capital represents
not so much the functioning of the state as facilitator of develop-
ment as its functioning as an active agent or creator of development.
To summarize, this chapter will deal specifically with two
sets of structures, or sectors, through which the Colombian state
acts as a facilitator of development-- the administrative sector, and
the banking and finance sector. The former is concerned particularly
with the characteristics and nature of the government in its role as
active agent in the economic development process. In a sense, this
deals with the state as the "director" of development. The latter
sector is concerned particularly with the characteristics and nature
of the banking and financial structures—those structures which pro-
vide the wherewithal (principally financial resources) with which
the state may persue development policy. This sector, then, deals
with the state as "producer" of development.
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Administration—The Directors of Development
The administration, or direction of the state's efforts
with respect to development policy, is inextricably linked to the
"how" questions of development strategy. The "how" questions with
which we are concerned at this point refer to both the scope and
method of state penetration in the economy. There are three issues
within the administrative sector which have implications for develop-
ment policy. These issues revolve around questions as to the proper
or most efficient "mix" between: 1) public and private sector con-
tributions to development; 2) centralized versus decentralized ad-
ministrative arrangements; and 3) planned versus unplanned develop-
ment.
The first of these—the debate as to the best public/private
sector balance— has been considered as perhaps the most basic issue
of the state's role in development, especially in the United States.
The question here is principally one of scope. In a capitalist econ-
omy, the general rule has been that expansion of the public sector
at the expense of the private sector is to be avoided. Although
this may be qualified somewhat by consideration of the specific areas
into which the public sector may expand, for the most part this has
not been the criterion for judgement. The concept of development in
this respect is often seen as having the characteristics of a zero-
sum game—one sector can only expand to the extent that the other
sector contracts. Since the emphasis in capitalist development trad-
itionally has been the enlargement of the private sector, the ideology
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of development has invariably stressed the limits of public sector
involvement. In point of fact, the expansion of the private sector
has usually coincided with the expansion of the public sector. But,
it was not until Keynes that such a phenomenon was incorporated into
a specifically capitalist theory of development.
The growth of Colombia's public and private sectors during
the period under consideration in terms of their contribution to
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is traced in Figure 3 below. As
we can see, the percent of the GDP which has been generated by the
public sector (in terms of both consumption and investment) has re-
mained fairly stable except for a small spurt during the late 1960s
and early 1970s. During the last year under consideration, however,
the size of the government contribution had practically returned to
the pre-1968 period.
A ratio between the amount of the GDP accounted for by gov-
ernment expenditure and the amount accounted for by private expenditure
can be used as a rough estimate of the balance between the public and
private sectors. Table 3 compares Liberals and Conservatives with
respect to the average adjusted ratio between public and private com-
ponents of the GDP. After accounting for the effects of our covar-
iates, there is some ambiguity as far as differences between Liberals
and Conservatives are concerned. Liberal presidents tend to be as-
sociated with a larger ratio between public and private expenditures,
that is, public sector expenditures are larger relative to private
sector expenditures. By itself such a finding would indicate that
the Liberal Party is more inclined to use the mechanisms of the state
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than is the Conservative Party. Such a finding would coorborate the
contention by Dix that in Colombia, it has been the Liberals who
"have been more prone to look to legislation and government action
and to rely on its effacacy to solve social ills." 62 Unfortunately
the data also indicate that Liberal finance ministers tend to be
associated with a smaller adjusted public/private expenditure ratio
than Conservative finance ministers. In other words, Conservative
finance ministers seem to be more inclined to use the state than
Liberal s
.
TABLE 3
Adjusted Ratio Between Public/Private Expenditure
on the Gross Domestic Product
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
9.54
10.16
.32
10.74
9.48
.62
R = .944
R
2
=
.891
We are left with the question as to whose ideology is more
important here. The findings here indicate that variations in the
finance ministers' political party are more important in explaining
public sector support, (Beta = .62). Coupled with the finding above
that Liberal finance ministers tend to be associated with a smaller
scope for the publ ic* sector than Conservatives, this finding provides
evidence that Dix's hypothesis concerning state intervention may not
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have been as cut and dried as assumed during the Frente
. Of course,
we must remember that we are using gross public expenditures as a
measure of the size and scope of government involvement in the soc-
ity. Mechanisms of state involvement which require relatively small
amounts of expenditure are therefore underestimated. State inter-
vention which assumes the nature of licensing, regulation, and law
most likely require a smaller marginal financial committment on part
of the government than would direct government intervention. Indeed,
it is conceivable that state intervention via such non-fiscal routes
may be increasing in scope while the relative contribution of gov-
ernment expenditure to the GDP could be decreasing. The tendency
for Conservative finance ministers to be associated with greater
public sector scope may indicate not so much that support is more
extensive but that it is just more direct. Also it should be remem-
bered that while both parties have supported a strong private sector,
historically it has been the bureaucrats, not Liberals or Conservatives,
that "made up the most important force favoring a strong government,
consistent policy, and long-term programs."
Centralization Versus Decentralization
In structural terms, a strong, unitary central government
has existed in Colombia for less than a century. Although the need
for a central government has never seriously been questioned, debate
as to the form that the central government should take has been one
of the perennial issues of Colombian politics. Indeed, McGreevey
asserts that from the time of Bolivar until the War of 1000 Days at
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the turn of the century, this issue dominated political discourse. 64
What was at issue here was not so much the existence of government
but the relative balance between a national government and depart-
mental (state) governments. In short, the issue was one of a uni-
tary versus federal structure of political power. The issue was
settled de jure by the Constitution of 1886 under which Colombia is
still governed. It provides for a unitary central government with
very little authority and even less power delegated to governmental
units below the central government level, i.e., at the departmental
or municipal levels. The governors of the departments are appointed
by the president, and regular party membership in the departmental
assemblies (legislatures) is determined in large part by the respec-
tive national political party directorates. Therefore the actual
power which may independently be exercised by these sub-national
units probably is even less than the meager constitutional provisions
would allow.
Contemporary debate with respect to this issue in reality
revolves around two separate issues—devolution as well as decentral-
ization. Decentralization provides a structural alternative to cen-
tralized political power in which power is delegated to functional
units which, while still part of the central government, have a
substantial amount of independence. In the Colombian context the
decentralization of political authority has principally assumed the
form of official semi -autonomous agencies and decentralized instit-
utes. Devolution, on the other hand, refers more strictly to the
actual delegation of power from the central government to territorial
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units which represent smaller jurisdictions, such as departments
and municipios. It is this latter form of the decentralization
issue which has historically divided the Liberal and Conservative
parties in Colombia.
During the years 1863-1886, Colombia was governed under a
constitution in which the scope and power of the departmental and
municipal governments was even greater than that of the central
government. Furthermore, it has been asserted that the period in
which the departments and municipios in actuality exercised a sub-
stantial degree of autonomy extended from the Wars of Independence.
Inasmuch as Colombia's political parties were being formed precisely
in the midst of this transition, it is natural to assume that they
would reflect it if not dominate it. In this struggle it was the
Liberal Party that came to represent an ideology which favored a
more limited role for the central government.
The extent to which such an ideological position is rele-
vant in Colombia today is unclear. One method which may indicate
the extent to which such an issue has relevance in contemporary
Colombia is to examine the extent to which the central government
has relied upon departmental and municipal governments to carry out
policies. Table 4 examines the variations between Liberals and
Conservatives with respect to the extent to which investments on
part of the central government have been channeled through the de-
partmental and municipal governments.
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TABLE 4
Adjusted Percent of Central Government Expenditure
Invested by Departments, Municipios, etc.
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
11 .21
13.93
.16
11.54
13.04
.03
R = .212
R
2
= .045
As can be seen, on the average Liberal presidents have
channeled almost 25 percent more of central government expenditures
through the departments and municipios than have Conservative pres-
idents.
65 Likewise, Liberal finance ministers channeled 13 percent
more through the sub-national units than Conservative finance min-
isters. This finding supports the contention that, at least in this
area, rhetorical differences between Liberals and Conservatives based
on historical positions continue to be reflected in actual policy
a century later. Such a contention is mediated somewhat when we con-
sider that less than 5 percent of the variation in support for devo-
lution was explained by reference to both the political and economic
variables in the study.
As noted above, the issue of decentralization referes not only
to devolution but actual decentralization in which governmental
author-
ity for action is given to units which, while creations of the
central
government and ultimately responsible to it, function more or less
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autonoumously. The growth in this type of decentralization has been
phenomenal in recent years. Figure 3 illustrates the trend from
1965 (the first year in which data were available) in the percentage
of consolidated public sector expenditures which have been spent by
the decentralized agencies and semi
-autonomous institutes of the
central government. Inasmuch as these units are formally associated
with an existing ministry or administrative department, decentral-
ized institutes, autonomous and semi -autonomous agencies are tech-
nically part of the central government. Specific arrangements with
respect to ties with the central government vary from agency to
agency, but all are characterized by the fact that: 1) they are
more or less functionally specific, that is, the range of their
activities is defined in functional rather than territorial terms;
2) they have their own separate budgets and sources of revenue
(although it may be supplemented by additional appropriations from
the central government); and 3) they are administered or directed
by juntas di recti vas or boards which include both government offic-
ials as well as non-government personnel. Since the first one v/as
established in 1936 (the Instituto de Fomento Industrial --IFI , an
agency designed to promote industrial development), their number
has grown until by 1976 there were over 125.
No one is quite sure who or what is responsible for this
phenomenal growth. Fals Borda notes that during the administration
of President Eduardo Santos (1938-1942), "the Minister of Finance,
Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, promoted a policy of state intervention
and state capitalism with the creation of various decentralized
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official institutes." 66 In the view of Mejia G6mez, the tendency to
decentralize administratively was the inevitable result of deficien-
cies in the sub-national or territorial decentralization. 67 Re-
gardless of the ultimate cause, the relationship between these de-
centralized agencies and the central government is a fascinating
yet largely unexplored issue in Colombian politics.
As noted above, although decentralized institutes have fiscal
autonomy as well as their own sources of income (principally user
fees, special taxes, and other special levies) the central government
does utilize them for its own ends. Indeed, in 1976, over 80 percent
of the central government's own investments were undertaken by these
decentralized agencies. They are by far the more important of the
two methods of decentralization discussed in this section.
However, as can be seen in Table 5 below, the evidence as to
whether their support can be explained in terms of political party
is ambiguous. On one hand, Liberal presidents clearly tend to support
this method of decentralization more than Conservative presidents,
but on the other hand, it is the Conservative finance ministers which
are associated with the greater decentralized agency support. Since
variations in the party affiliation of both the president and finance
minister are about equal in their contribution to explaining the
level of support (Betas = .29 and .30 respectively), judgement as to
which conclusion is more valid is problematic. However, it should be
remembered that the same Carlos Lleras who was particularly respon-
sible for the first decentralized institutes in the late 1930s was
also president during four of the sixteen years under consideration.
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Furthermore, during his presidency, at least 31 new decentralized
agencies and institutes were established. It might be argued that
central government support for decentralized agencies was to a great
extent the reflection of this one individual's strong preference
rather than an ideological characteristic of the party.
TABLE 5
Adjusted Percent of Central Government Expenditure Invested
By Decentralized Agencies and Institutes
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
53.30
63.78
.29
66.46
54.94
.30
R = .323
R
2
= .104
One means of clarifying this ambiguity is to examine the var-
iation between support of the central government for decentralization
via territorial units (devolution) relative to decentralization via
functional units (decentralization). Table 6 presents variations
between the parties in the adjusted ratio between central government
support for decentralized agencies and support for departments and
muni ci pi os . The amount of support of the central government for
decentralized agencies relative to departments and municipios is
clearly higher among the Conservatives. In other words, functional
decentralization appears to be a much more popular route among both
Conservative presidents and finance ministers than among Liberals.
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TABLE 6
Adjusted Ratio between Central Government Support of De-
Centralized Agencies to Departments & Municipios
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Associ ation
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
9.85
7.71
.13
12.02
7.31
.27
R = .348
R
2
= .121
This finding tends to modify somewhat Dix's contention that
"[t]he Liberals as a party have emphasized the decentralization of
political and administrative authority."
68 Whereas the evidence
demonstrates that during the period of the Frente , the Liberals
have tended to favor devolution or the decentralization of political
authority, the situation is not as neat with respect to decentral-
ization of administrative authority. The decentralization of admin-
istrative authority, or decentralization by function, in one sense
still preserves the integrity of the central government. The extent
to which such decentralized institutes and autonomous and semi-auton-
omous agencies are able to really act independently of the central
government is unknown. But a functional decentralization of power
clearly represents an attempt on part of the central government to
gain the purported advantages of more specialized administrative
arrangements without giving up ultimate political authority. Be-
cause no one agency or. institute is able to act outside of the
narrow
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range of its charge, coordination and political direction must
originate at another level
--the central government. Whether such
coordination and direction is actually forthcoming from the central
69government is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, the fact that an
increased role for the state in the management of economic develop-
ment policy necessitates a change from the traditional mode of Latin
American government. Especially inasmuch as development is seen as
being a technical exercise rather than political, there is a need for
administrative structures which can accomodate the state's demands
for specialized knowledge embodied in the tfecm'cos without compro-
mising the effective overall management of development policy.
Planning and Program Evaluation
State intervention in the economy has seldom been accidental.
Especially in the case of Colombia, the intervention of the state
has been deliberate, intentional, and purposeful. This is not to
say that intervention has always been directed toward achieving a
particular goal, or that intervention has not sometimes been contra-
dictory in terms of its aims and its effects. With the change in
development strategy in the Latin American region precipitated by
the world capital crisis in 1929, both the tenor and the scope of
state intervention changed. Not only did orientation of development
change from hacia afuera to hacia adentro , but also the nature of
state involvement in the development process began to become more
"rational." In the words of Furtado, "The need to rebuild and
broaden economic infrastructures and the determination to exercise
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some control over the external sector prompted the first economic
programming experiments in the immediate post-war period. 70 From
these initial attempts on part of the state to direct more rationally
the conditions for economic development have emerged a contemporary
feature of all development strategies in Latin America--an emphasis
on planning.
There are basically two concepts which generally come under
this rubric—planning and program evaluation. The Charter of Punta
del Este in 1969, to which Colombia was a signatory, put a great
deal of emphasis on planning and program evaluation as indespensibl
e
elements in fostering economic development. 71 The former, which
deals more with long range macro-economic planning and forecasting,
will be dealt with later in the chapter. The latter is more specific-
ally related to particular development projects which are either con-
templated or actually in progress.
The basic idea of programming for development was popularized
by the United Nations and in particular the Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) under the directorship of Raul Prebisch. Al-
though the entire spectrum of planning and programming activities is
quite broad and complex, as it is used in this section, the concept
is comparable to what the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD, or World Bank) has called "preinvestment studies."
Briefly, program evaluation:
comprises the studies that are considered necessary to estab-
lish investment priorities, determine the feasibility of
individual projects, and define such changes in governmental
operations or institutions as may be required to insure the
successful implementation and functioning of investment projects.
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[They] cover the full range, from basic resource inven-
tories, sector surveys on a country wide scale, and
studies of alternative development patterns on a re-
gional scale, to the functional design, preliminary
engineering and financial or economic analyses re-
quired for specific projects. 72
The crucial element in program evaluation involves attempting
to incorporate as many elements of economic rationality into the
decision making process with respect to development as possible.
This involves at least two things— information and coordination.
The first of these refers to the central government, or an agency
of the central government, becoming aware of the particular pro-
jects which have been formulated to aid in economic development. It
has been observed that even at the ministerial level often there
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exists no systematic inventory of possible development projects.
Such an inventory would not only include a list of proposed pro-
jects. More importantly specific information is needed as to antic-
ipated costs and benefits of such projects as well as realistic
assessment of the feasibil i ty—both economic and pol i tical--of the
projects
.
The second element--coordination--refers to the balancing,
at least at the ministerial level, of competing projects. Often
many projects are designed to accopmlish a limited number of develop-
ment objectives. Since projects may overlap and duplicate one
another to a large extent, there is need to eliminate such dupli-
cation of effort. Also projects are often designed which embody
contradictory objectives. Of course, such contradictions may be
characteristic of the nature of the development process itself. But
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program evaluation at least provides decision makers with the
opportunity to become aware of such contradictions and to assess
their possible impact on both the project itself and the develop-
ment effort in general.
Evidence of the variation in political party support for
program evaluation is somewhat ambiguous. As shown in Table 7,
the average adjusted expenditure for program evaluation is slightly
higher under Conservative presidential administrations than under
Liberal administrations. At the same time, Liberal finance min-
isters have clearly favored the channeling of national resources to
program evaluation than their Conservative counterparts. The rel-
ative contribution of the finance ministers' party affiliation in
explaining the variations observed are substantially greater than
that of the presidents' party affiliation (partial Betas of .51 and
.10 respectively). On the basis of this evidence, we are inclined
to give more weight to the contention that the Liberals have tended
to favor the use of program evaluation in the persuit of economic
development than the Conservatives.
Such an interpretation will have further support when we
examine variations in industrialization and infrastructure policies
in later chapters. This is because the patterns of resource allo-
cation to program evaluation tend to be highly contingent upon the
specific nature of the projects being evaluated. Program evaluation
has most typically been applied to industrial projects as well as
certain types of infrastructure projects such as power generating
plants. Inasmuch as such concerns may be related to party affiliation,
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the committment of national resources to evaluating them may be
expected to vary likewise.
TABLE 7
Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Project Evaluation
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
1.67
1 .39
.10
.48
2.01
.51
R = .496
R
2
= .417
Whereas program evaluation refers to the technical rationality
involved in deciding whether a given development project or program
makes "economic sense," the idea of planning is much broader. Planning,
(as contrasted with project evaluation) is concerned more generally
with long-range macroeconomic planning or forecasting. It is, in
fact, this sense of the concept which one has in mind when it is
asserted that planning produces the overall designs for sets of pro-
jects which not only are not actually implemented but also are not
even intended for implementation. What will be argued here is that
planning is indispensible for the development effort not because it
guides that effort but because international funding agencies require
it. This speculation is bourne out somewhat when we consider the
fact that Colombia had the first social and economic development plan
in Latin America-the 10 Year Plan of December 1961; it was also among
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the first to share in the fiscal fruits of Kennedy's Alliance for
7 4Progress. 1 In addition to this plan, there have been three other
development plans in Colombia during the Frente and immediately
thereafter—one promulgated by President LI eras P.estrepo in effect
from 1969-1972, the "Cuatro Estrategias " of the Pastrana Borrero
administration, and another proposed by President Lopez Michelsen
in 1975. Throughout the period of the Frente
,
therefore, Colombian
development has ostensibly proceeded under the umbrella of a national
plan.
Of course this does not mean that Colombian developemnt has
necessarily been overly effected by such an umbrella. In particular,
long-range economic planning in Colombia has been subject to a
structural problem characteristic of many export oriented countries-
acute instability in export earnings. Coupled with the fact that
most development planning at the operational level (see above section
on programming) has emerged from the impetus of industrialization via
import substitution and international pressure, planning in Colombia
has tended to be both vague and inaccurate. Indeed, Griffin and
Enos argue that:
Colombia and Chile epitomize planning in Latin America. Where
plans exist, they are frequently prepared by foreign technicians
working with a few local advisors. The plans are essentially
technocratic exercises. The general public does not partici-
pate in choosing the plans' objectives, and as a consequence,
the plans enjoy little general support. The plans are not
implemented; nor are they intended to be implemented. They
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are documents prepared largely by foreigners, for foreigners.
Regardless whether one views planning as important for actually
guiding state intervention in the development effort, the presence of
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a planning effort has been indispensi ble for obtaining international
credit for the financing of development projects. Furthermore,
planning has had an actual positive effect in the rationalization of
pbulic investment as well as in the orientation of private industrial
investment. 77 While such benefits may not be the same as those which
would ideally accrue to a serious planning effort they underscore the
fact that something called planning has occupied an important part
in Colombian efforts to develop.
The costs of planning in Colombia have never been substantial;
on the average it has 'consumed no more than .2 percent of the govern-
ment's budget. Within the administrative sector of the budget, plan-
ning and analysis together generally account for less than 5 percent.
During the period of the Frente
, the Liberal Party has generally
spent a larger proportion of the administrative sector budget on
planning. However, as Table 8 demonstrates, after the effects of
the covariates has been accounted for, it is the Conservative Party
which has tended to give greater support to national planning.
TABLE 8
Adjusted Percent of Administrative Sector Expenditures
for Planning and Statistical Analysis
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Associ ation
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
5.59
4.37
.35
5.86
4.58
.35
R = .694
R
2
= .482
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Considering the adjusted percent of administrative expen-
ditures devoted to planning, we see that both Conservative presi-
dents and finance ministers have devoted almost 28 percent more of
the central government's administrative expenditures to planning
than Liberal presidents or finance ministers. Especially given the
Valencia administration's (1962-1966) antipathy to planning in
general, as well as LI eras Restrepo's vocal support for the same,
this is somewhat surprising. 78 But when we palce the concept of
planning into the Colombian context, several points must be kept in
mind.
First, planning as described does not include what we have
termed project evaluation or programming. As such, it is not as
tied to the development and feasibility analysis of particular pro-
jects which may be persued by the government. Instead, planning
here refers to central government efforts to provide forecasts of
probable future economic environments and national coordination of
sectoral plans which would optimize growth given the constraints
and opportunities illuminated by such forecasts. As such, planning
may be more of a vehicle for a particular type of administrative
control. The efficacy of such a control mechanism has been seriously
questioned in the general Latin American context. But the fact that
plans and forecasts which are developed may have little resemblance
to the situation as it actually prevails may not necessarily mean
that planning is unimportant—only that it is inaccurate. Given the
real constraints to accurate forecasting even in the developed coun-
tries, it should not surprise us that the plans developed for a
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country which has even less control over crucial elements in the
forecasting model (for example, the amount of government revenue
which may be anticipated in a given year) should be somewhat incon-
gruous with later emerging reality. Such incongruities should not
obscure the fact that the agency or agencies which are responsible
for formulating a national plan may in fact be important in spite of
the fact that the plan itself is weak. For example, in Colombia,
the Departamento Nacional de_ Planeacion in 1969 not only suspended
the approval of new investments in the financial sector but also
discouraged the classification of such things as technical assist-
ance, raw materials, and intermediate goods for Colombian industries
as capital--all because failure to do so could compromise policy
goals expressed in the national plan. In brief, planning does not
have to bo accurate in order for it to affect development policy.
A second aspect of planning should not be ignored when try-
ing to explain Conservative Party support. It was noted above that
the principal impetus for planning in both its programatic as well
as long-range aspects was not domestic but foreign. Much of this
impetus was not in the form of the logic or persuasiveness of the
arguement, but the logic and persuasiveness of the "bottom line."
International financing of domestic development programs has been
increasingly contingent upon the existence of a national planning
effort. Both the Agency for International Development and the various
United Nations agencies have required demonstration that development
projects which seek funding from them be part of a larger development
plan. Support for planning, therefore, may reflect a desire to "tap"
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international sources of financing development projects. At the
very least, nonsupport of planning may result in increasing diffi-
culties in obtaining international financial support, especially
from multi -lateral or bi -lateral loans and grants.
Banking and Finance
Throughout the period of the Frente, political and economic
leaders viewed the pursuit of economic growth as conditioned pri-
marily by a pursuit for capital. They saw the main obstacle to
development as lying in the inadequate supply of capital available
for development; this inadequate supply, in turn, was largely the
function of too low a rate of savings and investment (the two terms
were seen as largely one and the same). Furthermore, in those
sectors where the supply of capital was not seen as a problem, its
effective demand and use was viewed as inadequate for self-sustained
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economic growth.
Regardless of the alleged cause, the solution was seen as an
improvement in the growth as well as allocation of capital through
both the public and private sectors. The position of the public
sector in attaining this improvement is by no means clear. The
public sector, or more specifically the state, has always assumed
unto itself the responsibility of financing those investments which
are seen as necessary to further growth but are either too large, too
risky, or too unprofitable to be financed by the private sector.
Definitions of programs which would fit into any of these categories
is a matter of continuing debate and the choices which are made have
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have developmental implications, not only for the public sector
itself, but also the private sector. But regardless of the cri-
teria used, there has always been the assumption that the state,
at some point or another, would become involved in the creation of
capital via active sponsorship of development projects and programs.
This sponsorship can assume many forms in terms of organizational
structure, degree of involvement of organized or unorganized private
sector groups and so forth. But regardless of particular form,
virtually all policies involving active state involvement require
i on
the mobilization of resources for their attainment.
There are three ways in which the state can finance develop-
ment projects (or any other activity, for that matter): 1) through
current receipts and treasury balances; 2) through government
borrowing; and 3) through expansion of the money supply.^ The
relationship between the two latter techniques is quite complex and
has given rise to the long standing dispute between the monitarists
and the structuralists with regard to the causes and solutions for
chronic inflation. While it is not in the scope of this paper to
come to some resolution regarding this debate, it is the structural-
ist position which is more compatible in theoretical terms with the
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analysis in this study.
The extent to which the credit activities of the Colombian
government have assumed the character of "fiscal fission" of the
money supply is uncertain. For instance, Sheehan contends that the
Valencia government (1962-1966) financed its budget deficit by
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direct recourse to this method and "thereby helped increase the
money supply by 27 percent in the last three months of 1962. "° 3
The principal data base of this study does not differentiate
between credit financing which has come about through normal state
involvement in capital markets and financial institutions, on the
one hand, and credit financing which has come about through invol-
ventent in working the government printing presses overtime, on the
other. Therefore the extent to which credit has been "legitimate"
in the financing of state development efforts in Colombia cannot be
determined. What can be determined is the extent to which the state
has relied on equity type financing as opposed to credit type fin-
ancing for development. Furthermore, a distinction can be made be-
tween reliance upon domestic or internal credit sources as opposed
to foreign or external credit sources. The remainder of this chapter,
then, will be devoted to Colombian party variations with respect to
the type of financing actually employed during the period 1961-1976.
The oldest, and in the long run most important, method for
the state to finance its development policies has been the tax system.
Contrary to popular image, on the whole government expenditures in
Latin America have been financed on a "pay as you go" basis to a
greater extent than even in the United States. The extent to which
a nation is able to finance its expenditures without a deficit is a
function of both its fiscal capacity and its tax effort. In Colombia,
the fiscal capacity, or resources which can be taxed, are in some
ways atypical of Latin America as a whole. Of particular note is
that while indirect taxes (such as sales taxes and customs duties)
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remain a principal source of government revenue, they are not as
important in Colombia as elsewhere in Latin America. Instead,
direct taxes are used (albeit of a regressive nature) quite exten-
sively in Colombia. In fact, it is the only country other than
Brazil in which the corporate income tax is less important than the
individual income tax. 85 But while the structure of the fiscal
capacity of Colombia may appear to be relatively better grounded
than many nations in Latin America, the amount of revenue that can
be generated is extremely limited due to the low per capita income
of the country. Furthermore, the Colombian tax effort in tapping its
fiscal capacity has been somewhat lax. In spite of such character-
istics it has been observed that in comparison to other Latin American
countries Colombia has been quite fiscally orthodox and has not re-
sorted to deficit financing to the extent as has her neighbors. 87
The average adjusted variation between Liberals and Conser-
vatives in the percent of government income which has been raised
through taxation, as opposed to either domestic or foreign credit,
is presented in Table 9. From 1961 to 1976, Liberal presidents on
the average have relied on taxation based sources of government in-
come only slightly more than Conservatives (less than .3 percent),
while Liberal finance ministers have relied on taxation for almost
5 percent more government income than their Conservative counterparts.
In other words, the Liberal party has tended to finance a greater
proportion of its development policy from taxation; the Conservative
party, on the other h'and, has tended to rely more on credit.
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TABLE 9
Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Taxation
Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 79.69 77.25
R = .679
Liberals 79.87 80.93
R
2
= .462
Partial 3eta
This variation in part may be explained by changes in tax
effort and fiscal capacity. Two of the Liberal presidencies during
the period under consideration have been noted for their positions
with respect to the taxation issue. In addressing itself to President
Lleras Restrepo's economic policy, the U.S. Senate observed that "one
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of Lleras' major points of emphasis was a bill to curb tax evasion."
And the next Liberal president, Lo'pez, was responsible for one of the
most far reaching tax reform bills in Colombian history— a tax reform
which, at least as it was promulgated, implied a major shift in the
fiscal capacity of the tax structure. However, it should be noted
that the actual regressive nature of the Colombian tax system noted
by Currie (as opposed to its mildly progressive theoretical strucutre
noted by Musgrave) has probably exacerbated by some of the changes
promulgated by Lopez, that is, a much greater reliance on sales taxes.
Not all development programs sponsored by the government are
financed through current receipts and treasury surpluses. The most
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common mechanism to finance the remainder of the government's policies
fs through credi t— from either domestic or international channels.
Both of these channels will have an effect on the public debt struc-
ture, and the latter will have direct implications for the balance
of payments. The principal channel for domestic credit is the central
bank, although other institutions are becoming a more important source
of investment funds for both the public and private sectors—commer-
cial banks, special purpose banks, and financieras
. Other sources of
investment finance which may be important in other Latin American
countries, such as an organized securities market, insurance companies,
qn
and social security, are fairly unimportant in Colombia. Through
the requirement that commercial and special purpose banks as well as
financieras hold varying amounts of their reserves in the form of
economic development bonds issued by the government, the state has
ready access to a reliable source of domestic credit. Indeed, banking
institutions as a whole may be often less a source of private invest-
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ment capital than a source for government credit.'
The use of internal sources of credit to finance economic
development has long been encouraged by the United States. Indeed,
United States policy in Colombia has consistently "viewed the domes-
tic credit system of the country as the key tool with which to
channel development assistance into private sector production."
To the extent that domestic credit institutions are used as conduits
for bilateral or multilateral foreign assistance, the distinction be-
tween internal and external sources of credit can become a bit cloudy.
Furthermore, as Martin. has noted, in the context of multinational
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investments in Latin America the recent trend has been toward greater
and greater reliance upon domestic sources of credit.
Finally, it should be noted that who controls the domestic
credit institutions is by no means uncontested. This is in spite
of the fact that in 1975 a decree was issued which converted all
foreign owned banks to mixed status with 51 percent of the stock
held by Colombian nationals. Lombard, in a study of Colombian banks,
has noted that while foreign banks represent only about 10 percent
of all commercial banks in Colombia they actually control close to
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35 percent of its banking sector. Furthermore, it has been esti-
mated by the National Statistical Office, for example, that 45 per-
, 95
cent of the Corporation Financiera Col ombi ana is foreign capital
.
Foreign participation in domestic credit institutions, how-
ever, perhaps has its more important ramifications for private sector
financing. The extent to which the central government relies on
domestic financial institutions which may be highly influenced by
international concerns is quite complex and outside the scope of
this research. Since the central government relies not only on the
central bank, but also on other financial institutions for internal
credit, such a determination would be highly instructive in inter-
preting the findings presented in Table 10.
As can be seen, evidence as to systematic party variation in
reliance upon domestic credit for financing central government develop-
ment policies is mixed. On the one hand, Liberal presidencies are
associated with a higher reliance upon domestic sources of credit than
Conservative presidencies, but on the other hand, Conservative finance
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ministers are associated with a preference for domestic credit finan-
cing. Since the relative contribution of the finance ministers'
party affiliation in explaining the variation is substantially grea-
ter (Beta = .33) than the presidents' party (Beta = .11), we are
inclined to say that other things being equal, the Conservative party
tends to rely more on domestic credit resources than the Liberals to
finance development policies.
TABLE 10
Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Domestic Credit Sources
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
10.68
12.42
.11
15.30
9.84
.33
R = .678
R
2
= .460
This interpretation must be qualified by two points, however
The first is that since the finance minister is legally responsible
for matters concerning domestic finance (and all government finance
for that matter) we might expect that variations observed in prefer-
ences for finance source may be due less to ideological tendencies
than to demands of the office. A second qualification is that domes
tic credit financing has a direct impact (albeit at an unclear level
and extent) on domestic inflation. Especially in the latter half of
the period under consideration, this issue has become increasingly
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important. It was noted above that the data in this study cannot
distinguish between domestic credit resources which represent the
mobilization of actual private domestic savings for investment in
public projects from those which only expand the money supply.
Therefore, to assert categorically that the Conservative Party tends
to prefer domestic credit resources to finance developemnt may be
a bit misleading.
Colombian banks and credit institutions have never been the
exclusive source of non-treasury based financing of economic develop-
ment policies. The principal substitutes for the perceived shortage
of national capital for development have been private foreign invest-
ment and foreign credit. Historically the former has been more im-
portant, although compared to other Latin American countries there
has been "a history of relatively small interest in Colombia on part
of foreign private investors." Nevertheless, it has been estimated
that by 1966, United States based corporations were transferring four
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dollars to the United States for each dollar invested in Colombia.
In spite of both of these facts the Colombian government has
only recently taken an active role in the regulation of foreign invest-
ment. Beginning in the mid 1960s the Colombian government has steadily
increased its formal role, which culminated in the adoption of Decision
24, the "Statute on Foreign Capital," of the Andean Pact in 1976.
Prior to the adoption of a modified version of this convention in
Decree Law 444 of 1967, "there were practically no controls in Col-
ombia over foreign investment as such."
93 The controls introduced
established administrative criteria by which foreign investment
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would be judged—the most important involving assessment of the
investment's impact on the balance of payments. We can see the
gross effect on the rate of foreign investment proposals in Table
11 below. Of these proposals, $57,685,309 (U.S.) were approved in
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the years 1967-70. Considering the fact that this figure for
four years represents a 14 percent increase in the total amount of
foreign investment in the entire period 1917-1966, one may wonder
whether in fact foreign investment is as insignificant to Colombia's
domestic economy as is customarily assumed. Furthermore, Furtado
has noted that the "influence of foreign owned companies [in the
domestic economy] is no longer measured in terms of registered for-
eign owned capital but in terms of the volume of their sales." 100
This being the case, even regulations such as those now in effect
mandating 51 percent ownership of foreign enterprises by Colombian
nationals will not negate the fact that increased foreign financing
of development may increase "dependency" by a multiplier.
TABLE 11
Foreign Investment Proposals in Colombia,
1967-1974, Current U.S. Millions
Year
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Proposals 18,4 20,2 27,4
38-9 32,9 16,3 60,9 120,0
SOURCE: Amadeo Armendariz, Monopolios y miseria en Colombia (Bogota:
Ediciones Los Comuneros, 1 973)
, pp. 37-38.
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This dependency aspect of direct foreign financing of economic
development is not popular in Colombia. Yet, Colombian decision
makers continue to feel the need for foreign capital in order to
pursue those policies which are deemed necessary for further economic
growth. The principal mechanism that has evolved to take care of the
need for foreign capital, yet not increase the type of dependency
implied with private foreign investment, has been public foreign
assistance and credit--or "aid."
Economic assistance of this type can be distinguished from
other forms of foreign exchange flows such as private foreign invest-
ment in that "aid is essentially governmental ly provided either
through a bilateral arrangement between provider and recipient or
through some multilateral agency such as the World Bank or the IADB."^
Both the bilateral and multilateral forms of assistance are alike
in that they are used to finance particular development projects but
do not represent foreign "ownership" of whatever was constructed
using the funds. In other words, foreign assistance (as opposed to
foreign investment) is seen as being less onerous and dependency pro-
ducing. Indeed, this has been given as one of the important reasons
that President Lleras Restrepo had a clear preference for foreign
loans over foreign investment, especially for industrial development.
1
But, as Currie notes, "Colombians are inclined to overlook the process
of repayment of debt and to exaggerate the benefits received from
1 03
foreign borrowing.
The first such economic assistance mechanisms to be used on
a significant scale were bilateral aid programs—largely the result
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of Cold War policies on part of the United States. 104 The preference
for bilateral aid as a mechanism for escaping the dependency assoc-
iated with foreign investment may be somewhat misplaced. Since the
end of the 1950s until the middle of the Nixon administration, almost
all U.S. aid to Latin America has been tied to paying for imports
from the United States that otherwise might not have been imported.
This "tie-in," known as the criterion of additionally
,
significantly
reduces the actual aid component of this type of external financing.
1 '
Hunter and Foley estimate that about 75 percent of all bilateral
assistance is tied in some fashion, and the U.S. Senate note that
"the issue of additional ity was destined to become one of the most
vexing and complicated in the entire aid program to Colombia." 10 ^
In recent years multilateral financial institutions have
steadily increased in their importance as providers of external
development credit. This is in part due to U.S. policy and in part
to preferences of local policy makers. Indeed, this is cited by
Furtado as one of the two major recent trends in international
finance for development in Latin America.
107
A major attraction of
multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid lies in its allegedly
greater "independence." However, the extent to which multilateral
aid is more independent may easily be overstated.
It is true that the criterion of additional ity is no longer
an issue in multilateral aid, and that development capital can be
purchased from non-U. S. suppliers. However, that does not mean that
indigenous local suppliers will necessarily be able to satisfy de-
mands. Martins, for instance, argues that the "domestic" supplier
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which can most often step in to fill the demands are domestic sub-
sidiaries of multi national corporations. 108 The result of this
will be a shift in dependency from U.S. suppliers which may or may
not be affiliated with a multinational enterprise to domestic
suppliers which are often affiliated with or are subsidaries of
either U.S. or non-U. S. multinational corporations. What may be
preserved in foreign exchange by buying "domestic" can easily be
lost through both repatriation of profits to, and purchases of
production inputs from, parents of subsidiaries. Because of the
difficulties involved in measuring such a flow, as well as the
seemingly more domestic character of development capital, the
effects of such a shift are definitely more subtle and more dif-
,. . 109
ficult to assess.
One final point about both bilateral and multilateral
economic assistance is their penetration into the domestic private
capital market. It was noted above that foreign banks in Colombia
control a significant amount of the domestically available capital
for use by the private sector. Bilateral and multilateral insti-
tutions have also participated in the provision of financing to the
private sector in Colombia. The participation of U.S. bilateral
assistance in private sector lending in Colombia has been principally
through the Private Investment Fund.
110 The IBRD and the IADB, on
the other hand, have participated in private sector lending through
their support for private corporaciones financieras -
1 1
1
Regardless
of the particular institution, however, we must be wary of the claim
that the use of economic assistance provided by bilateral and multi-
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lateral institutions necessarily "frees up" domestic financial insti-
tutions to sponsor other development projects. The observed trend
for increased reliance on domestic sources of capital, particularly
by multinational corporations, may be partially the result of such
"laundering.
"
Evidence in this study as to whether Conservatives or Liberals
have been more sympathetic to foreign sources of credit is ambiguous.
Table 12 gives us the average adjusted variation in reliance upon
foreign credit as a source of development finance. The percentage
of foreign credit resources received by the central government is
25 percent higher among Conservative presidents than Liberal, while
it is about 7 percent lower among Conservative finance ministers.
Since the relative contribution of each in explaining the variation
is about the same for both the president and finance minister (Beta
= .17 and .15 respectively) we cannot judge using this criterion.
TABLE 12
Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Foreign Credit Sources
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
9.64
7.70
.17
7.44
8.00
.15
R - .875
R
2
= .766
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Secondary evidence is also ambiguous. Boyce and Lombard,
and the Conservative newspaper El Siglo
, have observed that the
Conservative Party is generally more favorable to foreign invest-
11?
merit that the Liberal Party. Mt This does not, however, distinguish
between foreign investment and foreign assistance. To the extent that
Conservative support for the former implies support for the latter,
we would be inclined to give more weight to the variation shown in
the presidential party affiliation. On the other hand, it should
not be forgotten that the U.S. Senate has noted that Liberals, espec-
ially under Carlos Lleras, have had a clear preference for foreign
loans over foreign investment. But while this speaks to the distin-
ction made between the two principal types of foreign financing of
development, it does not address the question of whether such foreign
loans and credits are to be preferred to domestic credit or taxation,
or whether the preference for foreign credit is also shared by Conser-
vatives. In brief, there is not enough evidence either way to assert
that either the Liberals or the Conservatives have tended to favor
systematically the use of foreign sources of credit to finance Colom-
bian development policies during the Frente period.
Conclusions
It is clear that the issues which characterize what we have
called the executive functions of the state have not been settled in
Colombia. Within what we have called the administrative sector,
evidence indicates that with respect to the broadest issue--the
delimitation of public and private sectors— there may be broad
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agreement that the scope of the public sector should be substantial,
albeit in different ways. The Liberals seem to prefer to use the
state in a more managerial or activist sense, almost as an instru-
ment to attain specific economic and social goals. The Conservatives
also use the state, but perhaps prefer to emphasize more of its execu-
tive nature, relying on the bureaucracy and government to better enable
those Colombians who are in a position to affect change ostensibly to
do so.
The second issue within the administrative sector—decentral -
ization--al so evokes varying responses on part of the Liberals and
Conservatives. After distinguishing between decentralization by
territorial units (devolution) and functional units (decentralization),
we note that Liberals continue to support the former than the Conser-
vatives. Evidence as to support for functional decentralization was
mixed, although additional evidence supports the contention that
Conservatives are not as disinclined to use decentralization via this
route.
Finally, the third issue within the administrative sector-
pi anning--has been shown to be generally favored by Conservatives
more than Liberals.
Variations between the two parties with respect to the issues
in the banking and finance subsector of administration are not as
clear. The Liberal Party showed a tendency to rely more upon taxation
and use of current treasury resources for development finance. The
Conservatives, on the other hand, have been more ameniable to the
use of credit. But, variations with respect to the source of credit
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financing is much more ambiguous. Conservatives seem to favor domes-
tic sources of credit more than Liberals. But this support may be
modified by the possibility that these sources of credit may overstate
not only the "internal" component of the concept but the "credit" com-
ponent as well. Likewise, apparent Liberal preference for external
credit must be mediated by the fact that Conservatives seem to prefer
direct foreign investment as a source of development capital.
All of the executive functions of the state, especially those
discussed above, have serious implications for the role that Colombia's
government may assume with respect to economic development. But this
should not obscure the fact that their contours have come about
through political decisions .which have never been made "once and for
all." Such decisions define the context within which development
will or will not occur, as well as to whom the benefits and burdens
of development will accrue. However, they do not necessarily imply
what kind of material changes in the lives of Colombian citizens may
be brought about by state intervention. In a sense, we have set up
the characteristics of the state in the organizational aspects of its
capacity of "director" of development and its capacity of "producer"
of development. But economic development itself is more than just a
matter of state structure and process; it is also a matter of policy
substance. Up to this point we have not systematically examined what
"sectors" have been targeted by the Colombian political leadership
for the state's economic development efforts. In other words, the
real flavor of Colombia's development policy cannot be determined
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until we have examined not only the "how" questions of development
policy, but the "what" questions as well. It is to this latter set
of questions to which we turn our attention in the remaining chapters
CHAPTER III
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
The most distinguishing characteristics of human lifestyle
in the final quarter of the twentieth century are due directly or
indirectly to the industrial revolution. Colombia's position in
both a geographic and an analytic sense with respect to the indus-
trial revolution has been on its periphery. But whether at the
center or the periphery, the process of industrialization has come
to define the terms of both economic growth and economic development.
However, taken at the level of an individual state such as Colombia,
this has not always been the case. The concept of industrialization
may be accepted as essential for defining economic development, but
that does not necessarily imply that the process of industrialization
itself must be embraced within any one nation. The process of world
industrialization may affect both center and periphery but there is
no compelling reason why industrialization in the former must be
accompanied by industrialization in the latter. Indeed, the con-
comitant concepts of the international division of labor and com-
parative advantage would mitigate against such an occurrence. It
would be highly inefficient, at least from the perspective of those
in the center, for industrialization to proceed too far in those
areas which could serve as potential markets for the surplus produced
in the center.
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The position of Colombia is not atypical of Latin America in
this respect. Neither is the sentiment expressed by Finance Minister
Florentino Gonzalez in 1848:
The law [in Colombia] should not attempt to encourage in-
dustries that detract the inhabitants from the agricultural
and mining occupations.
. . Europe with an intellegent
population, and with the possession of steam power and its
applications, educated in the art of manufacturing, fulfills
its mission in the industrial world by giving various forms
to raw materials. . . We should offer Europe raw materials
and open our doors to her manufactures, to facilitate trade
and the profit it brings, and to provide the consumer, at a
reasonable price, with the products of the manufacturing
industry J ^
What caused the change in sentiment from what must be admitted
an extreme conception of the international division of labor? The
picture painted by Minister Gonzalez was not atypical of the time.
But the consequences of the very patterns of trade which were estab-
lished according to this concept of development, as well as the evol-
ving nature of the industrialization process itself, were to result
in pressures which Colombia could not resist.
Sources of Industrialization
The pressures to industrialize derived from at least four
sources: 1) free trade and the international division of labor; 2)
a real increase in national income and its distribution; 3) an increas
ing rate of urbanization; and 4) deliberate state policy.
The dynamics of free trade and the international division of
labor led to the creation of certain structures which have come to
define the particular economic systems of all Latin American countries
The international division of labor is based on an alleged efficiency
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inherent in such a scheme; it simply makes more economic sense to
order the productive capacities of a given nation-state to maximize
this efficiency. But this efficiency is based not only upon the im-
partial and invisible hand of the free market. It is also based on
the advantages and precedents accruing to the very structure of the
international division of labor itself. The sentiments expressed by
Minister Gonzalez did have a basis in fact. The increasing pace of
technological improvement in the center (principally Great Britain)
led to the economic growth of not only the center but also those
nations at the periphery which made use of their natural resources to
supply the center with raw materials. Especially in these latter
nations, economic growth heretofore had been both irregular and quite
slow.
The process of industrialization in the center led to marked
improvements in productivity per capita and real income. According
to one source, "the accumulation of technical knowledge is the greatest
1 1
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dynamic force in economic progress.' There can be no doubt that
the application of technological breakthroughs and improvements to
productive enterprises brought reductions in cost and even improve-
ments in quality. This application of science through technology to
productive processes has been at the cutting edge of improvements in
productivity. But this does not necessarily mean that nations out-
side of the industrialization process itself will enjoy the same
benefits.
It was not until the technological improvements wrought by
the industrial revolution in manufacturing industries were applied
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to transportation that the industrial revolution had its most lasting
impacts with respect to the structure of Latin American economies. 116
The first of these impacts was in the realm of international trade.
Up to this point, the laws of comparative advantage reflected prin-
cipally endowments of natural resources. Nations which, because of
climate, geographical, or other factors, could more economically
exploit a given natural resource stood to gain by doing so. But
with improvements in international shipping brought about by the
invention of the propeller and introduction of the iron hull around
the middle of the nineteenth century, the concepts of comparative
advantage and international division of labor both assumed new di-
mensions.
It was at this point that international trade changed from
being a mechanism affecting only a tiny portion of a country's pop-
ulation to a mechanism which would structurally alter entire pro-
ductive sectors of the peripheral countries. 1 ^ The extent to which
this increasing integration into world trade networks had an effect
on local economies varied from country to country, depending largely
upon the type of product produced for export. Generally the exports
of products which were either unrenewable, such as guano in Peru, or
produced within enclaves such as mining in Chile or bananas in Colom-
bia, produced fewer structural changes in the economy than those re-
quiring annual attention such as agricultural crops.
The cultivation and exportation of coffee substantially al-
tered the export production structure in Colombia:
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We may estimate that in the half century from the 1870s
to the early 1930s a fifth to a quarter of Colombia's
rural population was brought out of subsistence culti-
vation and into the market by coffee. No other substantive
economic change in Colombian economic history can have
been of such overriding social importance.''*
There are two implications in this shift. The first is that the
type of commodity produced for export did make a difference in
Colombia. Previous export commodities, most notably tobacco, had
failed to transform the structure of that sector. The second, and
possibly more important implication was that the transform of part
of the agricultural sector from a subsistence base to a market
base represented a real increase in national income. It did not
merely represent the shifting of existing production from an in-
ternal to an external market. In this sense the entry of persons
previously outside the market into the market generated demands
which previously were unknown. The impact on the initial indus-
trialization efforts by their entry into the market proceeds from
both the structure of demands generated by such individuals as well
as the increasing ability of local resources to at least partially
satisfy such demands. The key here is the concept of linkages, and
will be dealt with in further detail below when considering the
particulars of actual development strategy in the periphery.
Comparative advantage is both a cumulative and a relative
process. Improvements in technology are mostly built upon techno-
logical advances made at an earlier time. The improvements in pro-
ductivity built upon previous breakthroughs are real, but they are
not necessarily reflective of a natural superiority of one particular
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process over another. The more that a comparative advantage structure
is built upon technological progress, the more that elements of in-
ertia, luck, timing, and historical accident are important in explain-
ing it. The nature of technological progress is such that, theoretic-
ally, the technology itself is largely transferable. Indeed, it is
this aspect of modern technology which gives it its preeminent role
in explaining economic development. The treatment of modern tech-
nology as another commodity which may be bought, sold, traded, or
stolen is an important but often neglected aspect of economic develop-
ment. And it is the tendency to overestimate the flexibility in this
"commodity" which has led to the increasing questioning of the ability
to achieve economic growth predominantly through technology transfer.^
It is important that the transfer of technology applicable
to production has come to occupy a prominent position in most stra-
tegies of economic development. This importance derives partially
from the fact that the export product of the center is increasingly
technological in nature. This has not only comparative cost impli-
cations but also affects the entire structure of international trade,
particularly between the center and periphery. In simple terms, this
reflects the long term trend by which it takes an increasing quanta
of exports from the periphery to purchase a decreasing quanta of im-
1 ?0
ports from the center. This is commonly referred to as the
"Prebisch Thesis" for Professor Raul Prebisch, the former Executive
Secretary of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA). The Prebisch Thesis concerns the trend by which "the price
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relation turned steadily against primary production from the 1870s
until the Second World War."121 Both allegations and evidence con-
cerning the declining terms of trade have circulated since the develop-
ment of Lenin's concept of economic imperialism, and have been applied
specifically to the Latin American context by both Haya de la Torre
and Jose Carlos Mariategui long before Prebisch. 122 But it was not
until the prestige and weight of the ECLA was brought to bear upon
the problem that such an interpretation became "respectable."
Such an idea is contrary to the expectations of classical or
traditional economics and has been criticized from those quarters as
being somewhat less than accurate. One critic, for example, has
claimed that the Prebisch Thesis
:
is based on grossly insufficient empirical evidence, that
it has misinterpreted the facts on which it is based, that
the attempted explanation of the alleged facts is fallacious,
and that there is no presumption at all that the alleged un-
favorable tendency of the terms of trade will continue in
the future J 2 ^
Although the issue is still unresolved, it appears as though the evi-
dence supporting the Prebisch Thesis at present is not as "insuf-
ficient" nor is its interpretation as "fallacious" as the above econ-
omist wishes to believe.
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In fact, the perception that the Prebisch
Thesis is at least partially true has been at the core of many of
the industrialization policies which have been pursued in Latin Amer-
ica for the past quarter century.
As an impetus to industrialization efforts, the effect of a
perception of declining terms of trade should not be underestimated.
But neither should we underestimate the effects which the terms of
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trade, even if deteriorating over the long run, have had on the
national income of the countries in the periphery. This provides
the second principal source of industrialization pressures in Latin
America—a real increase in national income. It is through a rise
in national income brought about by trade patterns established in
the late nineteenth century that permitted the first industrialization
efforts in Latin America to take root.
According to Furtado the first phase of industrial growth in
every Latin American country except Mexico was based almost exclu-
1 or
sively on the growth of a dynamic export sector. Income has
accrued in every Latin American republic from the export of raw
materials and agricultural products. On one level this was the
essential characteristic of international trade involving Latin
America for centuries. But there are three crucial differences
which must be considered.
The first of these, already discussed above, involves the
extent to which structural changes in both the import and export
sectors of the periphery were brought about by the very dynamics of
world trade and the international division of labor. The second
difference was the fact that incomes accruing from the export of
raw materials represented a real increase in national income and not
necessarily the transference of income from sectors previously
engaged in production for a domestic market. In other words, the
export products of the periphery were able to tap into a surplus
1 2g
productive capacity which was previously unused. Both of these
phenomena—structural changes in the export production sector and
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the tapping of surplus production capacity for the purpose of expor-
tation—are applicable to Colombia. As noted above, the shift in
export production to coffee during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century not only generated substantial changes in the structure of
the Colombian economy but also represented a real net increase to the
national product. Colombia is not unique with respect to the success-
ful exploitation for export of a product which previously had been
ignored. All of Latin America, and in particular Brazil, has experi-
enced periods when previously untapped resources have been suddenly
subject to demand on the world market.
The reasons why such resources were previously unused are
numerous. Principal among them would be the fact that the changes in
manufacturing technology brought about by the industrial revolution
required raw materials of a type and scope which previously were un-
known. Also the reduction of transport costs brought about by the
application of technology to that sector brought about economies
whereby the costs of raw materials to the manufacturer could drama-
tically decline without a decline in the price paid to the peripheral
producer. Ultimately much of the emphasis upon exporting such pro-
ducts to the manufacturing center stemmed from an almost complete
lack of domestic demand for these products in the countries where
they were exploited.
It is perhaps somewhat specious to argue that the dramatic
increase in the periphery's exports v/as based on the fact that many
production factors for the extraction and preliminary processing of
the export commodity came from abroad. It has been noted that, for
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instance, at the same time that North American investors were invest-
ing in Chilean copper mines, native Chilean investors were purchasing
lands in Argentina. Not all of this can be explained by reference
to some inherent Latin proclivity to use scarce capital to engage in
speculative ventures in real estate rather than productive enterprises.
Similar occurences were rather common in Latin America during this
period. But in the words of one observer:
Availability of capital is not sufficient. It is necessary
also to have potential access to other factors by a par-
ticular sector of production, which means knowledge and
the absence of certain monoplies on knowledge, whether,
„
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these be in technology or in channels of distribution.
The existence of such monoplies or quasi -monopl ies on knowledge does
not detract from the fact that incomes did increase in the periphery
as a result of the emerging trade patterns. But it does illuminate
a crucial point as to the productive possibilities (or lack thereof)
to which this increased income may have been directed.
The case of Colombia gives evidence to support at least part
of this arguement. Foreign investment played a relatively small part
in the development of what proved to be Colombia's major export corn-
modi ty--cof fee.
128 However in the Department of Antioquia, where
much of the impetus for the cultivation of coffee as an export crop
came from, there were direct state efforts not only to promote research
in coffee cultivation and to subsidize initial experimental plantings,
1 29
but also to provide roads and promote railroad expansion. Some of
this state action was indirect, including the establishment and grant-
ing of concessions such as for railroad construction to foreign capital.
The extent to which the expansion of coffee exports during the nineteenth
99
century was due to foreign capital investments in transportation is
important but unclear. The relative influences of foreign investment,
state support, and private initiative in both the direct stimulation
of coffee exports as well as indirect stimulation via the transpor-
tation sector would have to be examined in order to arrive at a
precise conclusion.
Thus, the infusion of capital into the export sector--ei ther
foreign as with Chile's copper, or a mixture as with Colombia's
coffee--does not necessarily determine where the increased income
from that sector will be directed. This leads us to a basic dif-
ference between income generated from exports from the latter part
of the nineteenth century onwards and export income during earlier
periods. This is the fact that much (although perhaps not most) of
the export generated income was now settling in the nations of Latin
America themselves. Stability was coming to the area as the various
wars of independence receded further into the past and the nations had
begun to consolidate into sovereign if not viable states.
Income accrued not only to the states involved but also to
individuals involved in the trade. The issue of the distribution of
income resulting both directly and indirectly from international trade
becomes even more important when examining later industrialization
policies. At the time of the initial industrialization efforts, how-
ever, this issue was a bit simpler. There were basically two classes
of actors who directly benefited from these emerging patterns—the
state bureaucrats and the exporters. Tariff revenues continued to be
the most important source of governmental income. This was especially
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true after the abolishment of many special government monopolies and
concessions. In Colombia, from 50 to 65 percent of the national gov-
ernment's income from 1871 came from tariffs. 130 Although the Colom-
bian government itself did not actively become involved in the market-
ing of exports it was a direct beneficiary of the export trade. This
seems generally to have been the case throughout Latin America. What
the government did with its share of the export generated income was
usually to support the state bureaucracy and provide some infrastruc-
ture. The mix between these two varied from country to country, and
indeed from period to period in Latin America. The Colombian state
1
put relatively more stress upon the former than did, say, Brazil.
This may have been due to the relatively weaker position of the Brazil-
ian national government. Nevertheless, the point is that the state
qua state in no country used its share of income from the export trade
to actively establish and operate enterprises for industrial pro-
duction within its boundaries.
The merchants and those actively involved in supplying the
products for export also benefited directly from expanding income due
to trade. Just who made up these classes varies from country to
country, depending upon the structure of the agrarian sector, the
degree of urbanization, and even the type of primary products produced
for export.
132 This distribution is important inasmuch as most
classical treatments of industrialization are built upon the assum-
ption of a fundamental conflict between industrial izers and exporters.
Hirschman hypothesizes that when industrialization is spurred by an
increase in income and -market due to export expansion, the leadership
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of industrialization efforts has tended to be "domestic entrepreneurs
who were in no way tied to the importing interests." 133 This hypo-
thesis gives rise to a potential conflict of interest between those
involved in trade and those involved in industrialization. This con-
flict manifests itself principally over issues involving the tariff.
Generally both exporters and importers benefit from a lower tariff
and industrialists benefit from a higher one. But what may appear
logical from a profit maximization point of view often does not
obtain in situations where the latter is not the only function being
maximized.
Colombia appears to be precisely such a case. It is generally
recognized that industrialization in Colombia had its beginnings in
the Department of Antioquia in general and the city of Medell'n in
particular. McGreevey notes, however, that the industrial expansion
in Antioquia was often in the hands of the same individuals who were
1 34
prominent in coffee exportation. The social network of family,
relations, and compradrazcos provides several outlets for productive
enterprises. That several of these outlets may appear to be in
objective contradiction does not necessarily lead to objective con-
flict. At least with respect to coffee merchants and industrialists,
the Colombian situation was not one of two hostile classes in opposit-
ion, but two factions of the same class in cooperation. This cooper-
ation, McGreevey suggests, was one of the reasons that industriali-
zation was able to proceed during this period of expanding coffee
exports where it had been unable to gain a foothold during an earlier
1 35
period of expanding tobacco exports.
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The third factor leading to pressures for industrialization
was increasing urbanization. Reflective partially of increasing
national income as well as structural changes brought about by pro-
cuction for export, the phenomena of urbanization and industrial-
ization are almost inseparable. There have been great cities in the
past which have existed without industrialization, but industrial-
ization without urbanization is almost impossible. This may lead
one to conclude that it is the process of industrialization which
spurs urban growth rather than the other way around. This is espe-
cially true once the industrialization process is underway. But,
this arguement does not negate the importance of urban centers which
initially provided not only the labor but also a concentrated market
for the product of that labor.
The artisan sector in the periphery has been the principal
victim of the international division of labor. On the basis of 1870
census reports, McGreevey estimates that over 20 percent of the labor
force in Colombia were involved in artisan activities. Not only
did the drive to promote exports of agricultural materials and im-
prots of manufactures which characterized the late nineteentn cen-
tury lower the income of such groups, but also it substantially altered
1 37
the trends toward urban growth manifest in that period. But
although urban growth in Colombia was slower than most nations during
this period it was nevertheless significant. Between 1870 and 1884
the population of Bogota more than doubled and the population of
Medellfn increased over 25 percent. It is undoubtable that the
growth would have been even greater if official policy had not been
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to discourage industrialization. But the existence of increasing
numbers of people in urban areas led to initial pressures to foster
some type of industrialization. The size of the market, supply of
labor, and ability to "import" technology soon made it more econo-
mical to produce domestically some manufactures which had previously
been imported.
The fourth impetus to industrialization is as much political
as it is economic. The sovereignty of the nation state requires a
certain amount of independence not only in a political sense but also
in an economic sense. Dependence upon the world market for all manu-
factures is a dangerous route to take if a nation wishes to insure a
constant supply. Wars, disturbances, and depressions both in the
center and the periphery tend to disrupt normal trade flows. In cases
of war or depression in the center, the supply of manufactures for
the periphery may be drastically reduced or even cut off completely.
And this is assuming that the periphery would be able to pay for
such manufactures in the first place--a rather optimistic assumption
under the circumstances. Most likely such occurences in the center
would not only disrupt the flow of manufactures from the center but
also disrupt the ability of the periphery to export its raw materials.
This inability to export would have the same effect upon the supply
of manufactures in the periphery that an inability to import would--
a sharp reduction. And, if such disturbances occur in the periphery
a similar outcome is likely.
This does not even consider the normal fluctuations in prices
for both manufactures and raw materials. But it is especially the
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latter which is more important. Much more than the market for manu-
factures, the market for most raw materials and agricultural pro-
ducts exported from the periphery is variable at best. Wide yearly
fluctuations in the prices paid for such commodities, and the con-
comitant rise and fall in the periphery's income generated by such
exports makes even a modicum of stability an extremely unusual situ-
ation. Coupled with a secular decline in the relative terms of trade,
this condition makes both the short term and long term ability to
maintain a constant or increasing level of manufactured imports (not
to mention sustaining an acceptable rate of economic growth) almost
impossible.
Much of this may be implied from a tendency noted by Furtado
as being characteristic of the beginning stages of export oriented
growth
:
[R]ising productivity is accompanied by a simplification
in the supply structure of home-produced goods and diver-
sification in the overall composition of demand. '39
Both of these tendencies are probably to the disadvantage of the
periphery. A simplification in the supply structure of home-pro-
duced goods generally means increased specialization in the export of
one commodity—the commodity in which the country in question has the
greatest "comparative advantage." The diversification in the compos-
ition of the demand schedule generally means that the demand for
manufactures in the periphery will increase disproportionately to
the centers' demand for raw materials. As incomes increase, both
the quantity and variety of possible imported manufactures will ex-
pand. The ability to service this increasing demand depends, for the
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most part, on the ability to expand foreign exchange earnings— an
ability which, because of the evolving nature of the periphery's
exports, may become increasingly difficult.
In this way there is both a theoretical and actual lack of
control over external events which regularly have a profound impact
on the peripheral economy. Furthermore, this condition is exacer-
bated by a structural tendency built into the growth model itself
which would increasingly limit the options available to the nation to
satisfy internal economic demands. To have the policy options limited
by such conditions is naturally a cause of concern for most nations
in the region. Given not only the traditional power of the state
itself but also nationalistic sentiments which may be particularly
strong in circumstances of actual or perceived threats to indepen-
dence there is an impulse to try to bring under control as many of
these exigencies as possible.
All four of the sources of industrialization discussed above
are applicable to the Colombian experience. The evolving structures
of an international division of labor (including changing conditions
of comparative advantage and terms of trade) and the rise in actual
income in the periphery are probably the two most powerful factors.
The tendencies toward urbanization and independence, while important
in specific instances, are probably less important for the initiation
of industrialization efforts as for their maintenance and evolution.
Nevertheless, the structure of the industrialization effort in Colom-
bia during the Frente period has drawn from all sources. Now that we
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have given an answer to the question of "why" to industrialize, there
still remains the question of "how" (or how much) to industrialize.
Strategies of Industrialization
The four phenomena described above, individually and in com-
bination, have dramatically changed the life styles of Latin Amer-
icans in the past century. The processes of industrialization that
they have engendered mark one of the key axis around which economic
development policy, especially in the last half century, has irresis-
tably revolved. Most authorities date the beginnings of industrial-
ization in Latin America about the First World War or the Great De-
pression a little more than a decade later. The spurt of domestic
industrial activity at this time often has been labeled "Import Sub-
stituting Industrialization" ( I S I ) in order to distinguish it from
other forms of indigenous industrialization efforts which have been
in evidence in Latin America since at least the end of the nineteenth
century. Other authorities prefer to use the term ISI in a much
broader sense to encompass the particular nature of industrialization
prevelant throughout Latin American history. Implications of this
distinction will be discussed in more detail below. In general terms,
ISI refers to the process by which industrial goods and manufactures
which were previously imported by the nations in the periphery are
increasingly produced within the periphery itself. The sources of
ISI in Latin America are to be found in the four phenomena described
above.
107
Regardless whether one uses a broad or narrow interpretation
of the concept there is general agreement that in the most immediate
sense the pressures responsible for ISI have come from wars and de-
140pressions. World War I and especially the world-wide depression
of the 1930s had a lasting impact on the character of industriali-
zation in Latin America. As will be discussed below, prior to that
time most industrialization in Latin America had at its source the
expansion of national income from its trade on the world market.
With the collapse of that market during World War I and especially
after 1930, the nations of Latin America could no longer sell as much
of their export production to the center. The First World War sub-
stantially disrupted international trade through blockades of certain
nations in the center—particularly Germany. Exports of manufactures
from the center were also disrupted. Unable to import, some manu-
facturers in the periphery were able to reorient existing industrial
structures to provide some of the goods previously produced in the
center. The war did not last long enough and did not disrupt Latin
American trade seriously enough to cause a wholesale reorientation of
productive capacities. But it did serve to spur industrialists in at
at least some countries— notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—to
expand their production for the domestic market.
^
The world-wide depression which began in 1929 markes the
turning point in Latin American industrialization. The collapse of
the world market sharply curtailed the capacity for all nations to
import. In economies where trade was one of the main pillars of the
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domestic economy this event had tremendous implications. Industrial-
ization engendered by an inadequate capacity to import--ISI—was a
major response.
In its early stages, ISI was largely a more or less sponta-
neous reaction to the trade conditions extant after 1929. It must
be noted that not all countries in Latin America responded to the
crisis in the same way. The full impact of ISI was felt only in
those countries which had already possessed a significant nucleus
of non-durable consumer goods industries. 142 Furtado notes that only
three countries—Argentina
,
Brazil, and Mexico— had achieved this
state; Colombia was affected to a much smaller degree. The differ-
ence is relative, however. While the crisis of 1929 and subsequent
pressures for ISI may not have had the impact on the structure of
Colombian industry as it did in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, it was
not without effect. Currie noted in 1950 that in Colombia, "the
scarcities attendent upon World War I gave the first real impetus to
1 43
industrialization." At the turn of the century Colombia already
had such non-durable consumer industries as textiles, food and bev-
erages, and building materials. Currie notes further that "by 1934,
most of the present [1950] basic Colombian industries had been launch-
ed;" after that period most of the industrialization effort was con-
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centrated in expansion and diversification.
But in the same year that this statement came from the IBRD
mission headed by Lauchlin Currie to study economic development in
Colombia, another international agency, the United Nations' ECLA
headed by Dr. Raul Prebisch, published the following statement:
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Formerly, before the great depression, development in the
Latin American countries was stimulated from abroad by the
constant increase of exports.
.
. . These countries no
longer have an alternative between vigorous growth along
those lines and internal expansion through industrialization.
Industrialization has become the most important means of
expansion. '45
What had begun as a spontaneous response to a temporary supply
shortage engendered by war and depression became transformed into a
consciously directed response to a long term balance of payments
trend engendered by the structure of the international division of
labor. Citing evidence of a secular long term trend in the deterior-
ation of the terms of trade between the nations of the periphery and
the center, the ECLA proposed that the only solution to the chronic
underdevelopment of Latin America was for the conscious development
of public policies which would rectify this problem through state
action. Specifically, "the need is for the promotion of industrial-
ization through systematic interference with the balance of payments,
1 46
i.e., through protection and import controls."
This development marks a profound transition for IS I . Before
this time ISI had been seen primarily as literally a substitute for
imports which were temporarily cut off by scarcities in foreign ex-
change. Such scarcities and the export contraction which caused them
would, it was assumed, be alleviated by a return to peace and a re-
sumption of trade. This assumption proved to be false. Indigenous
industrial expansion did not simply contract along with the depres-
sion.
Hirschman has noted that the leadership fo the spontaneous
industrialization efforts which were based on these balance of pay-
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merits considerations tended to be "local importers and foreign ex-
porting firms." 147 In other words, industrialization was being led
by precisely those elements which were suffering most because of the
decline in trade. The commonly hypothesized conflict between those
involved in industrialization and those involved in commercial activ-
ities becomes somewhat blurred at this point. This fact, and the
fact that early ISI efforts were largely the result of spontaneous
reaction, may not only help explain why industrialization failed to
"whither" but also another characteristic of the industrialization
experience in Latin America: the fact that it appears to be "grafted
on" to the existing power configuration— the "living museum" metaphor
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of Charles Anderson.
The extent to which the industrialization of Latin America
has actually changed the fundamental nature of society there is by
no means clear. Obviously the fruits of industrialization are in
evidence in every corner of the continent. Whether it is good or
bad, Latin America is definitely part of a productive system which,
while ultimately consumer oriented, is geared to the reproduction
and growth of capital. The effect upon society of this committment
cannot help but to ultimately transform that society. In the words
of Robert Heilbroner, "the final impact of all technology is to be
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found in the social organization which it calls forth." The par-
ticular technology embodied in the industrialization process is per-
haps the most important determinant of the structure of all modern
societies. It certainly has been for the United States; and, at least
Ill
since World War II most structural changes which have taken place
in Latin America have been due to the manufacturing industry. 150
The question then becomes, how much has the museum really
changed with the introduction of this new exhibit? Has the addition
of industrial interests—both within the private sector and among
government leaders—substantially (and permanently) altered either
the structure of Latin American society or the balance among power
contenders within those societies? The answers to these questions
would most likely be in the affirmative, but with the qualification
that the changes have not been of a nature which may have been pre-
dicted on the basis of prior experience with industrialization. Un-
doubtedly the very structure of society was altered by industrializa-
tion among both the earliest group fo industrial izers (e.g., Great
Britain and the United States) and those industrializing in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (e.g., Germany and France).
The evidence with respect to even later industrial izers--the Third
World in general and Latin America in particular—seems to indicate
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that this occurence has not been repeated there.
The most likely reasons why the introduction of manufacturing
in Latin America has not achieved the significant structural trans-
formations of society expected on the basis of past experience else-
where are: 1) the political, economic, and social context within
which industrialization occured; and 2) the nature of the particular
industrialization process ( IS I ) itself. The structure of Latin Amer-
ican society has been characterized as corporative, hierarchical,
and patrimonial "to the core."
152 The entire basis of human inter-
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relationships is colored by this fact. The processes of development
do not occur in a vacuum, and industrialization in Latin America has
had to contend with alternative political as well as socio-economic
structures which have existed for almost half a millenium. The key
word here is alternative; it is not just that the structures engen-
dered by industrialization may "transcend" or modify previous arrange-
ments, but they must replace them. And when existing structures re-
fuse to be replaced but rather evolve according to their own partic-
ular dynamic, the resulting structures may look little like they are
"supposed to." In other words, when speaking of structural evolution,
a distinction should be made between change "from" and change "to."
Most interpretations of contemporary economic structures in Latin
America focus on the latter while the former is somehow considered
"unscientific" and the preserve of historians.
ISI as a strategy of industrialization could only occur in a
context of the international division of labor. That the process of
industrialization on one side of this division should be different
than on the other is almost tautological. The context within which
Latin American industrialization occurred is that of the periphery
exchanging primary products produced domestically for foreign exchange
which could be used to import from the center the capital goods neces-
sary for industrialization. This context is substantially different
from that of earlier industrial izers . Perhaps the most important
difference is the fact that the sectors in the economy responsible
for providing the resources needed for industrialization are different.
In the Latin American case industrialization has invariably been a
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function of the capacity to import. This, in turn, has always been
contingent upon the ability to produce and export primary products.
This latter capacity has always been in the hands of land-owning
and certain merchant interests. These interests themselves have
had little to gain and much to lose by the progressive industrial-
ization of their societies. One would expect that if industrializa-
tion is to be a function of the foreign exchange generated by the
activities of land-owners and merchants, these latter would remain
not only important but indispensible for industrialization efforts.
In the case of Colombia, industrialists as a group have been
closely associated with the emergence of exporting interests.^ 53
Their impact as an autonomous group, however, is not so clear. There
is no doubt that the relative size of this group increased drama-
tically after the beginnings of ISI and the political emergence of
1 54
the Colombian labor movement after 1930. But size alone implies
neither autonomy nor strength. The largest gremio or interest asso-
ciation which represents their interests, the National Association
of Industrialists ( Asociacio'n Nacional de Industriales—ANDI) is
cited by Dix as being one of the three most powerful interest assoc-
iations in contemporary Colombia, along with the Federation of Coffee
Growers ( Federacion de Cafete ros de Co1ombia --FEDECAFE) and the Na-
tional Federation of Merchants ( Federacidn Nacional de Comerciantes- -
FENALCO). 155 Another source has stated that by 1950, "the merchants
and industrialists were on their way to becoming the nation's strong-
est power contenders," and that by the 1960s these groups had evolved
1 55
into a quasi-confl ict relationship with landed elites. While
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political disagreements between and among such interests may indeed
emerge it is doubtful that they would be of such a nature that would
seriously threaten any one of them. To the extent that the interests
of both the industrialists and the merchants depend upon the agrarian
export sector for foreign exchange, a relationship has developed which
is more symbiotic and complementary than exploitative. Furthermore,
linkages between members in all of these sectors created and reinfor-
ced through both social organizations and political parties (not to
mention family and patrimonial linkages) makes it most difficult even
to disentangle the practical interests of one over the other. Taken
together, both the strengths and interests of Colombian industrialists
are incredibly mixed with other important sectors in society. The
overall implications of this are well expressed by Dix:
The new industrialists have not found it necessary to chal-
lenge [old political] patterns to achieve their ends. In
sum, the very facility with which the Colombian elite has
integrated the modern with the traditional has probably
helped to postpone or mitigate the need for more far-
reaching changes in social, economic, and political re-
lationships.' 5 '
If the nature of the industrialization process in Latin Amer-
ica has not substantively altered the structural balances of society
as a whole, there is a sense in which it has had an important impact—
the creation of a dualistic manufacturing sector. This characteristic
of ISI has been given particular prominence in explaining the nature
of industrialization in Colombia.
158 Within this conception, Colom-
bia has developed two types of firms for most industries in the manu-
facturing sector: 1) a modern subsector which is composed of firms
which are more or less, similar to typical firms in the same industry
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in more developed countries, especially with regard to technology
use, but somewhat smaller, and with lower value added per worker. 159
The existence of a dualistic structure within industry has several
implications. For example, Prebisch implies that part of the de-
clining terms of trade is attributable to the existence of a sec-
toral dualism which transfers part of the increases in productivity
in the "modern" sector of the periphery to the center. 160 To the
extent that labor unions have emerged predominantly in the modern
subsector, increases in productivity in that sector have sometimes
been passed on to employees in terms of wages. As can be seen in
Table 21, the rise in wages in the modern subsector have far out-
stripped wage increases in the craft subsector (as well as an "inter-
mediate" subsector). Nelson notes further that after 1958, the wage
gap between the modern and craft subsectors has increased signifi-
cantly.
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It is no wonder, then, that Nelson has asserted that the
intrasector dualism between modern and craft subsectors "lies at the
heart of the income distribution dynamics of urban Colombia."
A second implication of a dual structure in Colombian manu-
facturing concerns employment. Both the modern and the craft sub-
sectors' ability to absorb labor has been relatively low—lower than
the rate of population growth. Yet, the share of manufacturing
in the national income has increased substantially. The debate as to
where this "excess labor" is going is far from over. To the ex-
tent that manufacturing employment cannot keep pace with population
growth, the growth of. manufacturing itself will be more difficult.
The expansion of industrialization is a function of real demand—
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upon which both wage rates and unemployment have a very real impact.
The changes introduced into Colombian society by industrialization
may not have produced major structural realignments of power within
society, but they have resulted in substantive change. The degree
to which these changes may result in the type of structural transfor-
mation that Furtado speaks of will be as much a function of the nature
of the industrialization process itself as the fruits of its develop-
ment discussed above.
TABLE 13
Patterns of Real Wage Chanqes in
Colombian Industry, 1951-1 964
Sector % of Labor Force % Annual Change in Real Wages
Craft 50 + 0 - .5 %
Intermediate 15 + 2-3 %
Modern 35 + 5 %
SOURCE: Richard R. Nelson; T. Paul Schultz; and Robert L. Slighton,
Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia's Problems and
Prospects (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 139.
Much of the apparent contradiction between Furtado 's assertion
that industrialization has been responsible for major transformations
in Latin American economic structures and the evidence presented above
indicating the limited nature of these changes (at least in Colombia)
is due to a confusion of terminology. For Hirschman, industrialization
in Latin America is Import Substituting Industrialization; for Furtado,
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ISI is only one stage in the industrialization process. Furtado
himself admits that the ability of ISI to transform society substan-
tively is minimal unless it "becomes sufficiently diversified to
1 65generate its own demand." In other words, the nature of indus-
trialization has to change if it is to be used to evoke structural
transformations in the economy. ISI, in the Furtado formulation,
does not do this. It does not change the structure of demand for
industrial products; ISI, according to Furtado, merely accepts
existing demand structures as given and then proceeds to supply such
demands domestically.
In the Hirschman formulation, ISI does seek to change the
structure of demand. The mechanisms by which changes in the struc-
ture of demand are encouraged within this framework of ISI are back-
ward and forward linkages. Forward linkages represent the extent
to which outputs from a particular industry are used as inputs for
another economic activity other than final demand. Backward linkages
represent the derived demand, or degree of input requirements which
are generated by the establishment of a particular industry. Al-
though both are important, it is the establishment of backward link-
ages which most affects the structure of demand within the peripheral
nation.
The concern with linkages as the specific vehicle by which
ISI can transform a peripheral economy is due to the particular
nature of the industrialization process among what Hirschman calls
the "late-late industrial izers" or simply the Third World. Perhaps
the most distinguishing characteristic of the industrialization
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in the Third World-ISI-is that it is "a highly sequential
, or
tightly, staged affair." 168 It is highly sequential in that the
first industries which appear within an ISI framework are those in-
volved in the manufacture of light or non-durable consumer goods.
The next industries which appear, in order, are those involved in the
manufacture of intermediate and heavy or capital goods, and last con-
sumer durables. In the center (the First and Second Worlds) the
emergence of these subsectors of industry was much more interdepen-
dent and simultaneous. This has important implications for the struc-
ture of the industrial process. Linkages, both backward and forward,
are indispensible to successful industrialization. Whereas in the
industrialization process followed by the center these linkages arose
in a more or less spontaneous manner, the linkages within ISI must
be deliberately and carefully forged. It is this quality which gives
ISI its "tightly staged" nature.
The forging of linkages (especially backward linkages) are
indispensible for realizing the potential that the industrialization
1 CO
process has for transforming society. The forces and counter
forces affecting the establishment of backward linkages is most likely
the main factor in explaining why ISI appears to stall in some coun-
tries while continue in others. 170 Two of the principal obstacles
in establishing such linkages concern tariff and exchange restrictions
Tariffs on imported inputs for domestic industries are frequently low-
certainly much lower than those on goods which could compete with the
output of those domes-tic industries. This only makes sense if one
wishes to keep the cost of the output of domestic industries as low
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as possible. In order to establish domestic industries which would
supply other domestic industries with these same imported inputs, pro-
tective measures would have to be established in much the same manner
that they were established to protect the original domestic industry.
Because such measures would most definitely increase the price (and
perhaps even decrease the quality) of inputs for the original domes-
tic industry, industrialists representing the latter would most
certainly stand to lose in the short run. Therefore backward linkages
of ISI industries often must be instituted over the protest of ISI
industries themselves.
The degree of difficulty in overcoming these protests depends
in large part on the power configurations in the state at that time.
Ironically, it appears as though the stronger the industrialists (which
were created by ISI protection in the first place) the greater will be
the resistance to broadening the ISI protective umbrella to cover
backward linkage industries. But debate over the correct commercial
policy to be pursued in this regard involves most directly established
domestic industrialists versus those representing "emerging" or linkage
industries which wish to supply them.
Interestingly enough, the latter are often aided in their
struggle by the existence of periodic balance of payments difficulties.
Because of shortages in foreign exchange, imported inputs required by
existing ISI industries may be unobtainable even with a favorable
tariff structure. Such constraints on the capacity to import are
often cited as being one of the major problems with industrialization
in the region. The extent to which balance of payments difficulties
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inhibit the capacity of ISI industries to import needed inputs serves
to lessen their resistence to the establishment of domestic backward
linkage industries.
A second and perhaps even greater contradiction appears in
conjunction with exchange rates. In the effort to maximize the
capacity to import, countries in the periphery often have over-valued
exchange rates. Not only do over-valued exchange rates serve to lower
the costs (in domestic currency) of imported inputs for existing ISI
industries, they also serve as a mechanism for transferring to the
industrial sector wealth generated by the export of traditional pro-
ducts. On one level this is good for the growth of the industrial
sector. But on another level it not only inhibits the establishment
of domestic backward linkages industries but also inhibits the ability
of the entire industrial sector to expand via exports of manufactures.
This latter result is particularly important for nations such as
Colombia which have recently expressed as one of the aims of economic
development policy the expansion of "non-traditional" (i.e., manu-
factured) exports J 7 ^
Unfortunately for development policy makers in Colombia, the
existing structure of Colombian industry is dependent upon imports for
not only operation (intermediate goods) but also expansion (capital
goods). 172 Precisely those commercial and exchange policies which act
to facilitate the operation of its industrial sector act at the same
time to inhibit its expansion via exports. Furthermore, expansion via
enlargement of the domestic market is inhibited not only by structural
considerations such as the maldistribution of income but also by the
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related failure to diversify the domestic demand schedule via encour-
agement of backward linkage industries.
The automobile industry in Colombia serves as a good example
of this. One of the principal obstacles encountered in attempts to
establish an automobile industry for the Colombian domestic market has
been the reluctance on part of multinational corporations to allow
any kind of domestic linkages to be established. While President
Lleras Restrepo devoted considerable attention and resources to the
auto industry (in particular the auto parts industry), neither of his
immediate successors, Pastrana or Lopez, has been similarly inclined.
The automobile industry which has recently been established in Colom-
bia largely consists of an assembly operation for components which
must be imported from the Renault, Fiat, and Chrysler Corporations.
Attempts to vertically integrate, or establish backward linkages in
this case, this assembly operation by using locally produced parts for
autos sold on the local market have been vigorously resisted. As a
consequence, while Colombia now produces automobiles, in realtiy, only
the labor (and a small proportion of that) is "Made in Colombia."
This example underlines an important characteristic of Latin
American economic development in general and Colombian industriali-
zation in particular— the use of commercial policy as an active instru-
ment in the fostering of economic growth. Commercial policy, or
policies regarding the import and export trade, has been indispensible
for I SI . Since the beginnings of I SI , Colombian policy makers have
proceeded under the assumption that demands for imports would always
outstrip the foreign exchange available to finance them.
174
ISI as a
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strategy of economic development was partially based on this assump-
tion. Industrialization, it was thought, was to be a foreign exchange
preserving strategy--at least in the short run. In order to achieve
the independence invisioned using I SI
,
imports of particular classes
of goods— those goods which were to be domestically produced—had to
be curtailed.
In Colombia, this curtailment of selected imports has been
achieved by at least four policy instruments—the tariff, prior import
deposits, the exchange rate applicable to imports, and import licen-
sing. The particular details of each of these strategies is not as
important for understanding Colombian industrialization policy as is
1 75
the fact that they have seldom been systematically applied. In
particular, fluctuations in the actual availability of foreign ex-
change has been at least as important in explaining commercial pol-
icies with respect to imports as has been deliberate attempts on part
of the state to direct industrialization.
176 This makes it exceedingly
difficult to use fluctuations in these policies as indicative of
systematic policy shifts.
This is especially true with respect to policies affecting
IS I . As the composition of imports has changed from finished goods
to intermediate and capital goods, the above commercial instruments
have had to be adjusted. On the grossest level, the restriction of
imports has had the effect of encouraging domestic production. With
ISI, the idea has been to restrict imports of goods which might com-
pete with the ISI industry while at the same time encouraging imports
of goods which serve as inputs for that industry. Thus by examining
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just import restrictions we have little indication as to the ultimate
effect on the industrialization process itself. Paradoxically, the
encouragement of ISI may result in a greater dependence upon imports.
This is precisely why linkage effects are so important in ISI, and
perhaps goes a long way in helping explain the subsequent demise of
ISI as a viable strategy of economic development.
It also may go a long way in helping explain the revival of
a road to industrialization which had been largely eclipsed since the
Great Depression— industrial ization based on expanding national income.
As a method of industrialization, the contemporary version is slightly
different from that which generated the first stirrings of industrial-
ization at the end of the nineteenth century. As noted above, the
expansion of national income due directly or indirectly to the expan-
sion of world trade resulted in pressures for the domestic production
of certain industrial products. Industries producing processed food
and beverages, building materials, and textiles came about in Colombia
decades before the expansion of industrialization in other fields.
This was largely due to the increased ability of Colombians effectively
demand such products— in other words, the expansion of the market. In-
creases in the size of the market have been held to be the crucial deter-
mainant not only of investment in industrialization, but all phenomena
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associated with the general concept of economic progress. It must
be remembered, however, that market does not refer to a geographical
area of distribution so much as real purchasing power. Inasmuch as
the latter is a function of productivity, we are once again brought
back to the issue of declining terms of trade. The "export" to the
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center of gains in productivity in the periphery is one of the charac-
teristics of the decline analyzed by Prebisch. As has been noted by
Furtado, however, the industrialization process stimulated by the
expansion of exports was already showing clear symptoms of exhaustion
1 7Rbefore the 1929 Crisis. ° After this time, gains in productivity
in the periphery were no longer able to support the expansion of
industrialization there.
As it is conceived currently, the expansion of industrial-
ization via the expansion of national income could just as easily be
expressed as industrialization via expansion of the capacity to import.
While an increase in the national income implies an expansion in the
capacity to import, the reverse is not necessarily true. Transfers
of income from the center to the periphery, for example, often expand
the capacity of the latter to import, but they reflect little real
increase in national income--at least not in the sense of expansion
of the market via productivity increases. Where the expansion in the
capacity to import does impact upon national income is in the export
sector. Most of the periphery's ability to import goods is based upon
foreign exchange earnings of the export sector, not capital transfers.
A development strategy based upon real increases in the capacity to
export, i.e., increases in the productivity of the export sector, will
probably increase national income; but its principal function in the
final quarter of the twentieth century is to earn foreign exchange.
As a mode of industrialization, the strategy of increasing the
capacity to import has more in common with ISI than with earlier indus-
trialization via national income expansion. The latter strategy, which
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Hirschman has called "Import Swallowing Industrialization," is based
on national incomes and productivity reaching the threshold whereby
domestic production of certain industrial goods becomes profitable. 179
The former strategy, on the other hand, is based on foreign exchange
earnings reaching the point whereby the industrial sector is not
strangled by an inability to obtain either raw materials or intermediate
industrial inputs. Furthermore, as industrialization induced by ISI
begins to reach levels which bump against domestic market constraints,
the possible export of manufactures provides an attractive means of
using foreign exchange' to expand the market. All of this has come
about as a consequense of ISI. In the final analysis, the substitution
of local production for previous imports did not make imports less
important, it merely changed the composition of demand for imports.
And so another contradiction emerges. In their pursuit of
industrial independence via ISI, nations such as Colombia have achieved
part of their goal. The domestic production of manufactures currently
exceeds levels which were previously imported; imports have been sub-
stituted. Unfortunately, much of the substitution has been at the
expense of previous imports only in the most literal sense. As noted
in a previous example, Colombia may no longer have to import automo-
biles, but it will be forced to use the foreign exchange thus saved
in order to import the "components"— industrial equipment, raw mate-
rials, production technol ogy--for the domestically produced Carro
Colombiano.
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In short, Colombian industrialization based on ISI has
shifted the dependence on imports from finished goods to intermediate
goods
.
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One unfortunate by-product of this shift is that imports have
become even more crucial to the economic well being of the nation than
ever before. A decline in the capacity to import before 1SI affected
final consumers of imported products, the importers of those products,
and the government. A decline in the capacity to import after ISI also
affects these sectors. But the consumers of the imported products are
no longer just individuals but the industrial sector itself. Exchange
engendered shortages of imports no longer imply breakdowns in the com-
mercial and export sectors exclusively; the very foundations of the
peripheral industrial sector are affected.
The increased concern with industrial izaton via the promotion
of exports, then, expresses both a confidence in the consequences of
increased national income as well as a reaction to balance of payments
difficulties. But it must be kept in mind that both of these are based
ultimately upon developments engendered by ISI. The expansion of ex-
ports has not merely meant a return to the production of primary pro-
ducts for export. In Colombia, the drive to expand foreign exchange
earnings has been based on the promotion of "non-traditional" exports.
Non- traditional exports in Colombia include anything other than coffee
and petroleum; government policy, especially since the middle of 1967,
1 g2
has been to promote the export of manufactures. But the role that
manufactures play in the generation of foreign exchange is still rela-
tively small. Exports account for only about 2 percent of domestic
manufacturing output, but in the words of one authority, "On the whole,
it appears that Colombia has just begun to tap foreign market possibil-
1 g
ities for her manufactures both inside and outside the LAFTA region."
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The fact that Colombia is currently in a position which ties
manufacturing expansion to manufacturing export should not be over-
estimated. In one sense, the promotion of exports provides the in-
creased market which is necessary for industrial expansion. But it
does not realistically consider the fact that its success overwhelmingly
depends upon the trade policies of the developed (as well as other
underdeveloped) nations which would serve as its market. 184 Further-
more, industrial expansion via the promotion of manufacturing exports
still ignores the issues related to forward and backward linkages
discussed above; it does not necessarily reduce the dependence of
Colombian manufacturing upon imported inputs to produce and expand.
Indeed, by systematically ignoring such concerns, the overall depen-
dence of Colombia's industrial sector may well be exacerbated.
Policy instruments designed by the Colombian government to
promote exports are varied. Since 1967, the four most important have
been tax benefits, drawbacks and similar arrangements, export credits,
and the Export Promotion Fund ( Fondo de Promocion de Exportaciones --
PROEXPO). All except the last are operated outside the regular struc-
ture of the central government. The last, PROEXPO, is a decentralized
agency of the government which functions principally as a coordinating
agency, although it can provide some credit for exporters. While it
sometimes receives support from the central government, it is financed
principally by a tax on the c.i.f. value of all imports. The other
instruments are principally fiscal in nature, and provide a variety of
arrangements whereby exporters may receive negotiable tax credits,
duty breaks on imported components (the Vallejo Plans), and low interest
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loans to finance exports ( reintegros anticipados) . One important
similarity among them is that while all of the above provisions
mark tangivle initiatives on part of the state, the central govern-
ment itself provides little in the way of direct support for export
promotion. The data upon which assessments of variations in party
policy are based in this study consist of actual central government
expenditures. Therefore, the findings presented in Table 14 most
likely underestimate actual state involvement in the question of
promotion of industrial growth via export expansion.
TABLE 14
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development Expenditures
For Promotion of Industrial Exports
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
.06
.08
.07
.02
.09
.16
R = .805
R
2
= .704
The party affiliation of neither the president nor the finance
minister contributes much to explaining the variance in central gov-
ernment support for the promotion of industrial exports from 1961 to
1976. Nevertheless, overall, Liberals tend to support the promotion
of industrial exports more than Conservatives. The extent to which
such support can be traced to either one of the dual sources of this
industrialization strategy cannot be determined from the data. Con-
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sidering the findings presented below that the Liberal Party has
tended to embrace the concept of industrialization more fully than
the Conservatives, however, one is tempted to assert that industrial-
ization via export promotion has its roots more in balance of pay-
ments difficulties than in increased national income concerns. How-
ever, due to the tiny proportion of the central government expenditures
which are targeted for industrial export promotion, differences ob-
served between Liberals and Conservatives can easily be overstated.
Especially considering the fact that while state intervention
in this field is extensive, almost all of it is mediated by both
public and quasi-public structures and institutions outside the direct
purview of the central government. Any conclusions regarding even
the scope, much less the variation in that scope, must be treated
with care. But one conclusion which does appear justified is that,
at least with respect to the central government, the impact of ideology
on decisions to support directly the promotion of manufactured ex-
ports has been less important than other factors.
When we turn to the question of overall support for industrial-
ization in the years under consideration the tenor changes slightly.
An inspection of Table 15 provides us with an interesting parallels.
It demonstrates that the Liberal Party has tended to devote more of
the central government's resources to industrialization than has the
Conservative Party. While still relatively small compared to other
sectors of expenditure, central government support of industry in
general is much greater than support for the promotion of manufactured
exports.
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TABLE 15
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Industrialization
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservati ves 5.49 3.25
R = .559
Liberal
s
5.99 6.87
R
2
= .312
Partial Beta .04 .27
Considering the fact that about 98 percent of the market for
Colombian manufactures is domestic, this finding should not be sur-
prising. Neither should the fact that the Liberals have been more
sympathetic to the industrial sector than the Conservatives. The
Liberals established the first organized labor federation in Colombia
and have been the initiators of many innovations in the field of
labor relations. In the words of one authority:
In view of the crucial role of labor in the presidential
election [of 1930], it was in the interest of the Liberal
Party to foster industrialization and the growth of a
labor movement. But, in addition, the Liberals were
ideologically committed to labor. . . . The support of
labor by the Liberals was therefore both tactically impor-
tant and sincere.
This committment to the industrial sector has been a consistent theme
in Liberal political thought since. Indeed, Liberal President Carlos
Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) has asserted that the future development
of Colombia lies principally in the extension of industrial manufac-
turing.
186
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Given the intensity of both historical and verbal commitment
on part of the Liberals for industrialization, what is perhaps most
surprising is that in terms of actual central government support,
differences between the Liberals and the Conservatives (especially
when considering the presidency) were so small. Much of this most
likely is due to the points made above concerning the nature of state
involvement in industrialization. In Colombia, central government
support and state support can be very different. Government support
for the industrial sector through the creation and support of such
decentralized agencies as the Institute for Industrial Development
( Instituto de Fomento Industrial
-
-IFI ) as well as various public and
private financieros or finance corporations established to foster
industrial development would have to be taken into account in order
to assess accurately the total commitment of the Liberal Party to the
industrial sector.
Agriculture, Mining, and Export Promotion
Industrialization efforts in Colombia have historically depen-
ded upon its agricultural and mining development, most visibly through
the promotion of rural based exports. Of all central government expen-
ditures for economic development, about 25 percent have been devoted
to the development of the agriculture sector, and another 5 percent
to mining and the promotion of exports. We can see from Table 16
that the Conservative Party has generally tended to favor the systematic
development of the agricultural sector more than the Liberals.
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TABLE 16
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Agricultural Sector
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
25.30
21 .70
.29
24.48
23.05
.11
R = .534
R
2
= .285
Historically, both parties in Colombia have had strong support
at the rural leval, and studies have demonstrated that differences in
electoral support cannot be well explained by reference to a rural/
1 07
urban factor. Although the Liberal Party took the lead in mobilizing
the growing strength of urban workers during the 1930s, the Conservative
Party was not far behind in its development of party mechanisms to tap
urban support. Such a response on part of the Conservative Party,
however, did not mean that there was a fundamental shift away from its
previous bases of support. Findings provided in Table 16 above provide
evidence that the Conservatives have perhaps not gone as far as the
Liberals in directing government expenditures toward non-agrarian
sectors.
Government support for the agricultural sector is quite varied.
Its expenditures in this area are functionally subdivided into four-
teen different areas, but the bulk of resources have been channeled
into two-agricultural ' reform and what have been termed "studies
and
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investigations." The Agricul tural Reform of 1961 was one of the first
major policy innovations of the Frente
. Originally presented as a
mechanism to help alleviate the extremely skewed distribution of land,
the efforts at agrarian reform have since shifted. Especially during
the latter part of the Frente
,
agricultural reform has increasingly
emphasized improvements in agricultural productivity within the exist-
ing structure of land distribution rather than a more equitable dis-
tribution of the land itself. 188
Table 17 below illustrates the average adjusted percentage of
government expenditure directed toward its agrarian reform programs.
As it has been defined here, agrarian reform includes not only the
central government support component of programs under the auspices
of the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute ( Instituto Colombiano de
Reforma Agraria- -INCORA) but also support for those programs coming
under the heading of community development or Accion Communal . To-
gether these programs receive over one third of the central govern-
ment's expenditures targeted for the agrarian sector; this figure
does not include sizable expenditures by INCORA which have not come
from the central government itself.
As we can see, it provides conflicting evidence as to vari-
ations in party support of agrarian reform; Conservative presidents
have been associated with greater support than Liberal presidents,
but Liberal finance ministers have been more supportive than Conser-
vatives. The respective partial betas indicate that variations in
both the presidents' and finance ministers' party affiliation contri-
bute approximately equally to the explained variation. In short, the
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evidence indicates that differences in support for agrarian reform
are not systematically related to political party.
TABLE 17
Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditures for Agrarian Reform
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservati ves
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
48.31
30.27
.41
27.08
44.84
.38
R = .810
R
2
= .656
This finding tends to confirm Dix s contention that "all
political factions and parties, and all sectors of the press, give
1 89
at least lip service to the idea of an agrarian reform." In
this study, we examine more than just "lip service" commitment of
policy, and find that it varys--but not systematically according to
political party.
But, to say that most of the Colombian political elite
supports agrarian reform ignores the real differences in the policies
which may be subsumed under such a rubric. For example, both land
redistribution for landless peasants and increased credit for large
agricultural enterprises are considered agrarian "reform." Further-
more, the central government contributes only a fraction of the re-
sources utilized by INCORA pursuant to its charge. Both of these
factors would tend to blur any ideological distinctions which
might
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exist, or prevent them from being determined from the data. The data,
unfortunately, do not distinguish between types of program support
within what has been called agrarian reform.
The other major category of expenditures within the agricul-
tural sector has beer, termed "studies and investigations." This
category includes not only agrarian research and development, but
agricultural extension services as well. Table 18 shows that for
both presidents and finance ministers the Liberal Party has tended
to devote a greater proportion of agricultural development expen-
ditures for studies, investigations, and extension.
TABLE 18
Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditures for Agricultural Research,
Investigation, and Extension
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
24.33
25.45
.06
21 .29
26.53
.25
R = .294
R
2
= .086
The interpretation of fable 18 depends greatly upon the
nature of agricultural research. While it generally concentrates on
increasing agricultural productivity, such research may take numerous
forms such as the development of improved seed varieties, fertilizers,
insecticides, and harvesting techniques as well as research into the
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applicability to a tropical context of new or non-tradi tional types
of crops. Furthermore, research may be targeted at agricultural
products for either the export market or for domestic consumption.
Finally, research may be focused on increasing the productivity of
small -holders or large agricultural enterprises. Emphasis directed
toward any one of these areas at the expense of others will greatly
affect who in the agrarian sector benefits.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Liberals have shown a greater
level of support for a technological or "scientific" approach to the
question of agricultural productivity can be inferred from their sup-
port for agricultural research activities. Such support may tend to
undercut the traditional agricultural sector and that faction of the
elite which it represents, even though the latter probably is not
coterminous with the Conservative Party as a whole. More importantly,
it indicates support for that sector of agriculture which is least
subject to the influences of traditional power bases. In a sense, it
represents a basis for a "modern" if not elitist restructuring of the
agricultural sector according to principles which may be incompatible
with existing productive relationships.
It was noted earlier that the rural sector in Latin America
has traditionally made its greatest contribution to economic develop-
ment (at least in terms of foreign exchange earnings) via the mining
and extractive enterprises. Colombia has been an exception to this
phenomenon, with mining (exclusive of petroleum) generally accounting
for about one half of one percent of the GDP. Even though Colombia
has the largest known coal reserves in Latin America, and is by far
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the world's largest producer of emeralds, it still remains a net im-
1 on
porter of mineral products. u Only recently has government atten-
tion been directed toward alleviating the slow development of the
mining sector. The extent that such a commitment has included the
allocation of central government resources is demonstrated in Table
19.
TABLE 19
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Mining Development
Political Party and
Strength of Association
President Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
-.16
2.84
1 .18
2.71
.72
.73
R = .878
R
2
= .772
The data presented here provide conflicting evidence with
respect to variations in central government allocations to the mining
sector attributable to differences in political party administration.
Relative central government support for the mining sector is greatest
among Liberal presidents and Conservative finance ministers. The
extent to which party variations in each of these positions can ex-
plain the variance in expenditures is greater among the presidents
than the finance ministers, but both are relatively important. Finally,
it seems as though Conservative presidents are associated with a
negative allocation for the mining sector. This can be somewhat mis-
138
leading unless we recall that the percentage distribution of expen-
ditures have been adjusted for our covariate variables. In other
words, the figures represent proportional expenditures after the
effects of the relative size of the government contribution to the
GDP, official capital imports from abroad, projected budget receipts,
and the previous year's budget deficit have been statistically con-
trol led. for.
Although it cannot be discerned from the data, one possible
explanation for the ambiguous nature of the above findings lies in
several structural changes instituted by the government in the late
1960s and early 1970s. These include a reorganization of the Minis-
try of Mines and Energy, the creation of several affiliated decen-
tralized institutes, and the reorganization of others.^ 1 Also
during this period there was a policy shift toward the active develop-
ment of export production potential for several minerals which were
1 9?
previously either unexploited or geared toward domestic production.
The latter shift has been characteristic of not only the
mining sector but the agricultural sector as well. The exportation
of agricultural products has been one of the key components of Colom-
bian economic development policy since the middle of the last century.
What is relatively recent is the active and direct mobilization of
state resources in this quest. All modes of economic development
within a dependent capitalist economic structure have placed particular
emphasis on the trade arrangements which have come to characterize the
commercial relations between the developed capitalist center and the
underdeveloped capitalist periphery. Such trade arrangements have for
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the most part consisted of the production and exportation of mining
and agricultural products by the periphery for consumption and/or
further processing by the center.
The foreign exchange earned by the peripheral economy from
all of these arrangements have been used to import first manufactures
and later the capital equipment needed for the domestic production of
such manufactures. By skillful use of the "laws" of comparative ad-
vantage it has been alleged that the maximum economic benefit could
accrue to both the parties in the exchange process. In short, active
participation in the international trade of primary products has been
assumed to be the sine qua non of any kind of further economic develop-
ment in the nations of the periphery. It is, therefore, more than
apparent that the issues of an active export sector are inextricably
linked to industrialization policy, although it is only recently that
this linkage has become readily apparent.
Table 20 demonstrates the adjusted variation in central gov-
ernment support for the promotion of exports. Conservative presidents
as well as finance ministers have been more inclined to use central
government resources to promote rural exports than Liberals. This
tendency is especially strong among the finance ministers, where the
Conservatives are associated with an adjusted central government out-
lay of almost 220 percent greater than that of the Liberals.
These findings could be indicative of several things. We
noted above that the Conservative Party has generally favored the
agricultural sector more than the Liberals. The finding that the
Conservatives also favor the active promotion of exports from that
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sector may just be another aspect of this general concern. But, if
this is the case, we are left with explaining why support for agri-
cultural research, development, and extension were not also part of
such a general Conservative Party concern for agriculture.
TABLE 20
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Promotion
of Agricultural Exports
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberals
Partial Beta
4.94
4.74
.01
9.12
2.87
.38
R = .474
R
2
=
.225
An alternate explanation would be that the Conservatives more
than the Liberals are inclined to favor development via the integra-
tion of the Colombian domestic economy into the international economy.
A policy of active promotion of agricultural exports would place Colom-
bia squarely in the middle of the developmental mainstream.
A third possible explanation lies in the fact that the pro-
duction for export in today's world requries a much more extensive if
not sophisticated marketing mechanism than production for domestic
consumption. While the overall distribution of benefits accruing from
the export of agricultural products is unknown, we might expect that
it would not differ greatly from the distribution of other benefits.
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In this case, those individuals and groups at the nexus of the agri-
cultural production and marketing for export may be the most direct
beneficiaries of such a policy.
Cone! usions
To be a viable instrument of economic development policy,
benefits from agricultural development must accrue to more than just
merchants and exporters. In recent decades, however, development
and industrialization have been treated almost synonymously. In
their efforts to industrialize, the nations of Latin America have
repeatedly come against a foreign exchange constraint. Perhaps the
greatest indirect benefits from the increase in agricultural exports
(or more precisely, from the increased foreign exchange earned) have
accrued to the industrial sector. Much depends upon whether the
increased exchange earnings have been employed in industrial invest-
ment as distinct from further investment in agriculture or such non-
productive uses as real estate or currency speculation, or the im-
portation of sophisticated "defense" equipment. The extent to which
support for export promotion has been linked to industrialization has
been a consistent theme in Colombian economic development strategy,
although industrialization itself has come from several sources.
The effects of a free trade policy and the international divis-
ion of labor, a real increase in national income and its distribution,
an increaseing rate of urbanization, and deliberate state policy have
all made their mark on industrialization strategies pursued in Colombia.
For more than a century, however, it has been the rural sector which
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which most significant efforts have ultimately depended. The crucial
role of the agrarian sector in development policy is exacerbated by
the demands of development in the context of a dependent capitalist
framework. In this setting, the rural sector has been called upon
not only to support the urban areas in terms of food and resources,
but also to provide the bulk of the foreign exchange necessary to
finance much of the industrialization effort.
Within the agricultural sector itself we have found con-
flicting evidence with respect to variation in levels of party support
for agrarian reform, although due to the evolution of the concept of
agrarian reform in the Colombian context, differences may still lie
beneath the surface. The second major target of central government
support in the agrarian sector--agricul tural research, development,
and extension—does evince systematic differences between the parties.
Liberals more than Conservatives have tended to support this particular
component of agricultural development policy.
The second sector within rural development policy concerned
mining. Although sharp variations in policy were found in this sector,
the nature and sources of these variations remain unexplained. There
is little evidence that there have been systematic differences between
the Liberals and Conservatives with respect to levels of support given
mining development.
The final component of industrialization via the development of
the rural sector concerned export promotion. We found that the Conser-
vative Party has tended to favor central government support for export
promotion during the period of the Frente. This sector is the least
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ambiguous in terms of the dual nature of the rural sector's contri-
bution to economic development. Unlike the other areas described
above, this sector is specifically geared to the earning of foreign
exchange. As such it represents a self-conscious effort at increased
integration into the world market. The consequences (both positive
and negative) of this integration are particularly important when
considering not only industrialization, as was seen above, but also
infrastructure development, as will be shown in the following chapter.
Industrialization policy in Colombia has been the function of
both Liberal and Conservative Party support. However, it has been the
Liberal Party which has been most directly involved in the mobilization
of state resources to specifically encourage industrialization. The
Liberal Party has also been more concerned with the promotion of indus-
trial exports as a means of developing the domestic industrial sector.
In both of these areas then, systematic Liberal Party support has com-
plemented patterns of Conservative Party support in the rural sector.
The interrelationship between industrialization and rural sector dev-
elopment in economic growth, in Colombia, has more systematically
focused on the former than the latter. That is to say, economic growth
in the rural sector has principally been seen as a vehicle for further
industrialization. In this process, the Liberal Party has been the
principal initiator of state action. Whether it has been the principal
initiator of state action in the other major component of expenditure
for economic development--infrastructure--is the subject of the next
chapter.
CHAPTER IV
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Economic development at the national level is an extremely
interrelated process between the agricultural and the urba^ or indus-
trial sectors. The previous chapters have examined the role of these
two major components and the effects of the political structure in
the development of each. The final linkage to be forged involves
the structural interrelationship between agriculture and industry,
and the state's role in its development. The economic structure which
serves as this facilitator of economic interchange at the national
level is the social overhead or infrastructure sector. The concept
of social overhead capital can be quite broad, and the term is often
used to refer to all basic services which permit all other types of
productive activities in the primary, secondary, and tertiary spheres
to occur. According to Hirschman, such a definition would include:
all public services from law and order through education
and public health to transportation, communications, power
and water supply, as well as such agricultural overhead
capital as irrigation and drainage systems J 93
As it is used in this study, the concept of infrastructure follows
the more restricted definition of Kindelberger, and includes only
transportation networks, power sources, and communications networks,
or those sectors which are "needed to enable other production for the
1 94
market to take place."
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Infrastructure is fundamentally different from our other two
components of economic development in that the returns to it are
generally spread far outside of its direct production. In other
words, the externalities generated by infrastructure investment tend
to be far greater than those generated by either agricultural or
industrial production. Not only do the benefits derived from invest-
ments in infrastructure tend to be spread to society in general
rather than either the industrial or agricultural sectors in par-
ticular (or firms within them), they also tend to be extremely expen-
sive. In addition, many types of infrastructure facilities, par-
ticularly in the transportation and communications areas tend to
assume the characteristics of natural monopolies. Because of these
three reasons, even within a capitalist economic system, the state
can be looked upon as a legitimate producer of such services.
This is particularly true of less economically developed
countries where the development process has been such that many infra-
structure facilities did not develop concomitantly with the agricul-
tural and industrial sectors. Indeed, in the past, each of these
two sectors often developed their own separate facilities to perform
the functions that a well developed infrastructure would provide to
society as a whole. For example, roads and highways have been devel-
oped to service the export agriculture sector, and private power
generating plants have been constructed for particular industrial
firms. Although such facilities perform the function of infrastructure
they remain specifically geared to service one or the other productive
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sector and often cannot be easily converted to benefit the society
as a whole.
In previous sections we indicated the crucial role that
economic linkages play in the development process. Such linkages
refer not only to the industrialization process, although that is
where much of the emphasis has been placed. True economic develop-
ment means that linkages must be obtained not only within the indus-
trial sector itself, but between the industrial sector and other parts
of society. Economic integration of this sort will most likely not
arise through the efforts of either sector alone. This is particu-
larly true in a dependent capitalist context where both the agri-
cultural and industrial sectors are already strongly linked to a pro-
ductive matrix largely outside of the boundaries of the nation itself.
In short, the economic development of Colombia, as contrasted with
the development of either its agricultural sector or industrial sector,
requires that there be an infrastructure which integrates these sectors
within the nation itself.
Of the three sectors which comprise the "targets" of economic
development pol icy--industrial , agricultural, and infrastructure—the
development of an infrastructure has been the most consistent priority
of the national government in terms of actual outlay in any given year.
As can be seen in Figure 5 below, the emphasis placed on this sector
by the national government has varied from over 80 percent of its
economic development expenditures to about 50 percent.
During the period of the Frente , the Liberals have generally
favored the direction of more national resources to infrastructure
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development than have the Conservatives. Table 21 shows the extent
to which this is the case for both the party affiliation of the
president and the finance minister. Even after the effects of pre-
sidential party affiliation, official capital imports for infra-
structure development, and the other independent variables are con-
trolled for, on the average over 5 percent more economic development
expenditures have been channeled into infrastructure when there has
been a Liberal finance minister than when there has been a Conservativ
in that position. The figure for the president, while not as dramatic
is consistent with this finding. In short, during the period of the
Frente
,
the Liberal Party has tended to favor infrastructure develop-
ment more than the Conservative Party in terms of resource allocation
for economic development.
TABLE 21
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Infrastructure
Political Party and
Strength of Association
President FinanceMinister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
66.34
66.22
.11
62.72
66.46
.20
R = .756
R
2
= .571
Transportation
The infrastructure component of economic development is com-
posed of three sectors— transportation, energy, and communications.
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Of these three, it is the transportation sector which is, perhaps,
the major recognized prerequisite for continuing growth in all
sectors of economic development. In most economically underdeveloped
nations the transportation system is clearly inadequate for the
developmental demands which are placed upon it. The inadequacy of
the Colombian transportation system has stemmed from two sources-
one natural and the other created.
The topography of Colombia is one of the most difficult in the
Western world. Although there are areas more rugged, Colombia shares
with her neighbors to 1 the south— Ecuador and Peru—the characteristic
that there are major centers of population nestled among the three-mile
high Andes mountain range. Colombia is different from these neighbors
in that it alone has its major administrative as well as commercial
centers located in inter-mountain basins in these mountains. Both
Bogota and Medellfn are located in areas that makes contact both
between each other and between these cities and other domestic urban
centers most difficult at best. Indeed, even Bogota and Medellm
themselves were not connected by a railway until 1960, and Bogota and
1 95
the Atlantic coast were not connected until 1961.
The technical skills involved in building highways and rail-
road networks around and between three parallel cordilleras that make
up the Andes in Colombia are often not available. The Andes themselves
are very young geologically speaking. It has been estimated that the
196
Andes are among the most recently formed mountains in the world.
As such, they are still in an extremely active condition which means
that any kind of construction work undertaken in these regions will
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be confronted with the effects of incessant erosion and leveling.
No sooner is a road built than the geologic forces over which there
is no control begin to destroy it. Earthquakes and landslides are a
common occurence. In 197/, for example, a landslide took out a section
of the highway between Bogota and Vil lavicencio taking hundreds of
lives in the process. What is more, this event essentially cut off
the entire two thirds of the nation lying east of Bogota' for over a
week. Conditions which have caused such occurences are not likely to
change substantially for another few million years or so, so Colom-
bians must resign themselves to the fact that if a transportation
system is to be constructed it will be very expensive.
It is this extraordinarily high cost of constructing any
kind of land transportation which is partially responsible for the
second characteristic of Colombia's inadequate transportation system.
Those transportation lines which do exist have one very common element--
they tend to connect agricultural areas with either river or ocean
ports. In other words, the internal transportation system was con-
structed largely to service the export sector of the economy. This
characteristic is principally the result of what Fals Borda calls the
"Liberal Subversion" of the mid-nineteenth century which, economically
speaking, actively sought the integration of Colombia into the capital-
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ist world market system.
What was most necessary from this perspective was a transpor-
tation system which could deliver to ports of egress those products
which could earn foreign exchange for the nation. Beginning in the
late nineteenth century that product was coffee. As more and more
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internal improvements were made to the transportation system, the
balance between internal and external commerce became increasingly
skewed in favor of the latter. 198 Of course, not every road or rail-
road built since the nineteenth century has been exclusively designed
to service the export sector. But the neglect of servicing, indeed
even creating, a national internal market during these years must
not be underestimated. The fact that it was often less expensive to
import goods from Europe than to manufacture and transport them in-
ternally cannot help but to have had serious consequences for the
subsequent development of economic policy in Colombia.
The development of the national transportation network in this
way has had a tremendous impact not only on the Colombian economy but
also on the political system. In the words of one scholar:
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century when rail-
road building began, the improvements in the transportation
system exacerbated the regionalism of the country by improving
each region's tie to the external market while roads for in-
ternal travel went into decay. 199
Thus, the increasing linkages between Colombia and the rest of the
world were purchased at a price. The development of a strong central
government depends in part upon the ability to forge strong internal
linkages. Indeed, most of the literature on nation building stresses
the need to strengthen, or even create if necessary, those bonds which
will make the system more interdependent. The effect of tying Colom-
bian regions to the rest of the world rather than to other Colombian
regions was indeed "subversive" as Fals Borda terms it. One reason
why regionalism is still so strong in Colombia today most definitely
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stems in part from the nature of the transportation network, espec-
ially as it developed from the middle of the nineteenth century.
But whether the cause is primarily geographic, economic, or
a combination of both, the particular development the transportation
network in Colombia has implications which transcend economic develop-
ment. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the development of the
transportation system in Colombia has dominated not only priorities
of the national governments of the Frente with respect to infra-
structure but also has consumed a major portion of the national re-
sources devoted to economic development as a whole. As Figure 6
demonstrates, only twice has the percentage of transportation expen-
ditures fallen below three quarters the total expenditure for infra-
structure, and it has never consumed less than 40 percent of the
central government's entire economic development outlay. Because of
its overwhelming dominance, it is essential to look at the relative
importance of transportation in two ways: within the context of
national priorities with respect to other sectors within infrastructure
itself, and also with respect to all sectors which comprise economic
development.
Evidence as to which of the two parties has systematically
favored transportation relative to other types of infrastructure is
presented in Table 22 below. The table clearly demonstrates that
during the years of the Frente , the Conservative Party has tended to
support the transportation sector more than the Liberal Party. Further-
more, this pattern of partisan support for transportation was fairly
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strong for both presidents and finance ministers, although the
variability was stronger among the latter.
TABLE 22
Adjusted Percent of Infrastructure
Expenditure for Transportation
Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 81.59 83.86
R = .639
Liberals 78.57 78.36
R
2
= .408
Partial Beta .19 .33
Because transportation dominates the infrastructure sector to
the extent that it does, it would be valuable to examine its impor-
tance to the entire economic development effort. There are many
other possible sectors within economic development with which the
transportation sector must compete, although it dominates these as
well. As we can see from Figure 6 above, the transportation sector
on the average comprises over 50 percent of the total national gov-
ernment support for economic development. Given the findings above
that the Conservative Party has tended to favor transportation
relative to other infrastructure choices, does this pattern also
hold relative to other economic development choices? Table 23
below provides us with an answer to this question.
As we can see, there was almost no difference between Liberal
and Conservative presidencies in the adjusted proportion of economic
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development expenditures devoted to transportation. On the other
hand, Conservative finance ministeres devoted an average of 10.5
percent more than Liberals to economic development expenditures for
transportation.
TABLE 23
Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Transportation
Political Party and
President Finance Strength of
Strength of Association Minister Association
Conservatives 52.87 56.56
Liberals 52.85 51.18
Partial Beta .00 .25
R = .744
R
2
= .554
These findings essentially corroborate those above which
indicated Conservative support relative to the infrastructure sector
As with those findings, it is the finance minister who manifests a
more substantial degree of systematic variability than the president
Indeed, when examining the partisan patterns of support for transpor
tation relative to all other economic development sectors, we note
that there is essentially no difference between Liberal and Conser-
vative presidents. The fact that party affiliation of both the pres
ident and the finance minister explain less of the variance in trans
portation support relative to the entire economic development effort
as opposed to just infrastructure development is to be expected.
Transportation must compete only with the communications and energy
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sectors within the infrastructure component of economic developemnt,
whereas it must compete additionally with policy developing both
industry and agriculture when examining economic development as a
whole. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the Conservative Party
has tended to be more supportive of the transportation sector than
the Liberal Party remains valid.
This finding tends to complement the traditional ideological
position of the Conservative Party with respect to land. Historically,
the Conservative Party has been represented as the more supportive of
the interests of large land owners and agricultural interests. In
terms of rural economic development policy, the issue of transpor-
tation is important. This is especially true if the road to develop-
ment is perceived as being one of stimulating the export economy,
which in Colombia means principally the agrarian sector. One of the
principal costs of any product produced in Colombia and destined for
sale either internally or externally is transportation. The more
efficiently that the transportation network serves to facilitate the
entry of goods on the market results in a lowering of costs and
subsequently higher rates of return on other factors of production.
An efficient transportation network serves to lower the final
costs of imports as well. The extent to which the Colombian economy,
particularly in the capital goods sector, depends upon imports is
high and increasing. The allocation of national resources to trans-
portation serves economic development in this area also. But the
nature of industrial - production is such that large comittments of
national resources is not as crucial to serve it. The concentration
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of industries In certain geographical locations makes the matter of
linking them with sources of both raw materials and essential imported
components relatively simple.
It is not in the need to lower costs of both imported and
domestically produced inputs into the manufacturing process that
the transportation system as a whole plays its biggest role in Colom-
bian industry. It is rather in the distribution of the output of
Colombian manufacturing to both the domestic and perhaps even the
international market that the transportation sector qua system has
its greatest long term impact. Of course, any improvement in the
national transportation network will benefit international manufac-
turers as v/ell as domestic producers. But in one sense, the develop-
ment of a transportation system which would increase the accessibility
of the internal market would benefit domestic producers more. It
would permit inter-regional and internal trade to be carried on more
directly and without the need to route goods destined for the internal
markets along arteries designed to facilitate access to an interna-
tional market.
The preceeding discussion of the lowering of costs to service
the internal market applies not only to manufactures, of course.
Colombia always has been and still is a predominantly rural country.
As the agricultural sector is responsible for most of the domesti-
cally produced product, its importance in the Colombian economy can-
not be taken for granted. As noted earlier, the agricultural sector
serves not only to produce for export, it also serves as one of the
principal sources of internal savings and economic surplus needed for
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industrialization. Much of this is derived from the exchange of
agricultural products on the internal market. Any mechanism which
would facilitate economic transactions in the internal market must
benefit this sector as well.
While it is clearly important for the urban sector that
Colombia have a well developed transportation network, there are
other sectors in the economy, for example energy, which are at
least as important. But, for the development of the rural sector,
a viable transportation system is paramount. The Conservative Party
has been shown to support the development of the transportation
sector relative to not only other infrastructure sectors but also
all economic development sectors in general. The extent to which
this support can be traced to the Conservative Party's traditional
concern with issues of rural development is problematic. In order
to successfully arrive at an answer, one would have to examine in
closer detail the particulars of the transportation system being
favored. Are transportation lines being developed principally which
tie the agricultural hinterlands to river or ocean ports? Are they
being developed to increase inter-regional and other internal contact?
These and similar questions which would have to be explored before
one could arrive at a more definite answer cannot easily be answered
using the data in this study. But, an examination of the "types" of
transportation being developed in Colombia may provide some clue.
The contribution of transportation to economic development
is mul tifaceted. On. the one hand, transportation systems may be
developed which facilitate the exchange of goods and services within
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the world market. It has been noted that active involvement of the
state in transportation in Colombia was initially a response to the
export sector. It was developed in order to more easily bring Colom-
bian exports onto the world market. On the other hand, transportation
systems may also be developed which encourage the exchange of goods
and services within the domestic market. The development of such a
transportation system would increase the size and scope of the dis-
tribution of all products of a modern economy. Transportation barriers
to marketing are important whether products are imported or produced
domestically. Finally, the transportation system can contribute to
the economic and political integration of the country. Related in
large part to questions of domestic production and distribution, this
aspect of the transportation system would be closely allied with the
development of communications networks.
The functional aspects of a transportation system as outlined
above only partially parallel the sectoral approach used in this study.
The data used here describe the types of transportation which the
government may encourage, that is, between such options as railroads,
highways, airports, river ports, and so forth. However, they do not
distinguish between, for example, highways or railroads which exist
primarily to transport coffee or cotton to places where they may be
exported, from lines which are purely domestic in function. We may
overcome this problem only partially by noting the sectors within
the transportation system and paralleling them with the appropriate
function.
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Wa ter transportation
.
Perhaps the most obvious parallel between
type and function would be the case of sea and river transportation.
The nature of this transportation type is such that emphasis given
to it would be considered as fairly indicative of sentiment toward
international trade. The situation is clearest with respect to ocean
transportation. It is unlikely that all but an extremely small per-
centage of the trade to and from Colombia's ocean ports involve intra-
national rather than international arrangements. In addition, support
for ocean transportation also includes government support for the Flota
ffercante Gran Colombiana . This corporate merchant marine, operated
jointly by Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, has been the principal
vehicle to export Colombian products, especially coffee, since 1946.
The situation with respect to river transportation is also
likely to incorporate the international dimension to a great extent.
Currently, the inland water system is used mainly to transport petroleum
general cargo transport (except for bulk cargo) has declined both
absolutely and relatively since the early 1960s.
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Also, given the
fact that major population centers are not located on, or often even
near navigable rivers, most of the goods coming into or going from
river ports must be transported further using non-maritime transpor-
tation. Except for those localities directly on the coast or navig-
able river systems, the primary beneficiaries of improvements here
would be those involved in moving trade through these arteries.
Historically, the development of water transportation in Colom-
bia has preceeded improvements in overland transportation. Given
Colombia's topography it should not be surprising that improvements
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in the former were one of the first priorities of nineteenth century
governments. The emphasis given water transportation systems early
in Colombian history preceeded improvements in overland transportation
by perhaps as much as a half a century. 201 Currently, however, only
about 3 percent of the central government's investment in transpor-
tation goes to maritime systems.
In spite of its rather insignificant size with respect to
other transportation alternatives water transportation gives us the
purest example of a transportation system which is functionally
oriented toward international rather than domestic aspects of economic
development. As such, party variations in emphasis given river and
ocean transportation gives an excellent indication of ideological
tendencies with respect ot domestic versus international trade.
In Colombia during the period of the Frente , the Conservative
Party systematically supported the development of water transportation
more than the Liberal Party. As can be seen in Table 24 below, the
adjusted annual direct investment in water transportation has been
over 260 percent greater during the periods of Conservative presiden-
tial administrations than under Liberal administrations; during periods
when there was a Conservative finance minister, investment in water
transportation was over 410 percent greater than during periods when
Liberals held the same post.
The patterns within the components of water transportation
support this finding with additional evidence. The party variation
with respect to emphasis on river transportation as opposed to ocean
transportation is inconclusive. But, as can be seen in Table 25 below,
political party variation with respect to ocean transportation is
even clearer than water transportation as a whole.
TABLE 24
Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Water Transportation
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 5.31 7.60
Liberals 1.47 1.48
R = .494
Partial Beta .21 .31
R
2
= .244
Table 25
Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Ocean Transportation
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 4.76 7.30
R - .465
Liberals 1.10 0.94
R
2
= .216
Partial Beta .20 .33
The average adjusted percentage of central government direct
investment in ocean transportation has been over 330 percent greater
under Conservative presidents than Liberal presidents, and over 675
percent greater under Coservative finance ministers than Liberal
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finance ministers. Of course, the magnitude of these changes in
percentage terms is due to the relatively insignificant portion of
the transportation expenditures which are spent on water transpor-
tation in general. But there can be no mistaking the fact that
there are definite ideological differences between the Liberals and
Conservatives with respect to this aspect of economic development in
general
, and infrastructure development in particular.
Land Transportation
.
Other emphases within the transportation sector
are less obviously tied to a particular mode of economic development.
Land transportation, for example, is necessary whether one favors
development hacia afuera or hacia adentro . The production of goods
domestically requires a transportation system which can deliver raw
materials to the site of production. And, the distribution of goods,
regardless of whether produced domestically or imported from abroad,
is accomplished by the same overland transportation network.
The lack of a viable overland transportation system has been
one of the principal obstacles to economic development in Colombia.
Historically, the part of the price of a product bought in Colombia
which was due to transportation costs has been extremely high. All
throughout the nineteenth century it was probably cheaper to import
many goods from Europe and transport these goods to Colombian river
towns, than just transport them from the interior of Colombia to the
same river towns.
202 Not only did this have the effect of orienting
entire sections of Colombia to Europe more than the interior of their
ov/n country, but also of orienting internal economic development
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policy to the international stage more than the domestic. The
development of land transportation, then, has never responded solely
to domestic pressures.
One should not be surprised that land transportation in
Colombia developed initially as a response to an existing foreign
trade policy. The need to pay for imports necessitated improvements
which would lower the costs of Colombian exports. It has been
argued that the expansion of coffee cultivation and exports in Colom-
bia around the turn of the century was principally due to the expan-
, pen
sion of the railroad network. Nevertheless, relative to most
other Latin American countries, Colombia was slow to develop rail-
roads. And, the railroads which were constructed were geared prin-
cipally to servicing external trade requirements. As noted earlier,
Bogota was connected by a rail line neither to the coast nor to
Colombia's second city, Medellin, before 1960. But the rather
limited nature of internal linkages provided by the railroad system
in Colombia should not obscure the importance that the development
of railroads has had for its economic development. In the words of
one authority, "Colombian railways were as important to that counrty's
development as were the railways of North America to the United
* m204States.
The support provided to the international trade aspect of
economic development is less clear when considering the other major
type of land transportation— roads and highways. In order to achieve
an accurate picture of the contribution of roads and highways to the
lowering of costs of international trade one would have to examine
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the particular nature of the roads under consideration. Depending
upon routes and sizes, as well as facilities at either end of a
given highway line, the construction of roads and highways may
contribute not only to international trade but also domestic trade.
Indeed, given the historical development of Colombia's railroads,
the bulk of international trade may be expected to depend upon roads
and highways. There is evidence to indicate that the Colombian
government has made a conscious effort to make the railroad and high-
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way systems complementary with each other rather than competitive.
To the extent that this policy has been successful, we might expect
that the highway system is much less oriented to the external market
than has been the case with the railroads. If that is the case, then
the highway system would have a greater impact on national integration
and internal trade than would the railroad system. But again, in
order to assess directly such an impact, information would be needed
concerning the types of highways being constructed.
The relative emphasis given to roads and highways as contrasted
with railways is difficult to ascertain. Although the central govern-
ment budget does provide some support for Colombian railroads, most
of the expenses and investments in railroad lines since 1954 have
been under the jurisdiction of a semi -autonomous agency—the Ferro-
carrilles Nacionales de Colombia . While some of the responsibility
for highways is given to various semi -autonomous agencies, on the
other hand, the bulk of national policy emanates from the Ministry
of Public Works. Indeed, 90 percent of the Ministry's activities
include planning, constructing, and maintaining the national highway
166
network. 206 Since decentralized agencies' budgets are maintained
separately from that of the central government, examination of the
latter provides little clue as to the magnitude or composition of
the former. The examination of land transportation policy during
the Frente period, then, will be limited to a consideration of high-
ways and roads.
The acknowledged father of the Colombian national highway
system was German Uribe Hoyos, Liberal Minister of Public Works under
the Santos administration (1930-1934). Under the auspices of the
Liberal Party, in 1931 the transportation policy of the Colombian
government undertook a dramatic shift toward an emphasis on highways
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and away from railroads. During the period of the Frente
, the
Liberal Party has continued to stress the development of a highway
system more than the Conservative Party. As is demonstrated in Table
26, the adjusted average investment expenditure on highways under
the auspices of Liberals has been over 100 percent greater than under
Conservatives when speaking of finance ministers, and 18 percent
greater when speaking of presidents.
TABLE 26
Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Roads and Highways
Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association
President Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 50.00 31.84
Liberals
Partial Beta
59.00
.10
64.80
.33
R = .722
R2 = .521
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It was observed earlier that the Conservative Party has
tended to support the transportation sector more than the Liberal
Party. A possible explanation for this finding was that transportation
policy had a great bearing on the production for export, especially
for agricultural products. It appears a contradiction to find that
the Liberal Party, much more than the Conservative Party, supports
the creation and maintenance of roads and highways. This is even
more surprising when one considers the fact that the government
ministry primarily responsible for highways has been almost exclusively
a Conservative preserve during the Frente period. How, then, can we
resolve this apparent anomaly?
One possible explanation would be that the bulk of highway
expenditures are directed toward routes which do not directly benefit
the export sector. The transportation system in general and the high-
ways in particular are multifunctional phenomena. It has already
been established that the initial interventions of the state into
the transportation sector were to facilitate external trade. It
is possible that most of the routes which would achieve this goal
have already been established. A point of diminishing returns may
have been reached as far as establishing lines which could economically
connect those regions producing export products to points where they
could be marketed. If this is the case, a greater proportion of new
highway projects may be directed toward establishing and strengthening
trunk lines and inter-city links. While such links are indespensible
for internal commerce they are less crucial for production for the
external market. The validity of such an explanation would depend,
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of course, on an analysis of the types of roads which make up the
Colombian comittment to roads and highways.
Indirect evidence is available to support this contention.
In 1961 the government created the Fondo Nacional de taminos Veci^-
ales—CAVECINALES. This decentralized institute was established
primarily to construct feeder roads as part of a more general program
of agricultural improvement. The extent to which CAVECINALES or
other agencies have superceeded the Ministry of Public Works in
certain types of road construction, particularly in agricultural areas,
cannot be determined using the data in this study. But, a structural
shift in the highway activities of the Ministry of Public Works away
from agricultural and rural projects may help explain the apparent
relative lack of interest on part of the Conservative Party to this
particular component of the transportation sector.
Finally, it also must be remembered that the Conservative
Party has supported ocean and river transportation more than the
Liberals. Inasmuch as this type of transportation is more specific-
ally geared to the international scene, further investments in road
construction could conceivably be seen as at the expense of other
sectors which may be viewed as being more beneficial to economic
development as a whole. This explanation is strengthened when we
note the findings presented below with respect to air transportation.
Air transportation . The final subsector of transportation concerns
the development of air transportation. Given the extraordinary topo-
graphy of Colombia, the potential for air transport is enormous.
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This fact has not been lost in the development of a transportation
network. Organized in 1919, Colombia has the oldest commercial
airline in the Americas. Even as early as 1950, the Colombian air-
lines made up "a very important part of the transportation system
for both passengers and freight." The role of air transportation
in economic development is difficult to assess. One reason is that
economic development has been conceptualized as a basically material-
istic phenomenon. As such, the production and distribution of material
goods has been the basic concern. The role that transportation in
general plays in this process is basically one of facilitating this
production and distribution.
The particular contribution that air transportation plays in
this process is highly dependent upon what is being produced and
distributed. Such a formulation radically downplays the importance
of the transportation system for human "distribution." And, it is
in the realm of passenger transport that air transportation in
pnq
Colombia has seen its most steady growth. However, most of the
growth in this area has been due to increased average length of
trips; the grov/th of domestic air passenger traffic has been slowed
dramatically by improved highway connections. As far as the trans-
portation of objects rather than people, the position of air trans-
portation is less clear. As a rule agricultural products, which make
up the bulk of Colombia's exports, can more cheaply be transported
using other means of transportation. Of course some agricultural
products, such as orchids which in the past have constituted a
sizable percentage of Colombia's non-traditional exports, must be
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transported by air. For most non-bulk products, including many manu-
factures, the savings realized using air transportation is variable.
The growth of air cargo in Colombia since 1960 has been most
evident in the international portion rather than the domestic portion.
The IBRD estimates that while the average compounded growth rate be-
tween 1960 and 1968 for domestic air cargo showed an increase of 2.5
percent, the growth rate of international cargo increased 13.5 per-
21
0
cent. The development of transportation alternatives and increase
in the use of trucking are most likely the main reasons for the rela-
tively slow growth in 'the domestic sphere. The increase in the use
of air transportation in international cargo transactions most likely
reflects the changing composition of Colombian imports as well as
improvements in cargo handling facilities.
It is, perhaps, the "international" aspect which best accounts
for the findings presented in Table 28 below.
TABLE 27
Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Air Transportation
Political Party and
p
. , . Finance Strength of
Strength of Association ^resident Minister Association
Conservatives
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
42.53
40.23
.02
62.08
31.97
.30
R = .544
R
2
= .296
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We can see above that the Conservative Party has tended to
favor the development of air transportation more than the Liberal
Party. There seems little in the expressed ideological positions
assumed by either party to explain why this should be so. Evident
variations in developmental strategies also do not really help to
understand such a finding. Unless one is willing to assert that
this finding is evidence of a more general faith on part of the
Conservative Party in outward oriented growth, it is difficult to
explain in a theoretically meaningful fashion the relative support
differences observed.
Cone! us ions . Taken together, the subsectors of transportation policy
present us with a clearer understanding of economic development policy
in Colombia. Given the crucial importance of transportation in any
economic development strategy it is interesting to note that there
is evidence that the Liberal and Conservative Parties indeed manifest
systematic differences. While the Conservative Party has been shown
to give relatively more support to the development of the transpor-
tation sector as a whole than has the Liberal Party, there are definite
party differences in priorities between the transportation subsectors.
The Conservative Party has tended to support those aspects of
transportation which would facilitate the integration of the Colombian
economy with the world market. This is clearly shown with respect to
its relative support of maritime transportation, and also with its
support of air transportation. The Liberal Party, on the other hand,
has tended to support those aspects of transportation which would
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facilitate the internal production and distribution of goods, that
is, the internal integration of the Colombian economy. The national
highway system, which for all practical purposes was the result of
Liberal Party initiatives during the early 1930s, has been shown to
still be an actual concern of the Liberals a third of a century later.
Nevertheless, it also has been shown that choices within the
transportation sector are seldom associated with one particular
development strategy. Given the multi-functional character and mixed
nature of most transportation alternatives it is difficult to catch
more than a glimpse of actual variations in economic development
strategy in its broadest outlines. Variations in transportation policy
at the subsectoral level provides only a part, albeit a substantial
part, of that larger picture.
Energy
It was argued above that in one sense the development of the
transportation sector of the infrastructure would especially benefit
the agricultural sector. It is even more obvious that the development
of the energy sector of infrastructure would principally tend to
benefit the urban sector generally and the industrialization process
in particular. The critical need to develop adequate sources of
energy for Colombian economic growth has been recognized at least
since the 1950s. Indeed, the provision of electric and other
types of power is the sine qua non of industrialization efforts
wherever they may occur. And, with increasing urbanization the need
to provide electricity to non-industrial consumers also increases
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dramatically. Both industrialization and urbanization, then, require
that there be available from some source an adequate supply of both
electric and non-electric power.
The provision of power in Colombia is primarily a government
responsibility. As such, much of the pace of economic development
dependent upon electric power utilization is also a function of
government action. There has been an overall increase in power
generating capacity in recent years, but Colombia still remains below
the average per capita in Latin America. During the period of the
Frente
,
the installed generating capacity of Colombian power plants
has increased from 2500 to 7200 MGW (the latter figure for 1970). 212
But, this increase has not been steady or constant.
Part of the problem lies with the fact that jurisdiction for
the provision of power is fragmented among the central government,
various decentralized institutes and agencies, regional development
corporations, and municipal bodies. This is further exacerbated by
the fact that most emphasis during the past has been on the develop-
ment of generation and transmission facilities and not to distribu-
21 ? .
tion. This has left almost one fourth of the population without
electric service. But, it is not the provision of power to rural
communities which is viewed as a priority for economic growth. Most
gains to be derived from more and cheaper sources of power are in
industry, manufacturing, and commerce.
Regardless of whether one is referring to the president or
the finance minister,- the Liberal Party in Colombia has tended to
support the development of the energy sector more than the Conservative
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Party. When controlling for all other independent variables, Table
28 demonstrates that the average adjusted investment by Liberal
finance ministers was 62.8 percent greater than that of Conservatives.
TABLE 28
Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Energy Sector
Political Party and
Strength of Association
President FinanceMinister
Strength of
Association
Conservatives 12.05 8.77
R = .522
Liberals 12.55 13.90
R
2
= .272
Partial Beta .05 .48
These findings can be indicative of several things. As
noted above, a significant number of Colombians live in areas which
do not have electric power. Indeed, it was estimated that in 1970,
fully 70 percent of the rural population did not have any electricity
service at all.
214 Of course, much of this is due to impractical-
ities involved in a wider distribution effort given the geographical
conditions and the scattered nature of Colombian rural populations.
But not all of the rural /urban differences observed in the actual
distribution of power resources are the result of topography and
settlement patterns. Much of the difference may be attributed to
the function that energy resources assume in the developmental
process.
Increased productivity has usually come about with the
substitution of mechanical devices or technology for human labor.
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This substitution can take place in a number of ways, but one impor-
tant characteristic of them all is the requirement for energy--ei ther
to drive the device directly or for use in the device's creation.
The fact that electric energy cannot be efficiently stored,
only transmitted, leads to a host of problems in terms of economic
returns to energy use. Economies of scale and other factors contri-
bute to the contention that a maximization of efficiency in the use
of energy requires a concentration in terms of users. This concen-
tration implies two things: 1) urban areas are more "efficient" in
terms of power utilization than rural areas; and 2) industrial uses
are more "efficient" than residential and perhaps even commercial uses
The Liberal Party in Colombia has been the beneficiary on both
of these counts. In other words, the greater electoral support for
the Liberal Party in urban areas, as well as its early lead in the
mobilization of the industrial workforce may help explain this finding
Especially in light of the findings presented in the previous chapter
with respect to industrialization policy, it is not unreasonable to
hold that there is a link between the systematic support of energy
development and support of manufacturing, commercial, and urban seg-
ments in society.
Communications
The communications concerns of the national government in
Colombia are primarily related to establishing radio communications
networks, regulating. telecommunications and postal enterprises, and
granting concessions and licences to public and private telecommuni-
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cations entities. Of all the infrastructure sectors, communications
has received the least amount of attention from the central govern-
ment. On the average, only about one percent of the national resources
invested in infrastructure development have been targeted for the
communications sector. Part of the reason for this relatively insig-
nificant figure is due to the fact that communications services, more
than any other infrastructure sector, are primarily the responsibility
of local and regional entities, as well as decentralized agencies of
the central government. While the central government provides some
assistance, the majority of communications links, especially telephone
links, are expected to remain fiscally solvent through user charges,
fees, and the like.
In as far as actual party variation in support for communi-
cations investments, Table 29 below shows that the Liberal Party
tends to favor the communications sector more than the Conservative
Party. In relative terms, under Liberal presidents the central gov-
ernment has invested almost 64 percent more on communications systems
than under Conservative presidents, although there was little differ-
ence among finance ministers.
It is unclear how such a finding should be interpreted. As
far as economic development strategy is concerned, the role that
communications plays is ambiguous. The larger issues of economic
development policy and variations in that policy have been concerned
with the creation and distribution of goods and services. Communi-
cations networks are essential for all such transactions. Perhaps
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the less "concrete" issue of national integration could better explain
such a finding than could economic development policy in itself.
TABLE 29
Average Adjusted Percent of Infrastructure
Expenditure for Communication Sector
Political Party and
Strength of Association President
Finance
Minister
Strength of
Association
Conservati ves
Liberal
s
Partial Beta
0.57
1.57
.75
1 .05
1.08
.09
R = .810
R
2
= .656
The communications system extant in Colombia is somewhat weak.
It was estimated in 1970 that only about half of Colombia's popula-
pic
tion lived in areas with telephone service. Furthermore, people
without telephone service were not exclusively rural residents. The
IBRD estimated in the same year that there were about 19 areas in
Colombia with populations greater than 20,000 which had no local
telephone service.
216 The lack of local communications facilities
in certain areas may not severely cripple development efforts. Most
strategies of economic development require investment in communica-
tions only in so far as they are necessary to conduct business. The
economic development strategies expressed by neither the Liberal nor
the Conservative Parties directly address the question of what
kind
of communications sector would be required for successful implementa-
tion.
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Historically, the Conservative Party has expressed a greater
interest in issues of integration than has the Liberal Party. This
interest, however, has not been expressed in terms which would in-
dicate that increased communications networks would be a means to
achieve this end. Stressing hierarchy and authority, integration
of Colombian society in traditional Conservative thought is based on
the maintenance of traditional patron-client relationships and organic
21
7
conceptions of "la patria ." The Liberal Party has traditionally
stressed the contractual nature of society. Implied in such a
position would be support of the means necessary to permit such
interpersonal interactions to occur.
The linkages between this and an ideology of economic devel-
opment are less than clear. It does seem to suggest that an economic
development strategy which was geared more toward internal dynamics--
desarrollo hacia adentro , if you will --would be more compatible with
an emphasis on developing communications. In other areas of infra-
structure development, the Liberal Party has indicated more of a
preference for such a strategy than the Conservative Party. The
findings with respect to the development of the communications sector
give evidence to support such an interpretation.
Cone! usions
The development of infrastructure clearly demonstrates the
interrelated nature of the state, industry, and agriculture in the
economic development process. In this chapter we have observed that
this interrelationship, has not been defined in Colombia exclusively
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either the Liberal or the Conservative Parties, even though the
Liberals have shown the most support for aggregate infrastructure
development. This finding could be misleading, however, if one
ignores the specific nature of infrastructure development policy
in Colombia during the period of the Frente.
By examining sectoral variations within the infrastructure
component of economic development, we have seen several trends, par-
ticularly in the transportation sector. While the Conservative Party
has generally tended to favor the development of transportation rela-
tive to other sectors in the entire economic development sphere,
the findings are mixed with respect to support for transportation
relative to other infrastructure sectors. This latter finding, in
particular, is most likely the result of the predominance of the
road and highway component within the transportation sector. This
subsector of transportation development has clearly been favored by
the Liberal Party.
On the other hand, the two other subsectors of transportation
pol icy--water and air transportation development—have been supported
more by the Conservative Party. The particular contribution that
each type of transportation could make to the further economic inte-
gration of Colombia into the world market is felt to have some bearing
upon the patterns observed. However, due to the sectoral nature of
the data used in this study, such a conclusion can only be inferred.
The energy sector was clearly supported by the Liberal Party
more than the Conservative Party during the period of the Frente .
Given the findings in the previous chapter with respect to patterns
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of support for the industrial sector, this is not surprising. A
sufficient and reliable source of power is essential for the develop-
ment of an industrial sector. If the state is serious about encour-
aging industrialization it has no choice but to either provide or
encourage the development of an adequate energy infrastructure, or
provide support for industrial firms to provide their own. The
former is probably to be preferred to the latter not only because
it is more efficient (at least in the long run) but also because of
theoretical considerations concerning the nature of infrastructure
in the entire economic development process.
The final sector of infrastructure development—communi ca-
tions—was also supported more by the Liberals than the Conservatives
during the Frente period. The relatively urban nature of much com-
munications development as well as this sector's contribution to
national integration in both social and economic spheres were cited
as possible explanations for this finding.
Government support of infrastructure development is a crucial
part of economic development policy. Within the context of a capital-
ist mode of development it is the principal (and only real legitimate)
entry point for productive government involvement in the development
process. But infrastructure development is not in itself neutral to
that process. In other words, the size, scope, and nature of develop-
ment in the industrial and agricultural sectors will be profoundly
influenced by the types of infrastructure which are supported by the
government. The nature of government intervention in the infrastruc-
ture sector will have an effect not only on policies in the industrial
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and agricultural sectors, but the entire economic development
process. The overall implications for economic development policy
of observed variations in the sectoral support of central govern-
ment policy during the Frente are dealt with in the final chapter.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this study we have been concerned with political
variations in economic development policies as applied to several
sectors of Colombian society. In particular, we have been concerned
with the impact of political party affiliation upon variations in
politico-administrative arrangements used to structure state involve-
ment in the economic development process, and in the distribution of
central government resources among the three sectors of economic
development—industry
,
agriculture, and infrastructure. In this
chapter we outline the variations found and discuss the possible
implications of these variations with respect to three areas: 1)
the alignment of internal political power relations; 2) the impact
upon other sectors of economic development; and 3) the political/
economic relationship between Colombia and the rest of the world.
The first of these derives from the fact that hiscorically
,
the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia have tended to be
associated with different sources of power. Some of these sources,
such as specific regional and local identification with one party or
another, probably have little impact upon variations in the substance
of economic development policies. This is not to say that particular
regions or local caciques may not enjoy (or suffer) fluctuations in
the amount of "developmental" resources available from the central
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government on the basis of party affiliation, only that fluctuations
will vary along functional rather than geographical lines. More
importantly, sectoral variations in economic development policy will
be examined with the thought in mind of "who benefited" and "who lost"
from the choices that were made. In other words, we seek to determine
if the variations observed in functional emphasis give us any clue as
to which sectors in Colombian society have been most directly effected.
The second type of impact derives from the limited nature of
the resources mobilized by the central government for economic dev-
elopment purposes. It has been emphasized throughout that economic
development is a multi faceted phenomenon, and that equal attention
cannot be afforded to all of its aspects. Resources channeled toward
one particular sector of economic development necessarily implies
that other possible sectors have not received all that they could.
The balance between the sectoral allocations gives rise to particular
modes of economic growth. These trade-offs within the area of econ-
omic development have implications not only for the subsequent develop-
ment of these particular sectors but the nature of the entire develop-
ment effort as well
.
The final type of impact examined derives from the fact that
the economic development of Colombia has occured (and continues to
occur) in the context of being economically integrated into a world-
wide capitalist system. Specific economic development policies can
be geared to increasing, decreasing, or changing the nature of this
integration. Pol icy_ choices made with respect to this issue have
implications not only for the world economic system but the very
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character that economic development is to assume in Colombia. In
particular, it will affect both the nature and distribution of power
within Colombia as well as the emphasis given to specific types and
sectors of economic developemnt,
Pol itico-Administrati ve Policy
There were several politico-administrative arenas within
which party variation has been examined. The first of these--
administration—concerned both the scope and method of state pene-
tration in the economy. On the basis of evidence used in this study
there appeared to be no systematic difference betv/een the Liberal
and Conservative Parties in terms of scope assumed by the state (or
the public sector) in the economic development process. This finding
tends to confirm the suspicion long held concerning the Liberal and
Conservative Parties in Colombia that the alignment of internal
political power relationships has occurred in the context of a fairly
stable relationship between the public and private sectors. Both
parties tend to embrace the concept of a generally active state as
well as a vigorous private sector. This implies that both the
Liberals and Conservatives have a commitment to the pursuit of economic
development largely through the activities of a strong private sector.
At the same time, both parties tend to mediate involvement in the
domestic economy through the state, and that neither party is ideo-
logically adverse to actively mobilizing state influence, prestige,
and resources in the- national and international arenas for the general
benefit of domestic economic development policy
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This finding indicates only that the Liberals and Conserva-
tives tended to agree on the most general level with the desirability
for (or scope of) active state involvement in the economy. Evidence
developed in this study indicates that there were differences between
the parties in terms of preferred methods and administrative arrange-
ments within that public sector. The Conservative Party tended to
favor more centralized administrative arrangements, with deviations
from this ideal usually in the form of administrative (or functional)
decentralization as opposed to territorial decentralization (or devo-
lution). The Conservatives also tended to favor the use of the state
in the development and support of national level planning. The
Liberal Party tended to favor more decentralized administrative ar-
rangements, particularly those which assumed the character of devo-
lution or territorial decentralization. They also tended to devote
more state resources to project evaluation, programming, and pre-
investment studies.
The observed variation between Liberal and Conservative policy
with respect to the decentralization issue confirms an historical di-
mension of conflict between the two parties. It is difficult to say
how much of the current differences between them can be attributed to
differences in their bases of power as opposed to just tradition. The
type of decentralization favored by the Liberals would tend to actually
delegate power to regional and local levels, and may provide some
patronage which could be distributed among local power elites. Also,
given the traditional Liberal Party strength in most of Colombia's
cities, such a delegation of power could help reinforce the party
186
structure at the local and regional levels. Likewise, the functional
decentralization of power favored by the Conservative Party offers
a source of patronage. However, the patronage resulting from this
type of decentralization does not tend to create local or regionally
based "competitors" to the national government. Instead, while the
"decentralized" units act with a certain degree of autonomy within
their own areas of specialization they are nevertheless part of the
central government and perform functions which are vital to its per-
formance.
The particular type of decentralization used by the govern-
ment in its pursuit of economic development in itself probably has
little effect upon the sectoral distribution of government resources.
The issue seems to be more one of effective control among all sectors
of economic development policy. There are few grounds upon which
to assume a priori that the decisions involved in the sectoral dis-
tribution of development resources are influenced by a preference of
one administrative arrangement over another.
The type of decentralization used probably has more effect
upon Colombia's relationships with other nations, particularly the
United States. Decentralization via the functional route creates
the various decentralized agencies, autonomous and semi-autonomous
instituties which have populated the Colombian administrative land-
scape in recent decades. Many of these agencies are administered
under regulations which permit them to directly contract a debt in
the name of the Colombian government with various external funding
agencies such as the IADB and the IBRD. Decentralization via the
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territorial route increases the resources at the regional and local
levels but does not entail any added capacity on their part to con-
tract a foreign debt. In other words, international capital is much
more likely to flow into Colombia via her decentralized institutes
than through her departments, municipios
, and national territories.
To the extent that this is true the policies of the Conservative Party
have tended to result in the tighter integration of the Colombian
government with those nations and multilateral agencies active in
international finance.
Variations between the Liberals and Conservatives with re-
gard to the planning issue complement the above findings in several
ways. The Conservative Party has tended to devote more attention
to national planning during the Frente period; the Liberal Party,
on the other hand, has tended to devote more attention to project
evaluation and programming. In a sense, these are micro- and macro-
aspects of the same phenomenon. The exercise of planning is concerned
principally with the forecasting and analysis of economic opportun-
ities and constraints, and conditions which affect both. It seeks to
develop appropriate economic development strategies on the basis of
this understanding. Project evaluation and programming, on the other
hand, is more involved in the detailed (and hopefully realistic) ela-
boration of these strategies. In short, good planning but bad pro-
ject evaluation may give you a 100 meter-wide dam on a 150 meter-
wide river, but good project evaluation without good planning may
give you the same dam where there's no river at all. In Colombia
during the period of the Frente , it appears as though it was the
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Conservatives who tended to look for rivers and the Liberals who
built the dams.
Above, we noted that the Conservatives tended to favor that
type of decentralization which at least theoretically permitted the
maximum amount of administrative control. The planning exercise is
much more important than program evaluation in its contribution to
administrative control. Because program evaluation tends to look
only at the "pieces" of development it is difficult to arrive at a
panorama of the entire development process using its focus. On the
other hand, effective planning requires the models upon which it is
built are both valid and reliable— two criteria which, judging from
the record of past experience, are less than certain. Furthermore,
planning tends to ignore the "details" which, unfortunately, tend
to make up the real world. Project evaluation is much more adaptable
for use in the specific development sectors themselves. One par-
ticular sector in which project evaluation, more than planning, is
put to use is industry. The extent to which project evaluation is
used in conjunction with industrial sector development may affect
the relationship between the parties and program evaluation expendi-
tures. It may be that much of the Liberal Party commitment to pro-
gram evaluation has been reflective of its commitment to industrial-
ization as much as any ideal of the effecacy of program evaluation
i tsel f
.
Both planning and project evaluation are necessary for the
successful attraction of international assistance, especially from
multilateral sources such as the United Nations. The tendency of
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the Conservatives to favor planning indicates that they are at least
sensitive to these requirements. The Liberal commitment to project
evaluation is not incompatible with either their end, if it is indus-
trialization, nor their means, if it includes the assistance of
developmental capital from abroad. In short, the evidence linking
the Conservative Party to a policy of desarrollo hacfa afuera via
attention to planning is stronger than that linking the Liberal
Party via attention to program evaluation, neither party has par-
ticularly eschewed the idea of international development assistance.
The final politico-administrative arena within which pol-
itical variations were found was the banking and finance sector.
Overall, the Liberal Party tended to rely more on taxation to finance
development expenditures. The use of taxation may imply that the
Liberals are better able to use the tax mechanism to raise enough
to finance its programs. This may be due to a number of factors
including more vigorous enforcement of tax laws under Liberals, un-
controlled windfall shifts in the treasury balances due to variation
in taxes earned on export sales, or a general bias in the tax struc-
ture away from those sectors where the Liberal Party is most influ-
ential. It should be remembered here that Colombia is one of the
only two countries in South America in which the corporate income
tax is less important than the individual income tax.
The reliance upon taxation for the financing of development
only indirectly impinges upon Colombia's integration into the world
economy. The extent to which the tax is based upon receipts from
multinational corporations is unknown. Given the greater importance
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in Colombia's tax structure of direct taxes on individual incomes,
as well as sales taxes, indicates that levels of taxation may not
be as dependent upon international considerations (other than fluc-
tuations in commodity market prices) as other methods of development
finance such as credit.
Although generally credit financing was preferred by the
Conservatives during the Frente period, variations with respect to
either domestic or international sources was somewhat ambivalent.
The Conservative Party did tend to rely more on domestic credit
institutions than the Liberals, but the record with respect to inter-
national credit institutions was ambiguous. Other evidence has in-
dicated that the Conservative Party has been more receptive to dir-
ect foreign investment than the Liberal Party, but such a finding
only gives an indirect indication of generalized support for inter-
national capital
.
The nature and control of the Colombian credit and banking
system is not a sell explored area. This is particularly true if
one is looking for variations in political party control. The evi-
dence in this study suggests that the Conservative Party stands in
relation to its banking sector in Colombia in much the same way that
the Republican Party stands in relation to the banking sector in the
United States. Influence within the domestic credit institutions by
the Conservatives may also have effects in the strategies adopted
by the various regimes to combat Colombia's chronic inflation. In
other words, the Conservative Party may tend to rely more upon mone-
tary instruments to combat inflation while the Liberals may prefer
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to use fiscal ones.
The influence of the Conservative Party in the domestic
credit sector also may be reflected in the sectoral distribution of
credit. The fact that the banking sector in Colombia has been more
tied to financing imports and exports may have an additional impact.
The most likely bias of such an impact would be toward the agri-
cultural sector and away from the industrial sector. This has been
found to be generally true at the level of private credit to domestic
producers, and there is no reason to belive that its impact upon the
sectoral distribution of public credit would be different.
The implications of a Conservative tendency to prefer domes-
tic credit and a bipartisan tendency to use international credit can
be seen in two ways. We noted earlier that the distinction between
domestic and international sources of development credit has become
increasingly blurred in recent years. This blurring has been due to
both the "internationalization" of Colombia's domestic banking sector,
as well as the "Colombianization" of the previously wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of large international banks. The fact that there was no
apparent party variation with respect to preference for international
credit does not necessarily mean that party variations do not exist.
Instead, it may mean that the definitions used of domestic and inter-
national sources of development credit may not be as mutually exclusive
as would be optimum.
But, the evidence as to no systematic party variation in the
preference for international credit may also imply that both the Lib-
eral and Conservative Parties rely upon international sources of
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finance capital, but then distribute it sectorally according to
their various priorities. In other words, the issue of integration
into the world economy through reliance upon international finance
credit may not really be the principal area distinguishing the
Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia. Instead, the prefer-
ence for international credit may vary with the particular economic
development sectors for which it is sought.
During the period of the Frente
, there were three sectors
into which economic development resources were channeled— industry
,
agriculture, and infrastructure. But these three sectors did not ex-
haust the set of possible sectoral alternatives for which central
government resources could be spent. For example, expenditures on
defense, general administration, education, community services, wel-
fare, health, and public buildings, while they undoubtedly have
developmental implications and consequences, were not included in
the measurement of governmental allocations for economic development.
As may be expected, the distribution of government resources to these
other sectors together make up the majority of central government ex-
penditures .
During the period of the Frente there were political party
variations with respect to the relative emphasis given to the econ-
omic development sectors as a whole versus the other sectors mentioned
above. Overall, the Liberal Party was found to be associated with
a slightly greater proportion of central government resources directed
to the economic development sectors.
This could be indicative of several things. First, is that
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the Liberals have tended to view development more in economic terms
whereas the Conservatives have tended to view it more in socio-
cultural or politico-administrative terms. Such an interpretation
is reinforced if one takes seriously the more "organic" conception
of society embodied in the fundamental ideology of the Conservative
Party. Alternatively, a Conservative preference for utilizing admin-
istrative and regulatory policy rather than direct central government
intervention in the implementation of economic development policy
could also explain the apparent difference. Finally, it may be that
the particular sectors which make up the economic development com-
ponent of Colombian public policy touch more upon those areas which
the Liberal Party has traditionally stressed. The validity of these
explanations may become clearer as we examine the impact of political
party affiliation in the distribution of central government resources
among the three sectors of economic development— industry, agriculture,
and infrastructure.
Industrial Policy
The most visible effects of economic development in Colombia
are in the industrial sector. This is as much due to the essential
role that industrialization has played in all concepts of development
that have been actually considered by policy makers in Colombia since
the 1930s as it is to deliberate modifications in government policy
by either the Liberal or Conservative Parties. The fact that indus-
trialization has come to dominate concepts of economic development
used by both Liberals and Conservatives has great implications in
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terms of their policy responses during the Frente period.
For one thing, there is a much broader array of governmental
options for dealing with the encouragement and regulation of indus-
trial development than for any other sector. Compared to the agri-
cultural and infrastructure sectors, the industrial sector receives
the smallest proportion of actual resource allocations directly from
the central government. But this does not mean that the government's
concern for industrialization is proportionately smaller. Indeed,
most of Colombia's policy of a non-fiscal nature directly related to
economic development is of direct concern to the industrial sector.
Almost all international commercial policy, which among other things
includes balance of payments concerns, tariffs, tax credits and re-
bates, export promotion, credit availability, and exchange rate reg-
ulation is inextricably tied to issues of industrial development
pol icy.
Variations in this type of policy attributable to political
party differences were not discernable from the data used in this
study. From secondary sources and isolated policy examples it would
appear that much of the Colombian government's policy in this area
is as much determined by situational variables, most notably balance
of payments considerations, as by any systematic application of ideo-
logical principles. In other words, although commercial policy is in
many ways basic to industrialization efforts, the latter are often not
directly considered in the formulation of the former.
The differences manifested by the Liberals and Conservatives
in that part of industrialization policy which does consist of direct
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resource allocation from the central government to the industrial
sector have been distinct but not extreme. During the period of
the Frente the Liberal Party has tended to support the direct allo-
cation of resources both to industrial development itself as well
as to the promotion of industrial exports. In each of these areas,
however, the contribtuion of political party differences in explaining
variations in levels of support was not as great as in most other
areas of economic development.
These findings lend tempered evidence to the assertion that
the Liberal Party is more representative of the industrial interests
in Colombia than the Conservative Party. Historically the Liberals
have been quicker than the Conservatives to recognize the political
implications of the industrialization process, as is evidenced by
their specific cultivation of urban labor as a source of support.
The Conservatives, while not as self-consciously as the
Liberals, have also sought the support of urban labor. But perhaps
the most important implication for the internal alignment of power
come not from mass support but rather support from those elements
in Colombian society who are both capable and willing to support the
industrialization process. In other words, given the extent to which
commercial and other policies have been used during the Frente to
encourage industrialization, it is perhaps more relevant to examine
who in Colombian society has stood to benefit from the types of
industrialization policies which have been promulgated.
It has been noted that industrialization in Colombia has
largely resulted not from a conflict between those involved in export
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trade and those who wished to industrialize. Instead, the same
sector which benefited from the development of the coffee exports
initiated the development of the earliest Colombian industries.
This fact has resulted in a system of cooperation (albeit at times
quite strained) between portions of the elite primarily interested
in one or the other of these economic activities.
This interrelationship has become especially important with
the maturation of the industrialization process characteristic of
Colombia--ISI
.
One of the fundamental differences between industrial-
ization spurred by real increases in the level and distribution of
national income and ISI has concerned the nature of the linkages gen-
erated by each. In practice, ISI has not developed the crucial for-
ward and especially backward linkages needed to make industry an
economically viable vehicle of development. Because of this neglect,
industrialization in Colombia has resulted in the substitution of
the importation of finished manufactures advocated in earlier designs
of economic development, with the importation of intermediate capital
goods and raw materials. In effect, the substitution of imports re-
quired in the ISI strategy has resulted in the development of an
industrial sector in Colombia which in many ways is even more depen-
dent upon imports—both financial and material --for its survival.
This dependence has implications for both the development of
other sectors of the Colombian economy as well as Colombia's economic
and political relationships with the rest of the world. In order to
maintain (if not increase) the levels of production achieved in the
industrial sector, an increase in the capacity to import is needed.
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This increase in the capacity to import can be achieved in several
ways— all of which have become increasingly important in recent
years
.
On the domestic front, the ISI derived need to increase the
capacity to import has led to an emphasis on increasing production
in the agrarian sector, especially in those areas geared to production
for export. Land redistribution as a goal of agrarian reform has
been all but abandoned not only in practice (where it never really
got off the ground in the first place) but also in rhetoric. Tax
and credit policies have increasingly been geared toward encouraging
the establishment of export-related enterprise. Also, given the
highly technical and capital oriented character of the drive to in-
crease agricultural productivity, the agrarian sector stands in in-
creasingly strong competition with the industrial sector for available
domestic and international credit.
The other major domestic response to the need to increase
the capacity to import as well as spur productivity in the industrial
sector itself has been the increased drive to expand "non-traditional"
or industrial exports. Given the nature of the Colombian industrial
sector, it is easy to see why such a strategy would be highly desir-
able, but yet also highly improbable in terms of success. Because of
constraints in the size of the market coupled with the highly capital
intensive nature of many ISI industries, their productive capacity far
outstrips their absorption capacity. In other words, the ability to
market the excess productive capacity of Colombian manufactures through
their export would not only greatly increase the economic efficiency
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of the industrial sector but also serve as a source of foreign
exchange
.
Such a state of affairs is, however, highly unlikely for
two reasons. The first is that the same exchange rate policies which
benefit the industrial sector through overvaluation of domestic
currency also lowers the real return on exports. A policy to encour-
age export production of manufactures through exchange rate manipu-
lation would have the effect of making needed industrial imports
more expensive in terms of local currency.
A related and' possibly more important reason that the promo-
tion of industrial exports as a policy option would be extremely
difficult in Colombia concerns the trading policies of the nations
which would ostensibly serve as their market. Colombian manufactures
would most likely not be very competitive on the world market. Un-
less the Colombian government were to subsidize industrial production
to make it more competitive, or unless the nations receiving Colombian
manufactured exports were to allow them entry as a sort of "back door"
approach to aid, the expansion of Colombia's industrial sector via
export expansion would be highly problematic no matter whether either
the Liberals or Conservatives encouraged it.
The policies of those elements outside of the national govern-
ment responsible for the development of ISI in Colombia, particularly
the multinational corporations, are just as important as variations
between Liberals and Conservatives for further expansion of the indus-
trial market. Indistrial expansion in Colombia has proceeded with
substantial direct and indirect infusion of foreign capital. Although
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formal ownership of new industrial enterprises must be at least 51
percent Colombian, other important elements such as effective control
over patents, trademarks, production processes, and many factor in-
puts remain with the parent company.
In much the same way that the expansion of Colombia's indus-
trial exports depends upon the trade policies of the developed coun-
tries, it also depends upon the internal policies of the multinational
corporations involved in the industrial sector. The shift from bi-
lateral to multi-lateral sources of official developmental capital
only exacerbates this trend. The increasing integration of the
Colombian industrial sector wi.th the rest of the world economy in
terms of both domestic operations and international expansion only
highlights the interdependency of Liberal efforts to expand indus-
trialization and Conservative efforts to increase agricultural pro-
ductivity. In other words, the nature that the industrialization
process has assumed in Colombia has narrowed the boundaries within
which the Liberals and Conservative Parties can effectively afford
to disagree.
Agricultural Policy
Economic development in Colombia has always hinged upon the
development of the rural sector. Therefore it has been essential for
both the Liberals and Conservatives to devote a substantial proportion
of state resources for its development. Indeed, along with infra-
structure, the rural sector has absorbed the greatest bulk of resources
targeted to achieve economic development. Neither party, therefore,
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could afford to neglect the development of the rural sector. More
importantly, the sources from which both Liberals and Conservatives
drew their strength and support most often are either well rooted
in or have strong ties to the rural sector. Even the Liberal Party,
which has a stronger support base in most Colombian cities than the
Conservative Party, has depended upon the development of the country-
side.
Within the countryside itself, the implications of the ob-
served patterns of support upon domestic power arrangements is re-
vealing. The more traditional modes of involvement in the agricul-
tural sector, which include support for such things as agricultural
and ranching improvement, the development of primary materials, and
the conservation of national resources, apparently derive more support
from the Conservative Party. Those portions of the agriculture sector
which are involved in agricultural research and extension and the
promotion of agricultural exports ahve been supported more by the
Liberal Party.
This pattern of support implies that that part of the agrarian
sector which is more geared to the external market and biased toward
the development of new agricultural technologies may have a different
basis of support than the morp traditional subsistence and domestically
oriented part. In terms of economic power the part represented by the
former may be most important, but in terms of numbers of people effected
it may be the latter. Government support for agricultural research
and development is more likely to have a direct impact on fewer people
in the countryside than government support for more traditional agri-
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cultural concerns.
In this sense, Liberal support for those particular sectors
of agricultural development may have several results. First, the
traditional sources of power in the countryside may tend to be under-
cut in the long run. Unless most agricultural research and develop-
ment is being devoted to increasing small-holder productivity and/or
techniques which may be used by farmers of modest means, one likely
result would be the relative decrease in the importance of this type
of agriculture. The introduction of new agricultural techniques and
the integration of the agrarian sector into the world commodity market
both are extremely disruptive of old patterns of social and economic
relationships.
A related point concerns the beneficiaries of a policy of
export promotion. Unlike most other areas within the rural sector,
resources devoted to export promotion are more likely to be channeled
not to the agrarian sector itself but to the merchants and middlemen
responsible for marketing the commodity. In other words, the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of this type of policy are the least likely of
all the areas in rural development to actually be involved in the
direct production of agricultural products.
Finally, the disrupted network of relationships are more
«
likely to be reformed along lines congruent with "modern" productive
techniques, that is, the "proletarianization" of the countryside.
The Liberal Party most likely has less to lose in the restructuring
of relationships in the countryside than the Conservative Party.
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Not only does the Liberal Party have a stronger base of support in
the urban areas, but also the effects of la violencia were probably
more disruptive of Liberals in the countryside than Conservatives.
Whether those in the countryside most directly effected by the changes
in rural relationships subsequently find their way into Liberal Party
ranks is problematic. Instead, we are arguing that rural sector
changes implied by this type of support are just as likely to dis-
rupt networks which tend to benefit the Conservative Party, if not
more so.
The finding of little systematic party difference in support
for the mining sector, as well as agrarian reform, has few apparent
implications for the alignment of internal political power relation-
ships. It was hypothesized that variations in agrarian reform policy
may be obscured by the change in the definition of the concept during
the Frente period. The acceptance of this shift from a definition
based on land redistribution to one based on unit productivity by
both parties indicates that the rural peasentry is not a powerful
force in either party. The transformation of the countryside im-
plied in this shift would most likely benefit a similar strata in-
dependently of party affiliation.
The patterns of party variation described above also have
implications for the other sectors of economic development. At the
broadest level, support for the rural sector has been at the expense
of the infrastructure sectors. Most of this is because the central
government contribution to the industrial , sector has been relatively
small compared to the two other sectors. The rural sector is linked
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to the industrial sector largely via infrastructure related invest-
ments. The extent to which infrastructure development is sacrificed
to rural sector development will tend to inhance the relative isolation
of the latter. The transformation of the rural sector without infra-
structure linkages either to the domestic market or the international
market is extremely unlikely. The ability of the rural sector to
complement industrial development is also impeded.
Subsectoral variations in rural sector support is also likely
to have repercussions in other economic development areas. The promo-
tion of both agricultural research and development, and export promotion
tends to complement the development of not only industry but also infra-
structure. Agricultural research and development, like industry, is
geared toward increasing output per unit input. Also, the input unit
most likely stressed in agricultural research, like industry, is
capital. Furthermore, as much agricultural research and development
is concerned with the use of various insecticides, fertilizers, new
seed varieties, and the like, there needs to be a source for these
products. These agricultural inputs are more often than not the
outputs of a particular portion of the industrial sector (or an
industry based outside of Colombia). Finally, the promotion of
agricultural exports in the long run provides the capital needed to
develop new industry through its earning of foreign exchange and its
contribution to the amount of surplus available for industrial develop-
ment.
It is through the rural sector that Colombia has been and
continues to be most linked to the rest of the world. The over-
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whelming bulk of Colombia's legal and illegal foreign exchange
earnings have come from her rural sector. In many ways, the support
given to it by successive governments has served as the basis for
further development not only of the agrarian sector itself but the
industrial and infrastructure sectors as well.
It is interesting to note that that part of the rural sector
which is most directly linked to the integration of Colombia into
the world market—the promotion of agricultural exports— has been
associated with Liberal Party support. It was noted earlier that
the Conservative Party has been more associated with those political
and administrative arrangements which have accomplished precisely
this tie. The fact that it is the Liberal Party and not the Con-
servative Party which has tended to support those developments in
the rural sector which accomplish the same thing appears at first
glance to be incongruous.
This apparent anomaly can be explained best if we keep in
mind the domestic function which the promotion of agricultural ex-
ports fulfills. Foreign exchange earned from Colombian exports can
be used to do a number of things. During the period of the Frente
one of the principal uses to which foreign exchange was put was the
importation of capital goods for Colombia's industrialization effort.
In fact, the development of industrial izaiton has been the consequence
if not the goal of many of the policies pursued in the rural sector.
The promotion of agricultural research and development, as
well as more traditipnal agrarian concerns, may or may not have a
direct bearing on Colombia's integration into the world market.
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Whether it does or not depends largely upon the nature of the research
being done and the type of agricultural production being encouraged.
If most agricultural research and development is designed to increase
the production of commodities which are destined for the world market,
central government support would be indicative of fostering desarrollo
hacia afuera
.
On the other hand, if research and development efforts
are systematically biased toward increasing self sufficiency or in-
creased production for the domestic market, desarrollo hacia adentro
may be more characteristic. Unfortunately, the data upon which this
study is based do not distinguish allocations along these dimensions.
But inasmuch as resources for agricultural research and development
are most likely geared to production for a market—either domestic
or international —rather than subsistence, increased integration in
a philosophical and ideological, if not economic sense, is likely to
be the net result.
Infrastructure Pol icy
The infrastructure sectors—transportation , power and communi-
cations—have been the major recipient of direct central government
resources for economic development throughout the period of the Frente
This has most likely come about for a number of reasons, the most im-
portant being the sel f-percei ved role of the government in the develop
ment process. Throughout this study we have emphasized that Colombian
economic growth policies have taken place within the context of a
dependent, capitalist mode of development. As such, the government
has had to justify direct intervention into the agricultural and indus
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trial sectors, and has for the most part left the development of
these sectors up to private entrepreneurs. The infrastructure
sectors, on the other hand, represent a legitimate if not crucial
area within which direct government intervention is permitted.
The Liberal Party was found to have devoted a relatively
greater proportion of central government resources to the development
of infrastructure during the period of the Frente
. They were also
found to have given greater relative support for the development of
highways as well as the energy and communications sectors. The
Conservative Party has been found to give greater relative support
to the transportation sector in general and the development of water
and air transportation in particular.
These findings present interesting clues as to the alignments
of internal political power relationships during the Frente period.
It was noted earlier that infrastructure principally serves as a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of two
other sectors of economic devel opment--industry and agriculture. If
we view infrastructure development as a whole as being concerned with
the creation and strengthening of internal linkages between and within
these sectors, the Liberal Party more than the Conservative Party has
been involved.
This may derive in part from the differences in the basis of
support for the two parties. We have noted that while both parties
have their roots in rural sector support, the Liberals have been
relatively stronger .in urban areas. Liberal support for infrastruc-
ture development may be reflective of their greater concern with
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maintaining this broader support base. Such a view is strenghtened
when we consider the patterns of internal migration brought about
by both la violencia and the nature of the urbanization process.
The maintenance or this broader support base through develop-
ment of the infrastructure also has implications for the other sectors
of economic development. Unless it is taken from other areas of
governmental concern, infrastructure support will necessarily be at
the expense of our other sectors of economic development. In this
way, Liberal support for infrastructure may indicate a tendency on
their part to subscribe more faithfully to the tenets of "liberal"
economic development; they may be less willing to utilize the re-
sources of the central government in those sectors which fundamental
party ideology has indicated belong in the realm of private sector
development. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, may balance
its concern in the infrastructure sectors with more active involve-
ment in the other sectors of economic development, particularly agri-
cul ture.
The general development of infrastructure impinges upon Colom-
bian political and economic relationships to the rest of the world
in an ambiguous fashion. In one sense, development of the infra-
structure sectors would result in a greater capacity for Colombia
to deal with the external world as an integrated unit rather than
isolated economic sectors. Throughout Colombian history, relations
between various regions and cities and the rest of the world often
have been easier to maintain than relations between these regions
and cities themselves. The strengthening of these internal linkages
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may be indicative of a desire for greater relative autonomy, at
least at the national level, in economic dealings.
On the other hand, increased infrastructure development may
also ultimately aid in the increased integration of Colombia into
the world-wide economic system. This is particularly plausible
given the changing nature of that system, especially its reorienta-
tion toward aiding domestic production (in the periphery) for the
domestic market rather than importation of finished goods for that
domestic market. Infrastructure developments aid in the production
and distribution of goods within the entire area affected by the
infrastructure network, irrespective of who is doing the producing
and distributing. As multinational corporations become integrated
into the domestic productive capacity (largely in the industrial
sector), they stant to benefit at least as much as native domestic
producers in the increase in market size and lowering of factor
costs brought about by infrastructure development.
These general observations can be brought into greater focus
when considering the .particular sectors which make up infrastructure
development. The alignment of internal political power relationships
as reflected in sectoral distribution of infrastructure investments
indicates that the Liberal Party, with its preferences manifested in
the energy and communications sectors, and the highway component of
the transportation sector, has aimed not only to increase domesitc
economic linkages but to do so within the context of a strong domes-
tic industrial sector and increasingly urban society. This twin
thrust implies that the basis of Liberal Party support may be shifting
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to a broader representation of domestic elites which would draw
support from all sectors of Colombian society affected by the mod-
ernization process whether in the urban or rural sectors.
The patterns of support manifested by the Liberals and Con-
servatives within and among the various infrastructure sectors also
specifically impacts upon the development of both the urban and
rural sectors. The complementary nature of the Liberals' support
for direct central government involvement in the industrialization
sector and their support of the above noted sectors of infrastructure
development implies a' relative neglect of the agriculture sector.
More specifically, the Liberal Party's emphasis upon the development
of power facilities, and communications and highway networks would
tend to serve the development of the urban sector more than the rural
sector. The areas of Conservative Party support among the infra-
structure sectors--mari time and air transportation—do not have visible
implications for their concomitant support for the agricultural sector.
In other words, Conservative support for the development of these
particular areas of infrastructure most likely draws from a motive
other than complementary support of the agricultural sector, and has
relatively less to offer in facilitating overall rural development.
The most likely implications of Conservative Party support
for maritime and air transportation are in Colombia's political and
economic relationship with the rest of the world. Maritime transpor-
tation particularly would serve to strengthen Colombia's capacity to
participate more economically in world trade, and improved air trans-
portation would facilitate the movement of the people concerned with
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making those decisions. The crucial role of agriculture in Colombia's
world trade involvement provides us with the principal link between
Conservative support for maritime and air transportation and its
support for agricultural development. In other words, the sectors
of infrastructure development supported by the Conservative Party
principally complement the development of only one part of the rural
sector--that part concerned with production capable of earning foreign
exchange.
Patterns of Liberal support among sectors of infrastructure
development have less' direct, but perhaps in the long run more im-
portant, implications for the integration of Colombia into the world
market. In the past, the limited size of the market has served to
limit the penetration of not only domestic but international manu-
factures into Colombia, except for particular regional enclaves and
for certain types of capital and consumer goods. The creation of
an infrastructure in Colombia which is not only compatible with, but
in many ways geared to, an urban life-style and high technology-
dependent production .processes serves to enlarge and strengthen the
domestic market. Coupled with the increased internal integration of
of the Colombian market, production and distribution within that
market will become both easier and more economical. The demands of
this market may be met either domestically or internationally, and if
current trends are an indication of future conditions, even domestic
production (particularly in manufacturing) is likely to become in-
creasingly "internationalized." In short, the increased internal
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integration of Colombia's domestic economy may also serve as an in-
centive to the increased integration between that economy and the
world.
General Cone! usions
The relationship between the Liberal and Conservative Parties
in Colombia has been defined over the course of more than a century
of cooperation and conflict. The issues which have defined this
relationship have changed during this period, with many of the
original political dimensions becoming more relevant as a source of
cooperation than conflict. The institutionalization of political
cooperation through the structure of the Frente Nacional has led
many observers to assume that no slaient differences remain between
the parties except in rhetoric. Issues of federalism, church-state
relations, and society-state relations, while still important in
the fundamental ideologies of both parties, have become increasingly
irrelevant in their operation ideology. Much of the practical trans-
cendence of these issues is attributable to the process of economic
growth— a process which has been dependent upon both Liberal and Con-
servative Party initiative.
While many aspects of economic growth are determined by the
inherent dynamic of the process itself, we have seen in Colombia a
deliberate attempt to structure particular aspects of the process
along ideological lines. Evidence of political variation in economic
development policies as manifested through the sectoral distribution
of government resources does not necessarily imply that the Liberal
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and Conservative Parties in Colombia respectively represent alter-
native solutions to the problems of modernization. Quite the con-
trary, this study has demonstrated that the policy priorities of
the Liberals and Conservatives have tended to complement one another
in the achievement of economic growth and a "modern" society. At
the most abstract level, many of the variations between Liberals
and Conservatives in economic development policy represent different
aspects of the same overall process. This complementarity can be
seen not only in the domestic sphere of alignments of internal pol-
itical power relationships and sectoral distribution of emphases in
economic policy, but also in the international sphere of Colombia's
political and economic relations with the rest of the world.
In the domestic political sphere, the ideological differ-
ences in economic development policy in Colombia reflect differ-
ences in the basis of support for the two political parties. Both
Liberals and Conservatives have drawn upon all sectors of Colombian
society for political support, but it has been the Liberal Party
which has most actively sought to mobilize the strength of support
based on the transformations brought about by economic growth in
Colombia. That is to say that the Liberal Party has tended to draw
relatively more support from that sector which represents the in-
creasingly industrialized and "modern" character of Colombia— its
urban sector. The conservative Party, on the other hand, has tended
to reinforce and expand its ties in the traditional income generating
sector of the economy—the rural sector.
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The limits to which this cleavage will represent an important
dimension in the years to come will be dependent not only on the nature
of growth generated in the urban and industrialized sectors but also
the nature of growth generated in the increasingly "modern" rural
sector. If, as some observers argue, industrialization in its current
form has for the most part run its course, the future economic growth
of Colombia may be seen to lie more and more in its rural sector.
But, the development of the rural sector, even if spearheaded by the
Conservative Party, does not obviate the fact that Colombia's indus-
trialized sector is a permanent part of its political and economic
scene. The extent to which these sectors represent an important
part of Liberal Party support would most likely act as a real con-
straint to the development of the rural sector at the expense of the
urban sector.
A perhaps clearer manifestation of the interrrel atedness of
the Liberal and Conservative Parties lies not in their respective
bases of political support but in the very nature of their economic
development policies themselves. As in many other countries, the
economic surplus generated in Colombia's rural sector has been used
to foster economic growth outside of that sector. The principal
target of this redirected economic surplus has been the industrial
sector, and the principal political agents responsible have been
within the Liberal Party. But, because the. rural sector has not only
been the source of economic strength but also the basis of further
economic growth via ISI, both parties have manifested a direct in-
terest in its development. This is due to the peculiarities of both
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industrialization via import substitution as well as rural develop-
ment via the expansion of export oriented agriculture. Both of
these are inseparable when considering the present character of
Colombian economic development and its potential in the future.
The industrialization and infrastructure developments which
generally have been attributed in this study to the systematic support
of the Liberal Party would not have been possible without the develop-
ment of an export-oriented agriculture sector. Likewise, the rural
sector developments generally attributed to the systematic support
of the Conservative Party make little sense except in the context
of expanding industrialization and urbanization. Specific Liberal
Party support for those parts of the agricultural sector which would
most directly benefit the industrial sector demonstrates that they,
more than the Conservatives, have recognized the interrel atedness of
these two aspects
.
But, Colombia is still predominantly an agrarian country.
The transformation of its rural sector exclusively into a source of
foreign exchange could be beneficial to economic development only
in the very short run, if at all. The nature of industrialization
in Colombia is such that its expansion in terms of productivity com-
pletely outstrips its capacity to absorb labor as well as to market
what it has produced. The extent to which Conservative Party inspired
policy in the rural sector may serve to absorb this supply of labor,
as well as provide a market for its product, could be of crucial im-
portance in the survival of both the urban and rural sectors.
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This capacity in large part depends upon the nature and
extent of Colombia's economic integration. This study has found
that both the Liberal and Conservative Parties have supported econ-
omic development policies which have encouraged integration, albeit
in slightly different ways. As evidenced particularly in the infra-
structure sectors, the Liberal Party has tended to pursue those pol-
icies which have facilitated the integration of Colombia's domestic
market; the Conservative Party's priorities in this area have chiefly
served to strengthen Colombia's integration into the international
market. This may in part be due to differences in the basis of
economic growth pursued respectively by the parties. The expansion
of industrialization in Colombia to a large part depends upon the
development of a domestic market, which in turn can be promoted by
increased internal economic integration. The development of an ex-
port-oriented agricultural sector, likewise, is in part a function of
increased international economic integration.
The interrelatedness of the two especially concerns the for-
mer—domestic integration. In the past, Colombian ties to the rest
of the world have largely been limited to the rural export sector
and certain urban areas. With increased internal economic integration,
Colombia begins to resemble an economic system in itself. As a con-
sequence, the potential for economic integration into the world econ-
omic system becomes greater. This is because Colombia's more tightly
integrated domestic system represents a market which is both broader
and deeper than that, which existed before. The economic incentives
(for both domestic as well as foreign producers) for partaking in an
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an integrated Colombian market are greater than those accruing to
a more restricted and limited one. The mushrooming foreign involve-
ment in the industrial izaiton of Colombia via the multinational cor-
porations represents a recognition of this interrelationship. The
respective policies pursued by the Liberal and Conservative Parties
with respect to integration each represent a crucial aspect of this
development; neither's policies alone are responsible.
The final point, perhaps, best captures the developmental
impact of policy variations between Colombia's political parties.
Differences in fundamental ideology aside, neither party represents
an alternative vision of economic development. The policy differences
which have been manifested in the operative dimension of their
respective ideologies instead represent differing emphases in what
is essentially the same mode of development. Colombia can ignore
neither its past nor its objective place in the world system. Neither
party, at least during the period of the Frente Nacional , has really
attempted to overcome this situation using a particularly "Liberal"
or "Conservative" set of policy responses. Instead, both the Liberal
and Conservative Parties have evolved policy responses which together
represent, in a very real sense, a uniquely "Colombian" solution.
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APPENDIX I
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
The overall focus of this study was to assess the extent to
which changes in the development policy of the Republic of Colombia
during most of the period of the Frente Nacional and two of the years
immediately thereafter (1961-1976) could be attributed to the oper-
ative dimension of the ideologies of the Liberal and Conservative
Parties. The operational ization of the concept of ideology consisted
of actual central government support given to various development
policy options, grouped according to the economic function or sector
toward which such support was targeted. Systematic preference for
one type of policy as opposed to another was taken as indicative of
partisan ideological support for that policy area.
Variabl es
The raw data used in the statistical analysis performed in
this study consisted of both interval and nominal level data. The
independent or predictive variables used were nominal in nature, and
consisted of political party affiliation of the president and finance
minister. Each independent variable consisted of two categories--
218
Liberal Party membership or Conservative Party membership.
The control variables and dependent variables both were in-
terval in scale. There were four control variables-total government
246
247
expenditures in each year, the budget deficit in the previous year,
the anticipated government revenues for the' year, and the amount of
official external financing in the form of loans and grants from
the United States' AID Program, the International Bank of Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD), the Interamerican Development
Bank (IDB), the International Development Association (IDA), and
219
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). These raw data
were transformed into percentages for the purpose of analysis. The
total government expenditure was expressed as percent of the GDP;
the budget deficit as the proportion of government expenditures
financed the previous year through deficit measures; the anticipated
government revenues as the proportion of anticipated revenues actually
received; and official external financing as proportion of actual
disbursements allocated to a particular economic sector.
The dependent variables were interval in nature. The raw
data consisted of actual expenditures of the central government for
220
each year from 1961 to 1976. The expenditures were classified
and grouped according to a functional classification categorizing
all government expenditures according to one of over 130 different
functions.
221
These individual functions were grouped together to
represent various sectors and subsectors of development policy. In
order to facilitate analysis, the absolute expenditures within these
categories were then transformed into proportions. For example, if
the absolute expenditure for agrarian reform in a given year were
X,
and the absolute expenditure on all programs in the agricultural
248
sector in that same year were Y, the proportion of agricultural ex-
penditures devoted to agrarian reform would be X/Y.
Methodology
The statistical methodology employed was a Multiple Classi-
fication Analysis (MCA) based on a two-way analysis of variance. 222
Conceptually akin to multiple regression using dummy variables, MCA
is a multivariate statistical procedure designed to assess the impact
of one or more categorical or nominal level variables upon an interval
level -dependent variable. In this study, it was used to assess the
impact of political party affiliation upon the proportion of actual
government expenditures devoted to particular economic development
sectors in Colombia.
In addition, a set of interval level covariates, or control
variables was included in the analysis. The relationship between
party affiliation and .levels of support for various developmental
expenditures was assessed after the effects of the control variables
upon expenditure patters were controlled or "partialed out." In
other words, analysis was based on the additional contribution of
political party affiliation in explaining expenditure preferences
after accounting for variations in these levels caused by all other
variables included in the study.
Three types of information from this analysis are contained
in each relevant table in the text. The first consists of the
average adjusted proportion of central government expenditure tar-
geted to a particular development sector by presidents and finance
24Q
ministers of each party. It is important to note that these figures
do not represent the actual proportion of expenditures. For each
case, the actual proportion was adjusted to account for variations
caused by the four control variables. These adjusted proportions
were then averaged for each category of the independent variables
producing the figures shown in the tables.
The second type of information contained in the tables is
the partial beta. This statistic is analogous to a standardized
partial regression coefficient, and is associated with each of the
independent variables. In effect, the partial beta provides an
indication of the relative ability of the independent variable
(party affiliation) to explain variation in the dependent variable
(government support for a given type of policy) after accounting
for the effects of all other variables. These variables include
not only the control variables indicated above, but also the inde-
pendent variable not under consideration. For example, the partial
beta associated with the political party affiliation of the presi-
dent indicates the effect of that variable upon the dependent var-
iable after controlling for not only the control variables but also
the political party affiliation of the finance minister. The par-
tial beta is interpreted to be the amount of change in the indepen-
dent variable needed to produce a change of one standard deviation
in the dependent variable. Therefore, the larger the partial beta,
the greater the change in the value of the dependent variable assoc-
iated with a change in political party.
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The final type of information derived from MCA analysis is
the multiple correlation coefficient, R. This coefficient, when
squared, indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent
variable which can be explained by all independent and control var-
iables together.
Footnotes
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Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, Mul tiple
Classificat ion Anal ysis: A Report o n a Computer Prog ram for Regres -
sion Using Categorical Predictors (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center,
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967).
i
251
I

